A good example is products liability law. The EU products liability directive is implemented in Germany as the Appliances and Product Safety Act. It does not create civil liability to injured consumers, but instead is part of an administrative enforcement regime. Authorities actively monitor the products on the market, and have the power to issue recalls, fines, and even criminal penalties.
For most areas of the law that see significant litigation (products liability, employment, etc) the U.S. either lacks such administrative entities or has undersized ones compared to what is common in Europe. In the American system, more of these issues are, consciously, left to be handled in private litigation. Essentially, in Europe you have more bureaucrats, and in America we have more lawyers.
Also, note that "loser pays" countries aren't usually literally "loser pays." In France, for example, losers pay court fees, but attorney's fees are awarded by a judge in an amount that usually doesn't cover actual amounts spent.
Being a lawyer does not make you magically more able to read the laws, the laws are written exactly because the intention is that people can read them and see what they do.
What makes a lawyer different is that a lawyer usually knows where to search for laws faster, and has a set of laws on his head that might be immediately useful, also lawyers tend to know some important past court cases that might affect future cases.
But still, being a lawyer does not make you a magical law knower, some countries even allow you to be a lawyer without law school.
'Faraway hills look green,' as the proverb goes.
the troll has a clear incentive to minimise their own costs (filing hundreds of carbon-copy suits must have huge economies of scale, each one has to be cheap or their model doesn't work), but the defendant still has to spend lots to defend, with only the upside of 2 * a small amount to collect when they win.
The other upside to winning is that you no longer have to pay whatever the patent troll was trying to extort.
In many (most?) acquisitions, patents are incorporated in the valuation of companies that are to be acquired, even when the purchaser is a giant entity that could probably beat the target in a patent litigation by countersuing for something else.
I agree that it would cause less filing among less-wealthy people/companies in some cases. But I'd also guess it would increase filings in other.
(assuming they can objectively and accurately determine their chance of winning, which isn't always a reasonable assumption)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attorney's_fee#Who_pays
I'd argue this is a sound principle, which reduces the number of abusive/frivolous cases taken to court.