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Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by sarahj on Saturday April 19, 2014 @10:21PM (#7615541)
Why have a single entity at all? Moxie Marlinspike proposed Convergence (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Wl2FW2TcA) as a solution - I think that something like that has far more potential wheels to travel than a Namecoin based system.

I should be able to choose who I trust, a notary system would allow me to do just that. No central CA systems.

The biggest concern I can see is Identity management, but, as mentioned by Moxie, most of these CA don't do anything close to proper Identity management any more - I have a number of certificates bought from quite a few different CA's all made out to my rabbit, at no fixed address.

Notaries can, of course, do additional verification - they could even advertise this as a premium.

I don't see why this can't be extended to DNS lookup's either. I trust X notaries and pin the results I get, I can choose to trust a majority, or be hyper paranoid and require everyone to agree. No need to run a power hungry blockchain, no single point of technology failure.

Technically, all of that is feasible today. And I imagine we will see a number of different technologies combined to form a proper, decentralised, system.

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by vxNsr on Sunday April 20, 2014 @01:30AM (#7615972)
The project seems to have lost support, the last github commit was over 2 years ago.

Do you know if there was a specific reason or were people just not interested/none of the browsers jumped onboard?

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by sarahj on Sunday April 20, 2014 @01:50AM (#7616013)
Most of the energy in this space has gone into http://tack.io/ which has been called "a non-controversial first step" - I believe it is making its way though standards talks at the moment although I have not looked into it for a while.

Personally I think now is good time to revisit assumptions made a few years ago - security and privacy and in particular non-government controlled systems are on many peoples lips.

If I ever clear my current plate, I would be interested in diving into the problem.

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by cpach on Sunday April 20, 2014 @04:44AM (#7616264)
For those interested, here’s the latest update from the TACK mailing list: http://slexy.org/view/s20UsKEoRm (January 2014)
Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by higherpurpose on Sunday April 20, 2014 @04:53AM (#7616278)
From Moxie:

"Convergence is blocking on TACK, which is blocking on browser vendors."

https://twitter.com/moxie/status/451020203099299840

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by ivanr on Sunday April 20, 2014 @05:23AM (#7616328)
There should be a clear statement about the status of Convergence on the web site. IIRC, the Firefox extension has been broken for more than a year now. Why? If Mozilla broke their APIs and made it impossible for the extension to work, then we should know about that. Otherwise, what's the excuse for the extension being broken for so long?

Convergence had the momentum, and there was a small but vocal group of people willing to support it. But, due to project mismanagement and lack of communication, that momentum has been lost.

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by 0x006A on Sunday April 20, 2014 @05:57AM (#7616371)
There are some more active forks like https://github.com/mk-fg/convergence/ but they too seam to not really work in current versions of Firefox.
Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by y0ghur7_xxx on Sunday April 20, 2014 @06:35AM (#7616417)
I don't understand this. Can someone weight in with an explanation? Convergence works just fine without TACK: I can set up two or more notaries on some VPS somewhere, and my browser would check if the notaries see the same certificate on that server I am trying to connect to as my browser. Seems secure to me: no external CA involved, the certificate on the web server can be self signed, and a MITM attack would need to hack two or more external servers to be successful. How does TACK fit in all of this?
Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by dvanduzer on Saturday April 19, 2014 @10:24PM (#7615548)
Want to help us work on this problem at http://telehash.org?
Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by sarahj on Saturday April 19, 2014 @11:00PM (#7615644)
I remember reading something about that before. I just had a quick look around and, while I don't believe I have fully groked the concept it would seem to me that Telehash is solving a different, but related problem.

The web, as a technology is probably not going anywhere for a few more decades at least - people have gotten very used to opening up a web browser - very few actually understand the technology beneath.

The CA/DNS issue is one based solely around them - can I type the domain name I saw on the tv/ my friend gave me/I heard about into a web browser (and these days) and it can direct me (securely) to the page where I can do business.

Telehash seems to fit in on another level. Perhaps one which we are heading towards - a world of machines securely finding and communicating with each other to achieve a goal set for them by some human actor.

This space is becoming more crowded and no good contender has emerged - and I think there is a good reason - they are either too radical as so they can't find a footing, or they are too conservative.

The documentation is slightly lax, but I feel telehash is the latter - it doesn't seem to be solving any problems already solved:

* Space/Storage/Data Transfer - I don't care what anyone says, the blockchain model is simply no scalable, any system where are full client has to hold onto/download gigabytes of information is a non-starter for me.

But still, in any new system - hopefully decentralised, we need to distribute information. Any kind of system we build must be tolerant of partitioning - I think the solution to this is injecting some trust (ala Convergence)

* Speed - Computers work in nanoseconds, the web currently operates in seconds (some sites in milliseconds) - we can't beat the speed of light, but we can certainly start removing the cruft from our communications - HTML, XML, JSON, CSV - are all formats designed for people. We need tools that let us manipulate formats designed for machines.

Our networking protocols are like this as well - as much as people hate ASN.1 it solved some problems decades ago allowing the phone system to scale on just duct tape and wd40

* Power - Blockchain bashing time again - we live in a world of limited, expensive power. We are getting much better at producing low power devices, people like wireless devices. Why should our networks be so power-hungry?

Just a few, rambling thoughts.

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by dvanduzer on Saturday April 19, 2014 @11:31PM (#7615734)
Just to be clear, Telehash is a protocol, not an application. The bulk of the documentation is on Github, and so far it's mostly for people implementing the protocol in different languages.

