However, the use of this feature for it in practice is . . . non-existent.
Google also famously went crazy when Motorola almost used Skyhook as network location provider for the Droid, on the basis that such information feeding back into their systems might be inaccurate and thus pollute their data collection activities. (They use Android devices as modern proxies for the WiFi slurping the streetmap cars used to do). As such Google have absolutely no incentive to resolve this problem as they are reliant on you not lying to them about where you are.
What's fun is J2ME got this right. Apps couldn't just assume they had permission for certain tasks, and users would be asked when the app wanted to do something. If the user refused you'd get an exception, but you were expected to handle it gracefully. It really wasn't that big of a problem, except for the user experience of the prompts some manufacturers chose to implement being fairly horrible.
Google couldn't even argue that getting fake data is harmful, as long as the data is forthrightly null or unavailable. Location apps have to deal with the lack of location data. Apps that access SMS have to deal with devices that don't get SMS messages.
I hope alternative Android distributions mature to the point that some OEMs will choose to provide more-private "remixes" of Android based on these distributions and on ecosystem partners like DDG.
I don't think having 'mock' data is the right approach, but as you mentioned below, it's enough that the relevant API simply throw a security exception and let the app handle it gracefully.
>If the user refused you'd get an exception, but you were expected to handle it gracefully.
And that's absolutely the right approach.
>It really wasn't that big of a problem, except for the user experience of the prompts some manufacturers chose to implement being fairly horrible.
That should be handled by the OS, which would completely negate this issue.
This is the exact scenario that needs to be avoided - if the app developer wants something that I don't want to give, then you can't rely on cooperation from the app.
The whole point is that if a flaslight app wants to read my SMS, then I shouldn't have to choose between using that app and keeping my privacy; the OS is perfectly capable of keeping that app in an ignorant bliss thinking that it read my SMS and can turn on the light.
I got so frustrated with flashlight apps asking for Internet access to show ads and getting stuck when there is no Internet (typically the same time when I need a flashlight) that I wrote one and made it completely permission free:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.bigosaur.l...
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.teslacoils...
also http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/android-app-permission...
Sharing with friends ;).
If you want, I can send you the source code to try to modify it. Just e-mail me.
google never accepted the patches into main android.
also as CM and google got more in bed that feature vanished for a while.
It is available for rooted phones running Stock Android through the Xposed framework. There it is called "AppOpsXposed".
I also miss the possibility to give slightly fuzzed/offset values for certain things, like GPS granularity (Do you need to know my exact location, or just my country?) There's however an eternal struggle between the API devs wanting to make the permission system simpler, and the APP devs wanting it smarter and more refined.
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.findsdk.ap...
Is there any evidence for that? My impression (from following blogs, G+, Gerrit, etc) was that CM simply couldn't keep up with adapting their features to new Android versions for a while, and the only reason the CM11 branch is reasonably stable is because KitKat has been out a full year.
It's not in their best interest to go "above and beyond" in protecting personal data.
If the app is not willing to function when being denied SMS access it should simply not be allowed on the app store. I have yet to meet an app on my iPhone that shuts down unrelated function because I denied it access to my calendar, SMS or phonebook.
I would rather have fields where the app developer can justify why they need each permission.
Your proposal would help only in combination where after seeing the justification, users can still choose to fake the data anyway. And if the justification isn't obviously acceptable, then a 1* review is a feature, not a problem.
I'm concerned more with the problems an app with a legitimate use for the data might have when the user tries a certain feature and it doesn't work properly or worse causes a problem by doing some important operation with the junk data.
That's the key point of system ownership - if the developer of the program wants it to do A, but the owner of the system wants their phone to do B, then doing A is a bug that needs to be worked around. Even if it was explicitly designed and implemented that way, from the viewpoint of the user this is an anti-feature; and the current system architecture that favors the will of the app developer over the will of the user is certainly feasible, but it explicitly means giving up control over the system. And that, IMHO, needs to be fixed.
It's similar to opt-out permissions for email marketing - if some company managed to get "permission" without meaningful consent, it doesn't give any permission and their actions are still immoral and, in some places, illegal. Or click-wrap agreements "signing away" basic consumer rights that (in some places) can't be signed away - again, formal "permission" doesn't imply real permission.
The second half is simple but requires a change on the device side - if an application needs feature X, Y and Z, then the choices shouldn't be limited to grant access or not install the application, but there should be a third choice per each feature called "fake that access being granted".
If an app claims to need access to my SMS messages, then there are two reasonable options:
1. I want the app to read my SMS, as it does something that I want with them; so I enable that feature.
2. I don't want the app to read my SMS for whatever arbitrary reason that doesn't matter and doesn't need to be justified to anyone. If the app cooperates with the refusal, then it stops at that, but if the app wants to read my SMS against my will (and, say, tests this ability to enable some unrelated feature) then that's hostile behavior and all of my hardware and software should assist me in thwarting that hostile behavior - e.g. by simulating fake data to the app, by falsely claiming to have sent SMS / made a call, etc.
The other options (including the current scenario where my device cooperates with the app developer against me) aren't reasonable and should be eliminated.