VCs have a similar issue, which is that there are more LPs and other investors who didn't live through 2000 and are more 'growth' rather than 'business' focused. They are giving their money to people showing 'growth' then that is the metric that folks start optimizing. If VCs will only fund companies which are headed toward 'cash flow positive' then that is the metric that gets optimized. You can see this dynamic in action at YC demo day as the YC tunes what it is they want to see in the companies, what ever that is, it shows up in a lot of slide ware :-).
So I think Fred is grumbling that there is a lot of "less smart" money out there and he has to either sit out while it flushes down the toilet or compete with it in the companies where he wants in. And that cuts into margins and it cuts into discipline because people who think the next round of funding is 'in the bag' have much less concern with how they spend this round. It doesn't help that even the "smart" money has no where to go that will provide significant returns [1]. So that doesn't help either. The good news is that these things reset themselves, the bad news is that it always seems to catch some folks completely by surprise.
[1] The period of low interest rates has gone on so long it has now started flushing out 20 year t-bills and other multi-decade "safe" investments. This is probably a much bigger story than the WSJ and others have yet picked up. There is a lot of dynastic wealth getting crimped.
My parents didn't inherit much, but made a lot of money in e.g. the '80s, and at least back then put a lot of that into Treasuries. They're now around 80 years old; I don't know the specifics of their asset allocation, aside from my father having some stock market holdings, but in general they're getting very little in the way of return.
1. US Treasury bills and bonds are not exempt from Federal taxation.
2. In your original comment, you referred to "20 year t-bills." There is no such thing. The longest dated Treasury bill is 52 weeks; they are most frequently issued with maturities of a year or less. You are confusing Treasury bills and Treasury bonds, which are not the same thing.
3. T-bills are short-term investments purchased for the security they offer; nobody buys them to beat inflation. Historically, they have never provided a real return significantly above that of inflation[1].
4. That the yields of 10 year Treasury bonds are not keeping up with inflation is not a news story. It's been talked about widely for years[2].
[1] http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/...
[2] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-14/treasury-yields-bel...
CPI affects Social Security payouts, that's a different thing than investment returns (but obviously does affect the well-being of seniors). CPI probably does understate perceived inflation for seniors. There is an index specifically for seniors (CPI-E) that has more healthcare in the basket of goods, and it's higher.
This is an inaccurate understanding of what is taking place.
It's not that there are no asset classes capable of delivering "significant" returns today; heck, the S&P 500 has nearly doubled in the past four years. It's that to get returns, investors have been forced to pay significant premiums and take on greater risk.
That said, the money that is pouring into startups (through venture funds, super angel funds and individual angels) is not money that was previously being invested in Treasuries. The startup bubble is being fueled by the public equities bubble, which is a rising tide that has lifted a lot of boats.
More of an inflating bubble that has lifted a lot of boats...
One of the dynamics that happened in the wake of the 2000 crash: There was quite a bit of back and forth between the VCs and the limiteds when everyone went into turtle mode. The result was that many VCs ended up reducing the size of the funds, which is in effect a pay cut since they take an annual percentage of funds under management.
It's really hard to justify 2% fees when you're only sitting on the money because that's the best investment at the time.
For example? Spreads between asset returns might be compressed, but I have a hard time coming up with assets that are no longer viable.
Nobody is entitled to "set it and forget it" returns. Loanable funds operate on the principles of supply and demand like anything else. When money is abundant - as it becomes when the Fed is easing - the risk premium shrinks. You don't get rewarded for money under the mattress or lent to the government. Instead, investors are incentivized to grease the wheels of capitalism by risking that money. That's our system.
Or should they? My impression is that many VCs are seeing bigger gains in shooting for $100mm+ acquisitions by Google/Facebook/Apple/Microsoft and cutting their losses on startups that don't make it, rather than trying to build sustainable businesses.
Hence, our very own pg's "Startup = Growth" essay: http://www.paulgraham.com/growth.html
Hence, the rumors that some VCs actively discourage startups from making any revenue at all (let alone profits), since those could act as anchors that drag down the acquisition valuation.
There's no correlation between the percentage of startups that raise money and the metric that does matter financially, whether that batch of startups contains a big winner or not.
Except an inverse one. That's the scary thing: fundraising is not merely a useless metric, but positively misleading.
[...]
We can afford to take at least 10x as much risk as Demo Day investors. And since risk is usually proportionate to reward, if you can afford to take more risk you should. What would it mean to take 10x more risk than Demo Day investors? We'd have to be willing to fund 10x more startups than they would. Which means that even if we're generous to ourselves and assume that YC can on average triple a startup's expected value, we'd be taking the right amount of risk if only 30% of the startups were able to raise significant funding after Demo Day.
