There's an analogy here to land ownership. Land is a public good. It is owned collectively by the nation-state that contains it, and the people rent exclusive rights over parcels of land. I'm talking here about the difference between allodial title (typically owned by the state) and fee simple title (owned by individuals). We do this so that the owners have an incentive to use and improve it, and everyone benefits when it owned by the people who can best do so.
Patents are similar in many ways, since inventions are also a public good. That's why patents exist in the first place: to promote the advance of our technology for the benefit of all, by granting exclusive rights to the use of a technology. And, like land, you want patents to be owned by the people who can best use it.However, in order for the system to work, there needs to be a cost to holding rights to the property to encourage people to sell the rights to someone else. With land, this is property tax; land owners have to pay a percentage of the land's value each year for the continued right to use the land exclusively.
We need a property tax for patents. Patents should have an assessed market value, and a patent owner should have to pay a percentage of that value yearly as 'rent' on the exclusive use of the invention. If they no longer feel that it's worthwhile to pay that tax for the benefit they get from holding the patent, then they can sell it to another party. It could be (and probably should be) a closed system, where all taxes collected should be put into a fund that the government uses to buy patents itself. When it does so, the patent gets returned to the public domain, and anyone can use it from then on. In that way, you may be able to get rid of patent term lengths.
In fact, it makes that problem worse, because the assessed or hypothetical market value of the obvious, or "too old" invention is much higher. For example, what happens if someone is (by foolishness) granted a patent on fire or the wheel? They'd pay a higher tax, but be entitled to a much bigger "extortion" from the economy. So it would "turbocharge" the incentive to slip undeserved patents through.
IMHO, the real problem goes away when patents only go to legitimate "oh my word I wouldn't have thought of that in a thousand years" innovations, at which point it would be much harder to say, "why should anyone have to pay to use that?"
That could prevent a number of the current problems: certain states particularly kind with patent suits, some judges ignoring higher courts resolution...
Companies in the business of making stuff and very seldom suing their competitors or even considering asking for licensing fees would suddenly find high quality "defensive" patents on their technology result in a bigger tax bill. Enter the troll, willing to take the patent and its associated tax bill off their hands for a nominal fee (perhaps then getting its taxable value reassessed based on its diminished market value) and then setting to work threatening litigation against everyone else in the industry. If they win enough settlements their patent might get reassessed at a higher value for a bigger tax bill, but they're still raking in plenty of cash on top, and able to source better patents from people that would never have considered selling their patents.
Sure, the government could buy up unwanted patents and release into the public domain indiscriminately (in which case they'll end up subsidising patent creation) or they could buy up unwanted patents discriminately... i.e. at the behest of industries most adept at lobbying, but if patent offices can't even consistently make good decisions on whether companies should be issued with patents, the last thing I'd give them is a budget to buy back the ones that might have been mistakes.
This is where things get challenging. The software industry could probably get along without patents altogether. The pharma industry, on the other hand, absolutely depends upon them. When a new drug is discovered and patented (which is part of the problem - drugs are discovered, not invented, which makes patenting seem a bit odd in the first place) the drug company has a 25-year window of time to develop it. This is actually a tight deadline as studies take a long time and often can face major back-to-square-one setbacks in the form of unexpected complications. All of this costs millions upon millions of dollars.
Now obviously drug companies would be willing to pay a handsome sum to keep ahold of their patents. But if you tax based on value, the value of a proven drug patent would be obscene, and that would cut deeply into the payoff for these pharma companies.
The space of inventions is also obviously limited, since it's often extremely challenging to work around a technical patent.
But is music a limited space? Prose? Software? In those cases it seems like the benefits of a "property tax on copyright" would be minimal.
> Land is exceptionally limited, especially in urban environments
Which basically emphasizes that while the space is limited inherently, the key part is that the subspace that is in particular demand at any given time (the place where people want it, and which is therefore as densely populated as it will support) is particularly limited.
> But is music a limited space? Prose? Software?
Even if the overall space of each isn't particularly limited, the subspace that is in demand at any given time is particularly limited.
There wouldn't be value to copyrights on these things in the first place if that wasn't the case -- there would be no value in excluding people from the particular niche you develop if there were an infinite array of equally-easy-to-develop, equally-valuable niches within the same space available. The entire value proposition of copyright is the same limited-space proposition that you say makes taxation make sense.
I don't see how that's counter at all. If you accept that the inventor has a right to that temporary monopoly, how could you not accept that they have the right to sell it, in return for the present value of the innovation, to someone else?
You would need to make some argument about how the mere fact of a non-inventor holding it, even after buying it from the inventor, and doing the exact things an optimally informed inventor would do, defeats the goals you outline, and you haven't done so. (I really can't imagine what such an argument would look like, either.)
You're absolutely correct that litigation over trivial, independently-reinvented stuff does run contrary to the purpose of patents, but that's a separate issue from whether inventors should be able to transfer the rights to a litigation specialist -- not every inventor is good in the courtroom, nor should we expect them to be.
a) really infringe on the patent, and b) would not have known to use the insights of the patent but for it having been published
This is because such people break the "good" kind of monopolies we want from the patent system. To the extent that the above isn't true, it reduces to the issue of "crappy patents being granted", not a problem with litigation specialists per se.
[1] you
[2] kind [3] weird.
[3] of
[0] Paul Graham did it
[1] And everyone copied it here
[2] It's also way easier than putting the effort to weave these remarks into the text seamlessly
Oh, and they are used as a substitute for the lack of hyperlink markup in HN, which makes them a necessity when linking sources in comments.
Not particularly so when compared with e.g. mailing lists (those I frequent anyway) and usenet.
[0] http://daringfireball.net/projects/markdown/syntax#link
[1] see what I did there
It also runs counter to the purpose of patents: patents are originally a time-limited and governmentally defended monopoly on an invention to encourage its full publication[0] and ultimately the progress and improvement of society as a whole[1].
When entities can exist to do nothing but defend such monopoly against independent reinventions the incentives are completely out of phase with the original purpose: patents assumed the invention (and its trade) is the important object, not the monopoly itself.
[0] rather than trade secrets, espionage and other such focus on anything but progressing
[1] not only because the invention is available at all but because once the monopoly runs out it becomes a new baseline[2] for further invention
[2] in that it's free, it is possible to license the invention to build upon it during the monopoly phase, but I think it reasonable to assume increased activity once the invention becomes literally free for all