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Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by tehwebguy on Sunday August 24, 2014 @07:58PM (#8220048)
I vote to drop nearly all of it.

The cockpit door is reinforced and locked, without the ability to take over the aircraft there is literally less risk than if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by dlp211 on Sunday August 24, 2014 @08:08PM (#8220064)
I vote to go back to the way it was pre-9/11. The 9/11 hijackings were a one time play, that is, they changed the rules by which the terrorists play by, and therefore the passengers have changed the way that they will react to a terroristic threat aboard a plane. We have seen passengers are more than willing to stand up to those that pose a threat on plane in post-9/11 air travel.
Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by gsnedders on Sunday August 24, 2014 @08:04PM (#8220054)
> if someone just drove a bomb into an airport.

Which is exactly what the 2007 attack on Glasgow airport was.[1]

All major airports in the UK now have limited access to the front of the terminal building (typically, buses and taxis only). Most now have a drop-off zone in the car park.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Glasgow_International_Air...

Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by scintill76 on Sunday August 24, 2014 @08:31PM (#8220105)
Does moving the "attack zone" make any sense? What if someone bombs the car park -- will the airport stop allowing personal cars into it?

I know I'm not the first to say this sort of thing, and maybe it's cliche, but really, what is there to protect at the front of the terminal, that is not just as vulnerable now in the car park? (Edit: I recognize the poster I'm responding to hasn't necessarily endorsed the authorities' action in this case.)

Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by Natsu on Sunday August 24, 2014 @09:07PM (#8220170)
They should be protecting anywhere large groups of people are gathered. I do think that large security lines of people waiting to be screened are detrimental to that.
Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by iancarroll on Sunday August 24, 2014 @09:03PM (#8220164)
I assume the theory is that there will be less people in the car park then in the terminal.
Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by alistairSH on Sunday August 24, 2014 @09:46PM (#8220239)
I imagine the front of the terminal is a place where groups of people can typically be found - drop offs, pick ups, waiting for baggage, etc.

Also, blowing up the front of the terminal has the potential to shut down airport operations much longer than a remote car park.

Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by cmdkeen on Monday August 25, 2014 @04:46AM (#8221040)
It is also to do with glass windows. Terminals tend to have massive amounts of glass which a bomb will blow out massively increasing the casualties. Car parks are open at the sides and sparsely populated.
Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by ctdonath on Monday August 25, 2014 @10:02AM (#8221742)
Shortly after 9/11, vehicles entering the airport car park were searched. Methinks it ended as formally extending the "security zone" to there proved untenable.
Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by cookiecaper on Sunday August 24, 2014 @08:02PM (#8220052)
There's a risk that an aircraft will be bombed in-flight, which doesn't require access to the cockpit. Before 9/11, such bombings were the primary security concern as hijackings usually resulted in a hostage situation. It'd probably be wise to keep explosives screening.
Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by toufka on Sunday August 24, 2014 @08:15PM (#8220075)
An in-flight bomb, though tragic, is much less of a threat, economic, social or otherwise, than an 'airplane-as-missile' into a populated area. So long as there is no access to the cockpit, the maximum effect of a terrorist's explosion is the downing of a plane, not the downing of a $1B 110 story building.
Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by joelhaus on Sunday August 24, 2014 @10:00PM (#8220270)
I don't think this conclusion takes into account the 'terror' part of the plan.

Most everyone here assumes rational responses from the: media > public > politicians. This is incredibly naive. It reminds me of economic arguments used by libertarians.

Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by tehwebguy on Sunday August 24, 2014 @08:16PM (#8220076)
Sure, but without taking over the craft and turning into a significantly more dangerous missile (a la 9/11) there is only as much risk as bombing a parking garage, mall, school or any other place with hundreds of people and virtually no security.

Not sure how much that logic actually applies to anyone trying to bomb stuff, though.

Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by raldi on Sunday August 24, 2014 @08:58PM (#8220153)
If you want to kill 300 people, you can just blow up five buses. It's much easier than trying to blow up a plane.
Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by cookiecaper on Monday August 25, 2014 @01:17AM (#8220710)
It doesn't have the same publicity quality, though. The groups that carry out these attacks do it for attention, and they're going to do whatever they can to maximize their press time. That results in worldwide publication of their message, often requiring their opposition to acknowledge and respond, and gives them outlet to advertise to potential new recruits. Airplane attacks and crashes get a lot more coverage than incidents involving similar loss of life due to the emotional factor of being isolated 35,000 feet in the sky, and that makes the cost involved in launching a more intricate attack on aircraft worthwhile.

You can try to run away from a bomb at a parking garage after the initial explosion and an ambulance will be there to check things out and rescue people pretty quickly. If you're in the plane when it gets attacked, you have no recourse and virtually no chance for survival, which is not usually the case when a ground target is bombed with conventional explosives. Even if you survive the actual ground impact (zero chance if an event happens at cruising altitude, small chance if it happens at a more reasonable altitude during takeoff/landing), there's no guarantee you'll be anywhere near civilization that can give medical help or attention. This makes the risk of an airborne attack much more frightening, since death is virtually guaranteed.

Passengers want a reasonable assurance that there's something more than chance protecting the flights they're boarding (and for whatever reason, they don't usually make the same types of demands from ground entities like parking garages or bus stops). That's why the airlines added their own security checkpoints in the 70s as hijackings became prominent. That's also the reason the TSA can exist at all. The TSA takes it too far, and we all acknowledge that some threats can't be screened out, but just going back to nothing isn't a plausible solution, at least not at first. There needs to be a more gradual transition if we're ever going to get there.

Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by thaumasiotes on Monday August 25, 2014 @07:36AM (#8221333)
I agree that an airplane crash is more newsworthy than an attack on a bus.

I'm not so sure about a campaign that takes out five buses. I'd expect that to get heavy coverage.

Re:Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf] by ceejayoz on Monday August 25, 2014 @01:43PM (#8222884)
Precisely. Think of the paralysis the DC snipers caused a few years back with just a rifle over a few weeks.