In this model, the VC's willingness to make risky investments becomes a kind of "thermometer" for whether an opportunity exists for an investor to win big. In fact, pg seems to be saying, "If VCs are investing in all of the startups, then that probably means there aren't any big winners seeking investment."
If that's true, and if VCs are investing in every startup, then it's likely that all of those VCs are going to lose. Whereas if VCs are only investing in 30% of the startups, then it's more likely that a selective investor can win big by investing in one of the 70% of risky companies that other investors aren't willing to go near.
That's totally bonkers. But it's also 'rumors', do you have concrete examples?
I'm suddenly having that same feeling. If you had solid examples, I'd probably have more than just a feeling.
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/disruptions-with-no...
That should come with a "don't try this at home, kids" warning. I've seen a case where an entrepreneur and his angel investors have a joint delusion about being able to pull that off even though those Tier Zero potential acquirers have no idea they even exist. He could have had a novel product in commerce two years ago but he would rather not have to answer for sales numbers meanwhile.
There are some cases where that's a rational plan. But not many.
I am not familiar with the funded startups/VC/acquisition ecosystem, so can you explain how a startup that is having revenue would drag down the acquisition valuation? Is it because it would drag down the acquisition price of the other startups that don't have revenue?
If a company hasn't even tried to get revenue, then the sky's the limit. But as soon as it does it gets actual numbers, and those numbers are usually not as big as anyone's wildest dreams. Sometimes they're downright depressing, and they lead to that hard and unglamorous slog of optimizing business model and pricing strategy and such.
In big companies this often manifests in the form of the project cancelled right before (or right after) it goes to market. A project that's still pie-in-the-sky tends to excite the sales and business folks, but once it gets closer to go-to-market you start getting real numbers. A lot of times this leads to cold feet, the project loses favor, and sometimes gets cancelled right before it ships.
Reality is never as much fun as dreams.
The counter-argument though is that rapid growth in the beginning is necessary to have any chance of getting really big.
I've got an effort out there right now that's growing but has a revenue model in place. I know for a fact that if I take the revenue model away it will grow faster, and I've been having a huge debate with myself on this. The revenue isn't huge and the growth is slow-- do I trade that small amount of revenue for larger growth on the promise that I can get more revenue later? It's a tough question.
But if Twitter had started charging for premium accounts, as an experiment, their revenue during the same period could have grown from $1M to $5M. Can a billion-dollar company have revenue of $5M? No. So the valuation of Twitter would have come back to earth, maybe $100M, maybe a bit more, but not "the sky is the limit" number.
In a crude sense, it's a form of a confidence scheme...
Valuation is deeply linked to growth rate and user base in this crazy industry of ours, so "we have X committed, paying users" is worth less than "we have 100X actives!!!!11one".
Not sure I agree. You can give for free a limited version of your product and charge something for a better version, or you can use the freemium model.
They will grow faster than you. This is why the "no-revenue" play works (well, until it stops working).
Any idiot can get signups when they have millions of VC money to burn. Getting people to actually pay you more than you're spending on user acquisition is infinitely harder.
Can you name 2 or 3 "idiots" that have done what you suggest?
Pinterest. Groupon. Reddit. Snapchat. Instagram. Youtube (for many years). Twitter took a long time to make money. Most news sites have a hard time, which is why WSJ is paywalled (as mentioned in the article). On the "smaller valuation side", we could say FriendFeed, Zite, Hot Potato, Beluga, GroupMe, TweetDeck, Dodgeball.
It's much harder to than you may realize to monetize.
The classic, ostensible rationale for taking on large VC rounds is to accelerate growth. Not to cause growth in the first place. If a company's entire business model depends on spending massive wads of capital on things like loss leaders, advertising, unsustainable pricing, etc., then it's not really a business. It's a gimmick. It's a race to the exit.
These sorts of plays can and will cause negative externalities in the markets in which they operate. They "disrupt" those markets for a short while. The disruption comes not from changing the fundamentals of the market, so much as temporarily and violently turning pricing on its head by ignoring the profit equation altogether. That's unsustainable by definition. (And it's not to be confused with the legitimate practice of running at a loss, or breakeven, by plowing available profits back into growth).
That's an assumption on your part. There are lots of companies in the $1 to $10M pear year in turnover and 20...40% net margins range that make their owners consistent fortunes. And by your standards they would qualify as 'tiny'. But that doesn't mean they are bad companies for their founders.
Simply put, we have different definitions of what a 'good business' is.
