The thing about crypto is that almost any bug in a crypto library is related to crypto. It can't be easily isolated, and if you try, you have to actually analyze the isolation to make sure that it's really isolated.
"...disruptive decisions..."
Who is it disrupting?
OpenBSD is trying to provide value to their users. If you want slow, steady, incremental, reactive improvements to OpenSSL, every other OS will give you that. OpenBSD apparently believes its users would benefit from a proactive approach to security.
But if you look at the code, you might come to the conclusion that the upstream is not so focused code quality (security!) as one might hope. There is such a jungle of code that can only be justified by the desire for more features, more portability (to crazy ancient platforms too), more speed, more flexibility... it's all more knobs and code where real security bugs can lurk. And code paths that do not get tested properly. You can also find many outright dangerous idioms used throughout. Does that mean the upstream is ignorant, or that they do not care, or that they do not have the man power to fix their aging code? Either way, it's bad.
The OpenBSD developers have different priorities, and they believe they can do better. As such, not being able to blindly pull changes and updates from the upstream developers they do not trust does not look like a significant loss. If new features are to be merged in, it has to be properly reviewed and adapted. Yes, it's more work that way. But the end result is likely better code.
Also, the $20k was for the power bill. Yes, there are some older systems among the powered ones. But there's more, there's really a rack full of hardware running the infrastructure that makes OpenBSD available to us. There's networking gear, there's AC...
Dobbsbob makes a good point too. The weird hardware OpenBSD runs on helps find bugs; the untested code paths in OpenSSL add bugs.
They use that old equip to find bugs
> They're choosing to switch from a simple packager role to a maintainer role.
This is hardly a leap of faith for the OpenBSD developers. The dev team has always placed an emphasis on security even if the added security meant significant additional work. OpenBSD has a history of creating new software products to replace products that they deemed unacceptable from a security standpoint (including forking netbsd). I imagine that in addition to OpenBSD you are familiar with at least one of these projects:OpenBGPD http://www.openbgpd.org
OpenNTPD http://www.openntpd.org
OpenSMTPD http://www.opensmtpd.org
OpenSSH http://www.openssh.org
In fairness it's always been my impression that a BSD distribution is intended to be much more than a mere packager of software, but instead an integrator of those libraries into a sane, coherent overall operating system.
This is the reason OpenSSH has their native version for OpenBSD and then a "portable" version for the rest of the POSIX world.
Although if they're going to embark on such an endeavour, maybe it would be best to also rewrite it completely in a memory safe language like Rust (but in a year or two, after Rust becomes more mature).
Regardless, I have mixed feeling about this, one month ago a lot of people lauded openssl for not being vulnerable to the goto fail saga while criticizing Apple for not using openssl and now everyone is ready to ditch openssl in a heartbeat for a flaw not related to crypto, not committed by core developers. I'm not defending openssl, I would love a concerted effort by big industry players for implementing a new SSL/TLS stack from scratch, maybe in a safer language, but I also don't think it is a reason for taking quick, disruptive decisions like this. It is also likely they had this move in mind before this episode and this flaw was the last straw but they should have exposed their plan, it would have been a bit better for us to understand their reasoning.