There's no correlation between the percentage of startups that raise money and the metric that does matter financially, whether that batch of startups contains a big winner or not.
Except an inverse one. That's the scary thing: fundraising is not merely a useless metric, but positively misleading.
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We can afford to take at least 10x as much risk as Demo Day investors. And since risk is usually proportionate to reward, if you can afford to take more risk you should. What would it mean to take 10x more risk than Demo Day investors? We'd have to be willing to fund 10x more startups than they would. Which means that even if we're generous to ourselves and assume that YC can on average triple a startup's expected value, we'd be taking the right amount of risk if only 30% of the startups were able to raise significant funding after Demo Day.
In this model, the VC's willingness to make risky investments becomes a kind of "thermometer" for whether an opportunity exists for an investor to win big. In fact, pg seems to be saying, "If VCs are investing in all of the startups, then that probably means there aren't any big winners seeking investment."
If that's true, and if VCs are investing in every startup, then it's likely that all of those VCs are going to lose. Whereas if VCs are only investing in 30% of the startups, then it's more likely that a selective investor can win big by investing in one of the 70% of risky companies that other investors aren't willing to go near.
That's totally bonkers. But it's also 'rumors', do you have concrete examples?
I'm suddenly having that same feeling. If you had solid examples, I'd probably have more than just a feeling.
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/disruptions-with-no...
That should come with a "don't try this at home, kids" warning. I've seen a case where an entrepreneur and his angel investors have a joint delusion about being able to pull that off even though those Tier Zero potential acquirers have no idea they even exist. He could have had a novel product in commerce two years ago but he would rather not have to answer for sales numbers meanwhile.
There are some cases where that's a rational plan. But not many.
I am not familiar with the funded startups/VC/acquisition ecosystem, so can you explain how a startup that is having revenue would drag down the acquisition valuation? Is it because it would drag down the acquisition price of the other startups that don't have revenue?
If a company hasn't even tried to get revenue, then the sky's the limit. But as soon as it does it gets actual numbers, and those numbers are usually not as big as anyone's wildest dreams. Sometimes they're downright depressing, and they lead to that hard and unglamorous slog of optimizing business model and pricing strategy and such.
In big companies this often manifests in the form of the project cancelled right before (or right after) it goes to market. A project that's still pie-in-the-sky tends to excite the sales and business folks, but once it gets closer to go-to-market you start getting real numbers. A lot of times this leads to cold feet, the project loses favor, and sometimes gets cancelled right before it ships.
Reality is never as much fun as dreams.
The counter-argument though is that rapid growth in the beginning is necessary to have any chance of getting really big.
I've got an effort out there right now that's growing but has a revenue model in place. I know for a fact that if I take the revenue model away it will grow faster, and I've been having a huge debate with myself on this. The revenue isn't huge and the growth is slow-- do I trade that small amount of revenue for larger growth on the promise that I can get more revenue later? It's a tough question.
But if Twitter had started charging for premium accounts, as an experiment, their revenue during the same period could have grown from $1M to $5M. Can a billion-dollar company have revenue of $5M? No. So the valuation of Twitter would have come back to earth, maybe $100M, maybe a bit more, but not "the sky is the limit" number.
In a crude sense, it's a form of a confidence scheme...
Valuation is deeply linked to growth rate and user base in this crazy industry of ours, so "we have X committed, paying users" is worth less than "we have 100X actives!!!!11one".
Not sure I agree. You can give for free a limited version of your product and charge something for a better version, or you can use the freemium model.
They will grow faster than you. This is why the "no-revenue" play works (well, until it stops working).
Any idiot can get signups when they have millions of VC money to burn. Getting people to actually pay you more than you're spending on user acquisition is infinitely harder.
Can you name 2 or 3 "idiots" that have done what you suggest?
Pinterest. Groupon. Reddit. Snapchat. Instagram. Youtube (for many years). Twitter took a long time to make money. Most news sites have a hard time, which is why WSJ is paywalled (as mentioned in the article). On the "smaller valuation side", we could say FriendFeed, Zite, Hot Potato, Beluga, GroupMe, TweetDeck, Dodgeball.
It's much harder to than you may realize to monetize.
Or should they? My impression is that many VCs are seeing bigger gains in shooting for $100mm+ acquisitions by Google/Facebook/Apple/Microsoft and cutting their losses on startups that don't make it, rather than trying to build sustainable businesses.
Hence, our very own pg's "Startup = Growth" essay: http://www.paulgraham.com/growth.html
Hence, the rumors that some VCs actively discourage startups from making any revenue at all (let alone profits), since those could act as anchors that drag down the acquisition valuation.