37signals and Atlassian are just as much outliers as dropbox and airbnb are.
Building a respectable, profitable business might be fine from a traditional MBA or bootstrapper's point of view but it's actually a failure in VC-land since it will not yield a monster exit.
Jacquesm is rightly irritated at how funding unsustainable businesses distorts the revenue-getting potential of sustainable but unfunded ones (#3). Another example is the difficulty of bootstrapped companies ranking for any competitive search terms or getting decent press without venture capital and a PR engine. It is a LOT harder to organically grow into multiple distribution channels in a short period of time if you have to fund everything out of a limited slice of the market because you are competing against funded competitors who don't have those limitations.
Jacquesm's point is dead on. The entire point of raising capital is to buy competitive advantage. So if a VC doesn't think the money is being well-spent, they shouldn't have invested in that business or market in the first place. It is ironic to be in the position to buy competitive advantage, then get upset because people act like that is how you run a business.
So going into a market with entrenched competitors is dangerous except when you're backed my a monopolist that can afford to cross-subsidize.
> Think of your risk/reward profile. Do you want to take a shot at being a billionaire by the time you're 35, even if the chances of doing that make the lottery look like a good deal? Ben and Jerry's companies are not going to do that for you.
It took 14 years, but Markus Persson just proved him wrong on that one.
Fantastic points, well reasoned post. As I've only done niche bootstrapped things, I'd never looked at it from that perspective before, where a bubble startup could screw up the sector for a long while, not just steal that day's lunch.
This struck me as well. The irony seemed lost...
You can't have it both ways. Bootstrappers who don't need your money, won't take it. People who do need your money, typically spend it, playing the longer game you've encouraged them to play.
> A healthy company would survive and grow even without VC investment, it's supposed to be an accelerator, not life support.
A thousand times this.
More than that, if you want the middle ground - externally financed but slower, more sustainable growth, you need to establish that from the get-go. Founders are chasing the fast 1000x exit because that's what VCs expect.
This industry, in the state that it's in, selects for those who over-promise, impress others with their charming but vacuous stories, fail to deliver, and make a mess that's really difficult for the rest of us to clean up. "What do you mean you can't deliver <SaaS X> for 25 cents per terabyte?" "What do you mean you can't do this story in one week?" "What do you mean we'll have to hire a maintenance consultant to get out of this mess?"
Institutions are still the main players and can develop persistent reputations and execute coherent strategies... but the game of private-sector technology itself is most successfully played by sociopathic individuals who make unrealistic promises, generate "flashiness" with minimal substance, and are promoted away from the chaos (say, into corporate upper management, or the VC investor ranks) before things start to blow up under their feet.
"At some point you have to build a real business, generate real profits, sustain the company without the largess of investor’s capital, and start producing value the old fashioned way. "
Exactly. So how annoying it is when you're bootstrapping a company, you have your price-points carefully set, you're doing a cracker job at concentrating on 'how to sustain the company without investors capital' and then boom. Out of the blue some never-heard-of before company that does the same thing you do starts to hit your customers with a price point that you simply can not beat because they are able to 'burn baby burn' or maybe even give away that identical product for free because they're racing for an acquisition before the money runs out.
That's real trouble. Sometimes it's not just one.
But there is good news: they usually don't survive in the longer term because they don't have a business model. Once it's free you can't really go back to 'old-fashioned'.
So once they've folded up, you've bought their Aeron chairs at 5 cents on the dollar and you're re-connecting with your old customers and picking up the pieces you have a fairly clear field. Contaminated by an over-promising under-performing competitor that thought that 'growth' is equal to 'health'. (If that were true then cancer or a locust plague would be good news.) How you're going to survive the interregnum of unfair VC funded competition is a really hard question for which I have no other advice than to cut every bit of spending and go into 'cockroach' or 'spore' mode, hang on to your core team at any price.
VCs should be far far more critical about the companies that they invest in, that the path to break even is clear and that they are not going to invest in a company whose business model is broken but where the cracks are paved over with marketing and growth by burning investors money.
That just spoils the soup for everybody and sometimes it kills entire segments.
Especially companies where investment is made in B, C or even later rounds should be looked at very carefully. A healthy company would survive and grow even without VC investment, it's supposed to be an accelerator, not life support.
So burn, but burn with care and a very good plan. Concentrate on your bottom line taking into account that VC capital will not last forever and make sure that the transition from 'supported' to 'unsupported' is a smooth one and that your business model does not somehow depend on the 'supported' bit in a hidden way.
If you're partying like it's 1999 you're definitely doing it wrong and your bubble will almost certainly pop, the more VC money there is the more of it will be dumb.