I'm in Australia where there's a system of dividend imputation. That means that together with dividends one will receive franking credits representing tax that a company has already paid. This has another advantage of really benefitting shareholders on a low income, few as there may be. The corporate tax rate is 30%. The highest marginal tax rate for the median income earner is 32.5%, meaning dividends, as paid out, will typically attract an effective 2.5% tax. Wonderful.
For someone receiving 70c in dividends and earning under $18k a year, they will get another 30c back through their tax return.
It's a pretty nice system and it's astonishing to me that the vast majority of other countries don't do this. It also means that domestic shareholders are advantaged over foreign ones.
Then there's also the government restriction on mergers/acquisitions among the four big banks, which provides stability, consumer benefits, a nice dividend for the shareholders - it provides an actual desire by the banks to create value.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualified_dividend#cite_ref-4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rate_schedule_(federal_income_t...
I suppose "stability" is one upside of a government supported quasi-monopoly. Australian banks are an absolute disgrace. I say that as an Australian who returns home from time to time. Charging $2.50 to withdraw money from an ATM?? They get away with gouging customers in ways that simply couldn't happen in the UK or US.
2. Only if you use an ATM not run by your bank or not in your bank's network. There's near enough always going to be a cluster of four ATMs corresponding to the four big banks in any area, at least one of which will be free to withdraw from.
3. Get an account with ING Direct and they will refund you any ATM fees, even those charged by other companies.
Disgrace? Please.
I've shuttled back and forth between the two countries for seven years now, and I can tell you, unequivocally, that you're speaking out of your bumhole.
Visa PayWave transactions in Australia, in July 2014: 58 million
All contactless transactions in the UK, in September 2014: 32 million
And with ING Direct offering 2% cashback (and some banks doing a promotional 5%) on all contactless transactions under $100 things are good. And in the UK contactless is limited to less than A$40, while in Australia it's A$100.
I will say that it is a complete mess. A lot of businesses today treat their customers and employees like garbage. On the other hand a lot of of the existing unions are parasitic so I understand criticisms on both sides. I can only suggest that it is because we have a very bad form of corporatism run amok in the US. Where regulation does exist it tends to support large companies (which I suppose is not much different from the picture in the 1970s).
The left is afraid of big heartless business. The right is afraid of big inefficient government. We have a wonderful mix of both. Both sides are too busy screaming about the splinter in the other's eye that they miss the log in their own.
> Nationalized and regulated businesses were stable, but seemed inefficient. They had no incentive to take risks to improve. The history of the Reagan era is well known, so that doesn't have to be repeated here, but reviewing the history of deregulation is useful. What seems to happen in deregulation of regulated monopolies is that a large number of new companies enter the field, and prices go down. Then most of the new companies go bust, and the winners consolidate. The result tends to be deregulated monopolies.
How do you combat this? Both seem less than satisfactory.
Hacker News barely supports links, and you want footnotes?
Volatility and CEO pay, Harvard Business Review: https://hbr.org/2011/06/volatility-the-nasty-truth-abo.html
AT&T breakup and reassembly: http://gadgets.boingboing.net/gimages/atthistory.jpg
Union decline: http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674725119
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Aren't they better for stockholders as well?
Suppose I have 1 share of stock, and I will sell it two years from now.
If the company pays out dividends, won't those be taxed as income at my marginal rate? Whereas if the company does a stock buy back, then two years down the road the marginal value that would have been paid out in dividends is now captured in the stock price. So instead of paying the marginal rate, I pay capital gains on that amount.
I might be missing something, but it seems like a tax dodge that benefits all (except the government).
With dividends, you pay the tax immediately/that year.
With capital gains, you don't pay until you sell.
If one looks long-term enough, you could also sell when you are in a lower income tax bracket or the government has lowered capital gains for random political reasons.
I'm Canadian, and we have something similar. But it only applies to corporations that are resident in Canada (where Canadian corporate taxes are paid on retained earnings?). I think the intent is to recognize the tax already paid on earnings, not necessarily to make it like taxable like capital gains... but it's all a wash.
