The problem is that whilst, yes, unique and constantly rotating randomness is used to establish unique session keys, the session keys are derived from the random nonce that's an encryption of the network selected randomness. In other words if you have the SIM key, you can figure out what the session keys also were. Ultimately the standard SIMs don't seem to use asymmetric crypto anywhere, meaning a compromise of the SIM key still allows you to undo all the encryption. Ultimately everything is derived from these shared keys.
And yes the problem of 2G downgrade attacks remain. There doesn't seem to be any good solution for those short of phasing out 2G entirely.
It would be a huge service to humanity if you summarized your findings and published them, with references to the specs...
3G/4G somehow uses random, short lived keys for encrypted communication, which change frequently enough to be a pain.
EDIT: It has been a while since I studied this, but I believe the shared key is used for trust - that this isn't a fake base station and the client is who they say they are. Then they use the equivalent of public key cryptography to establish short lived encryption keys. Stealing keys would probably enable a MitM only?