There's no blockchain involved in Telehash. It accomodates various cipher sets, including one suitable for ultra low power devices (there's a partially working implementation for Arduino). And you're correct, it isn't really aimed at enabling anything like trusting a URL from a television commercial.

Telehash is conservative in the sense that it solves useful problems, even within the current DNS infrastructure. No one's currently doing this, but you could easily map a DNS name to a Telehash address. But it also offers global resilience to partitioning, because the logical mesh can operate on any lower level network transport.

I like the multiple notary model of Convergence, but I think any of these trust models still need to separate the "human memorable names" component.

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by sarahj on Sunday April 20, 2014 @12:00AM (#7615796)
I was mixing a number of different criticisms of various technologies in my post...I never meant to confer that Telehash has a blockchain.

I guess, I still don't understand the point of Telehash. Even having read through the documentation. "Establishing private communication channels" is definitely a big problem, one with a huge threat model, and the solution is probably multi-faceted - I don't see where a system like Telehash fits in v.s. something like tor or i2p for example - does anonymity fit into the threat model?

Before dragging this thread off the page I will follow up with an email. :)

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by dvanduzer on Sunday April 20, 2014 @11:53AM (#7617185)
Hope to hear from you. :)

Telehash's design may simplify the future design of Tor-like protocols, but anonymity is not an intended core feature.

Partition resistance is probably the highest priority. If any possible insecure network path exists, encrypted communication between endpoints should also be possible (and automatic).

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by edwintorok on Sunday April 20, 2014 @02:26PM (#7617885)
How does this compare to the following which I've seen mentioned lately:

* sayI [http://www.ethos-os.org/~solworth/sayIgroups-20130614.pdf]

* MinimaLT: http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/310.pdf

* CurveCP: http://curvecp.org/

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by dvanduzer on Monday April 21, 2014 @10:51AM (#7621298)
sayI appears to be the directory service designed for MinimaLT / Ethos. CurveCP looks like it fits in the same use case as MinimaLT. That's where I'd say Telehash lives, too (but I've only skimmed any of these papers so far).

Telehash started out life as a more generalized global DHT-for-your-apps design circa 2010, and the spec has since evolved significantly to include the same kind of wire-level crypto.

Opening an issue is the easiest way to get the FAQ updated (and we'd definitely appreciate the feedback): https://github.com/telehash/telehash.org/issues

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by SixSigma on Sunday April 20, 2014 @05:24AM (#7616330)
But I trust your rabbit and it can happily take as many of my dandelions as it wants.
Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by einhverfr on Sunday April 20, 2014 @12:05PM (#7617247)
I think we should rebuild a PKI on top of DNS also. It shouldn't be that hard to do honestly and it would avoid a lot of this sort of problem.
Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by wyager on Saturday April 19, 2014 @11:08PM (#7615668)
> Why have a single entity at all?

How do you figure that Namecoin is a "single entity"?

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by sarahj on Saturday April 19, 2014 @11:49PM (#7615779)
There is one blockchain. The security of the blockchain requires everyone working very hard to maintain it - while it is made out of many parts it is 1 entity (like an ant colony).

Contrast with something like Convergence, where, while they share a common protocol (maybe...not necessarily) each part is responsible for itself, and not tied to any particular larger whole.

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by higherpurpose on Sunday April 20, 2014 @04:57AM (#7616288)
And do you think that makes it inherently less secure than a "free-for-all" system? I think the point of the blockchain is to remove trust and become trustless, while the point of something like this is to keep the trust system, but actually give you some choice of who you trust. It seems a little better, but I think trustless authentication (as in no 3rd party required) would be preferred.
Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by einhverfr on Sunday April 20, 2014 @06:47AM (#7616439)
Trustless is great for so many things but try answering this question in a trustless environment: "Before I give you my credit card info, how do I know you are who you say you are?"

If you can answer that without trust. .

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by vertex-four on Sunday April 20, 2014 @10:52AM (#7616932)
You can know that you are talking to the same named digital identity that you think you are talking to without trust; that's a significant amount of the value of Namecoin. Validating that a digital identity is tied to a specific real world identity is a separate problem.
Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by einhverfr on Sunday April 20, 2014 @11:53AM (#7617184)
> Validating that a digital identity is tied to a specific real world identity is a separate problem.

But it isn't for the main areas of SSL usage (e-commerce, ensuring your passwords are sent to the right party, etc). Those require trust. I don't know how you get around that.

I.e. I can imagine the concern being that X.509 ties together validating identity with public key infrastructure but since one use of a public key is to validate identity I am not convinced that is a bad thing, and to be honest, I can't see a trustless alternative for most of the current uses.

I can imagine many better alternatives to X.509 (anything that starts with a letter . three digit number is OSI legacy crap), but I don't see how to get rid of the identity vouching aspect of it.

Re:No, don't enable revocation checking by vertex-four on Sunday April 20, 2014 @12:29PM (#7617371)
As a general rule, people care that their connection is secure, because they've been told to worry about people stealing their card numbers on insecure sites. They've generally established trust in other ways - more commonly, they simply trust it because they've heard about it elsewhere or it ranks highly on Google, and they use a trusted payment provider such as Paypal.

Most people honestly don't go to the effort of verifying that a certificate matches the real-world identity they think it does. It's difficult, especially with smaller stores that don't use EV certificates.

For cases where people think third-party attestation is a necessary thing for their purposes, frankly, we have nothing better than the CA model right now; but that can easily be integrated with Namecoin, allowing for only those who need it to use it, and the rest to have access to secure communications and proofs of digital identity without having to pay up.