It seems that qualified dividends in U.S. are limited in similar ways.
My confusion makes sense in retrospect: I have generally held stock from U.S. markets, so I don't often benefit from the credit. I believe dividends were always counted directly as taxable income.
So... supposing that you're in the U.S. and your stock isn't U.S.-based, wouldn't buybacks always be more tax favorable?
Of course, I guess the argument for it is that it has the favorable effect of encouraging capital investment, that's what it's supposed to do right? I am curious what evidence there is of how well it does that.
According to wikipedia, capital gains were taxed as ordinary income in the U.S. until 1921, and the history since then have gone up and down -- but are currently at their historical low. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_gains_tax_in_the_United....
Most people who follow financial news know that share buybacks increase EPS, but Animats goes a whole level deeper.
As we found out from Wall Street's behavior during the recent crash, executives are rational actors, and what they want is as much as they can take, economy be damned.
None of the examples you give show this. What they show is that, because of flaws in corporate governance, things that do not maximize shareholder value are being done in the name of "maximizing shareholder value".
I don't follow the logic at all; other than altruism, why would anyone buy shares of a company that wasn't trying to make an excellent sustainable profit over time / increase its share value?
Because they're not trying to make money from the shares increasing in value sustainably; they're trying to make money in other ways. A couple of examples:
* Buying some shares, creating a bubble that causes those shares to increase in value non-sustainably, then selling the shares before the bubble pops;
* Getting compensated in stock options with a low exercise price, taking short-term actions that cause the share price to rise non-sustainably, exercising the options and selling the stock at a higher share price, then using a golden parachute to leave the company, letting others pay the price for the non-sustainable actions.
It was clear long before then. There was a lot of fear of the USSR's military capability, but not their economy. One obvious example was Kansas was shipping wheat to the USSR starting in the early 70's to make up for Soviet agricultural shortfalls.
The GDP charts I've seen seem to support the latter: the USSR's developing economy grew significantly faster than the US's developed economy for a sustained period of several decades. The "collapse" of the USSR didn't look so much like an adjustment (i.e. what you would expect if those numbers were completely fictitious) but rather a leveling off of growth. As for your "obvious example," 1. importing food is not necessarily indicative of a shortfall and 2. from what I understand, the central government of the USSR occasionally starved sizable chunks of its population for political reasons rather than due to actual shortfalls (e.g. while simultaneously exporting food).
Where did you get this? Stock buybacks are commonplace in Japan. Try and search "TOB 株" or "株式公開買い付け" on Google News (use Google Translate if you can't read Japanese).
Non-dividend-paying stocks are much less common than in the US, but that doesn't mean that buybacks aren't allowed.
How are buybacks a tax dodge? If they have the desired effect of boosting share price, then there will be increased taxes paid by shareholders when those positions are exited, no?
Also, some people will need dividends for cash flow needs.
Let's see what happens to two companies, one of which pays 10% dividend each year, and the other which increases in price 10% each year. Use a tax rate of 15%.
The first company: Every year we get 10% dividend, pay 15% tax on that, have 8.5% post tax dividend. Reinvest in company.
value = initial * (1.085)^nyears
The second company: Every year it increases in value by 10%. If we ever were to sell we would have to pay 15% tax on appreciation.
value = initial + initial * (1.1^nyears-1) * 0.85
Dividends, interest, and repurchases aren't the whole picture. Especially when funders are also insiders, a variety of other (sometimes "soft") benefits reward investment. Much corporate behavior studied in the vein of management conflicts of interest relates to executive compensation and other benefits that may or may not contribute to personal tax base. There is also the matter of trade in securities based on valuation, on public markets and otherwise, by investors of all stripes. Many listed companies have never paid a dividend and probably won't ever pay a dividend. S-1s for well subscribed IPOs often warn pro forma this will be the case. Companies may also adjust the amount and kind of risk they bear to align with one constituency at the expense of another (e.g. management over outsiders, well organized institutional investors over the masses).
