One prevents the attacker from accessing something they aren't subscribed to, and relies on crypto and secure subscriber identity mechanisms. This is completely possible to implement soundly.
The other prevents the attacker from copying something they can see or listen to, and relies on bizarre mechanisms designed to prevent the user from learning the state of their hardware.
I find the latter awful, because it's an infinitely losing battle (you can always point a camera at your display in the end) which erodes consumer freedoms and encourages walled gardens.
Satellite TV is a funny example - since the communication is strictly one-way, the hardware state needs to be protected or it can be cloned, but I still think it's fundamentally a question of the transport protection variety rather than the copy protection one.
Meanwhile, it all works because nobody cares to break your DRM because audio is already widely distributed in lossless DRM-free formats (CDs), and Blu-Ray DRM is already broken. The pirates don't want Netflix's 5Mbps stream when they can just buy a Blu-Ray and get a 50Mbps copy instead. (Similarly, they don't want Spotify's Vorbis stream because they can just source material from the uncompressed CD.)
(Piracy works because it's a http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_cow_problem)
My point was that normally we explain piracy by "it is an easier way of enjoying ..." and I can agree with that, but few things are easier to use (and pay for) than Spotify. I can see your point about researching their content protection.
Edit: Wow, learned my lesson, don't express admiration. I guess I just don't get the downvoting without leaving a comment.
Whereas any software-based mechanism, without buy-in from the OS/OEM, is essentially going to always be one click away from being cracked, as far as end-users view it.
However: it's worth knowing whether content protection is implemented soundly. Contrary to overwhelming popular opinion, there are content protection schemes that work. Generalist engineers mistakenly believe that content protection schemes must be unbreakable to provide value. They don't: all they have to do is cost more to break than the value of the content they protect (across all the users who might subsequently get access to it).
For an example of a content protection scheme that worked extremely well, see modern satellite TV smart cards.
Given that there are ways to implement content protection soundly, there's validity to research that determines whether a given content protection scheme is sound.