Why not?
Every major browser in its default configuration offers to remember your passwords, and some will even offer to sync them across all your devices.
The only thing that's missing is an offer to generate random passwords automatically, for which you currently need an add-on/extension. But even without that ability, the browser is already a pretty decent password manager.
On plenty of sites, Chrome/FF/IE/etc. will fail to recognize a user or password field. They'll often fail to recognize them at account creation. Sometimes you'll need multiple accounts on a single domain, which Chrome can't handle (for example). I could go on and on...
Browsers remember passwords as a mere convenience, when it happens to work. They are in no way "proper" password managers, which are encrypted with a master password, can be exported and backed up, handle multiple accounts, etc...
But since some of the best password managers are already open source, I wonder what's preventing browser vendors from integrating at least some of the functionality. A good password manager not only helps contain the damage of leaked passwords, but also does a very good job at protecting users from phishing attacks at similar-looking domains.
All the browsers have been pretty stagnant on this front for the last few years. I suspect they've been hoping that everyone will move to an SSO platform in which the browser vendors themselves have a vested interest (Mozilla Persona, Google account, Microsoft account).
1. Memorize a single prefix that has at least an uppercase letter, a number, and a symbol, to be used with all passwords. (e.g. j8$F)
2. Use a physical journal or pad of paper to note down each site's password restrictions (e.g. "no symbols") and a personal hint to the rest of the password.
3. Your password is the prefix (minus any unsupported characters) plus the answer to the hint.
So the hint "No symbols, They All Float Down Here" might become j8fPennyWise. "Feet On The Road" might be j8$fFlintstones.
___
This minimizes what people have to memorize, is secure against casual attacks by people in the same physical area, is strong against attackers who might try to replace "password4hn" with "password4reddit", and doesn't require any sort of special software.
Not seriously, but I'm just saying. If you are really concerned about security I have a hard time understanding this concept.
A paper pad, on the other hand, is extremely secure against cyberattack, and she has tons of experience with managing it and creating backups. And it's almost what she was gonna do anyway.
> Paper pads are extremely secure (sic).
Stop right there, asshole. You're doctoring quotes and changing their meaning. That's not the correct usage of (sic) either.
> I forgot that users no longer have to key in passwords
1. Not all passwords are commonly-entered.
2. Passwords collected together in a defined file format are a richer target than ad-hoc collection thank forms-with-password-fields used in one of multiple possible browsers.
It's good advice, but it's by no means simpler than the alternative.
Do you actually have a less complex way to reliably identify a person at the other end of a computer network?
(physical keys using NFC stuff are pretty exciting, but the tech isn't in place yet... until then we're stuck with "something you know" and the limits of human memory vs computer power)
At first I thought you were going to advocate the "just pick a prefix and then append the name of the site after it", like Go123facebook and Go123gmail. Which is, of course, quite awful because one plaintext reversing of one password may very well defeat all of the other passwords.
Hmmm... also, there's a failure-mode with systems that notice the prefix and reject future passwords as "too similar to one you used before". Users would have to deviate from the strategy somehow.
Am I missing something? I'm surprised to be the first to point out that this is very dangerous advice (to the extent bad passwords are dangerous).
All it does is add one, easily guessable bit of information -- for the first password the attacker seeks. And after someone has the first password, this method adds zero security; the attacker then has the passwords for every other website.
Another annoying but logical constraint is the one where sites query your pwd for references to the site itself and tell you not to include that - another strike against that appending approach.
The requirements vary, are conflicting and change over time. I tried your approach, but then gave up after repeatedly forgetting what restrictions applied for which site - altering my specific password and making it non-memorable. Enter 1Password.
There is something to be said for the philosophy of, "I don't have to run faster than the bear, I just have to run faster than you." But in this particular case, at least, it's not hard to do better than that.
For example, if you take a fixed secret string, append the site name, SHA256 the whole mess, and then derive a password from the hash, that's reasonably secure and only requires you to memorize one secret. The downside is that you need to perform SHA256 whenever you want the password for a particular site.
But if you take a fixed password and merely concatenate something derived from the site name to get the site-specific password, that's not secure. You're counting on the attacker not figuring out your "something derived from" and that's security by obscurity. (Unless your algorithm involves mixing in some hard-to-guess secret, but then you're back at my suggestion above with a bit of extra stuff tacked on.)
Password reuse is much worse that having a weak password. Hackers only brute force high value targets, everyone else should just aim to have unique passwords for every service they use.
However, the average person can only remember 5-10 unique passwords and they have many many accounts...password reuse. For the average person password managers aren't an option for normal people, so we have a big problem.