While leveraged buyouts are by no means dead, PE is far more than LBOs. The industry predates and has long outlived the 80s LBO boom. The term is a broad umbrella over many different kinds of operators leveraging (or suffering under) various features of our tax system.
Debt and equity still enjoy different rights in liquidation, and contractual covenants and controls accompanying credit are different than rights assigned to equity holders by statute, governing documents, financing agreements, securities laws, and exchange rules. Like the time-remote possibility of dividends from a growth company, different spots in line to the coffer of a healthy operation still affect valuation. Derivatives and public markets can facilitate decoupling of control rights from equity. Instruments can be designed to blend equity and debt characteristics. But debt and equity still confer different rights to affect operations.
It is difficult to speak of stock buybacks out of context; their use is varied, from purely financial to entirely structural. They are not entirely "unregulated", either. Background state corporate law, governing documents, exchange rules, and contracts (including debt documents) impose restrictions on when and how. The board is involved. Markets, public and private, may take note.
It is also difficult to make tax arguments out of context. Even statements about the macroeconomic effects of certain policies have to turn on the prevalence and kinds of tax situations meaningful populations of companies inhabit. Tying the tax effect to rising executive compensation requires at least time-correlating tax policy changes to compensation. I'm not sure that's borne out. There are many additional confounding variables.
Thanks for sharing your opinions. You've got some good back-and-forth started.
Edit: Changed "bankruptcy-remote", which is a term of art in bankruptcy, to "healthy", which makes the point with less risk of confusion.
We on "Hacker Digest" (actually curious, do some people call it that?) would kind of appreciate that.
Much corporate behavior studied in the vein of management conflicts of interest relates to executive compensation and other benefits that may or may not contribute to personal tax base.
Er, yes. Problems include "pay for volatility". If the CEO gets an option grant at market every year, and the stock price is flat, the option is worthless. If there's huge volatility, the option can be exercised at a peak, but is costless in a down year. McKinsey has a nice article on this: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/m...
While leveraged buyouts are by no means dead, PE is far more than LBOs. The industry predates and has long outlived the 80s LBO boom. The term is a broad umbrella over many different kinds of operators leveraging (or suffering under) various features of our tax system.
Seldom does "private equity" mean an actual cash purchase by a private party. There's usually debt involved, often taken on by the business being bought. There's also usually some tax gimmick involved. It's interesting how often a business turns around after going private, even with the same management team. See this article on Dell, a year after going private: http://www.cnbc.com/id/102026551
Debt and equity still enjoy different rights in liquidation ... But debt and equity still confer different rights to affect operations.
Yes, debt and equity are not the same thing. But they're a lot closer than they used to be. Here's a piece on startup financing, comparing convertible debt vs. preferred equity. (http://mintonlawgroup.com/?p=173) The classic property of debt is that there is a bounded upside; the best that could happen was that the creditor got their money back with interest. With convertible debt, if the company does well, or even just gets another round of funding, the loan can be converted to stock and the creditor can win big. If the company fails, as creditors they're ahead of all equity holders and maybe even general creditors. It's also not unusual for creditors to demand a seat or seats on the board, even if they don't have equity.
It is difficult to speak of stock buybacks out of context; their use is varied, from purely financial to entirely structural.
Yes, their use is varied. But about 87% of US corporate borrowing since 2009 is for stock buybacks or dividends. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/corporations-cant-sto...). This reflects the low, low interest rates the Fed is offering. Equity to debt conversion is so tempting.
It is also difficult to make tax arguments out of context.
Most tax arguments for political campaign purposes are over tax rates over time. There's less public discussion over what is taxed at which rate. That, though, is what a sizable fraction of K Street lobbyists spend their time on. See "http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/business/tax-lobby-works-t..., which notes, on tax breaks, "If you are not at the table, you are on the menu". Relative tax rates for alternatives drive many business decisions. Absolute rates, less so. Over the years, capital gains tax rates have gone up and down without affecting capital spending comparably. See "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_gains_tax_in_the_Unite..., the graph for note 17.
(I suspect I'm boring everyone to death at this point, so I'll stop.)
I have put a few of the links on my reading list.
On the contrary, I, for one, am quite engaged by both your commentary and citations. Thanks!
One is tax policy. A corporation can pay for its capital in three ways: 1) dividends on stock, 2) interest on loans, and 3) stock buybacks to increase the stock price. The first is taxed more highly than the second two. This has a huge influence on corporate behavior. Because payments on loans are not taxed, converting equity to debt increases profits. This funds the entire "private equity" industry, which is really about leveraged buyouts. This bias in favor of loans also increases the involvement of the banking industry in corporate finance.
Loans and investments aren't really that different. They once were; lenders expected to be paid back. Then came junk bonds, where the interest rate is cranked up to compensate for the risk, and the securitiziation of debt, which allowed off-loading the risk onto other investors. (See 2008 financial crisis.)
There's an occasional call to "end the double taxation of dividends". Taxing interest paid and stock buybacks at the same rate would be equally effective. This would be a good time to do that economically, because interest rates are so low.
Stock buybacks are mostly a tax dodge. But that's not the full reason for their popularity. For stockholders, they're no better than dividends. But for stock option holders, which usually include the CEO, they're a windfall. Option holders get nothing when the company pays a dividend and the stock price remains the same. But in a buyback, the stock goes up and they win big. This is one of the major factors driving CEO pay upward. (If you assume CEOs are rational actors as regards their own compensation, much corporate behavior becomes clearer.) Japan doesn't allow stock buybacks for most types of corporations. The US does. It doesn't really benefit anybody but management.
So that's the tax policy argument. It's dull, but important.
As for why companies prioritize shareholders so much, more than they used to, the reason is simple - less fear by companies. Companies used to be afraid that overdoing it would lead to government action. Their business might be nationalized, taken over by the Government. Britain did that to the rail, coal, steel, airline, power and telephone industries. The US never went quite that far, but electric power and telephone companies used to be regulated utilities with rate-of-return regulation, and the airline and trucking industries were regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission. In the US, this was a political compromise between big business and small business. Small businesses didn't want big monopolies to have control over their essential services, like power and transportation.
All this changed starting in the late 1970s. Nationalized and regulated businesses were stable, but seemed inefficient. They had no incentive to take risks to improve. The history of the Reagan era is well known, so that doesn't have to be repeated here, but reviewing the history of deregulation is useful. What seems to happen in deregulation of regulated monopolies is that a large number of new companies enter the field, and prices go down. Then most of the new companies go bust, and the winners consolidate. The result tends to be deregulated monopolies. Look at the last 30 years of the telephone industry, from AT&T to lots of little companies and back to AT&T.
There's another source for the decrease in corporate fear - the end of communism. It's hard to realize this now, but from the 1930s through the 1970s, there was real worry in the US that communism might beat capitalism economically. By the 1950s and 1960s, the USSR had a successful space program and was industrializing rapidly. Capitalism had serious ideological competition. In the 1980s, though, it became clear that the USSR couldn't make their system work. It worked for some of the big, centralized stuff - coal, steel, power, and such. But the rest of the economy didn't work very well. With that threat removed, companies could stop worrying about socialism and communism gaining popularity.
Related to this was the decline in labor unions. This has a lot of causes, but the biggest one is simply that unions peaked in the era when industry centered around huge plants with huge numbers of semi-skilled employees. Those were the situations in which unions had the most leverage. There were once steel mills which employed 5,000 people with shovels. If you visit a steel mill today, there will be some shovels around, but they're just for cleanup. You'll see a lot of machinery and not many people. Manufacturing employs 7% of the US workforce. It was around 40% in 1950.
Labor unions once had a big influence on working conditions. When a sizable portion of the workforce was unionized, non-union businesses tended to have working conditions not much worse than union shops. Companies didn't want a labor-organizing campaign. So the 8 hour day and the 40 hour week were standard, and pay tended to follow union levels in non-union businesses. That's disappeared.
As a result of these changes, there's no major political opposition left to "maximizing shareholder value". That's why we're where we are now.