Re:CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]
by sneak on Wednesday April 02, 2014 @09:04PM
(#7520187)
> In your blog post there seems to be little context that can excuse such a mistake
This is a recurring theme with cryptocat. Stay away for 5-10 years until they get their act together.
Re:CryptoCat iOS Application Penetration Test [pdf]
by kaeporan on Wednesday April 02, 2014 @08:46PM
(#7520114)
Hi there,
The fix for the MITM bug is to offer proper notice via the user interface when a user re-keys with a different public key. There's a demonstration of the user interface element in the blog post.
In your blog post there seems to be little context that can excuse such a mistake and nothing that explains how you fix it? Am I correct in reading your blog post that right now there isn't a fix? I.e. it's an open attack assuming someone compromises a CA or a cryptocat server?
Isn't this a rather big issue since the only point of cryptocat is to protect against that kind of an attack. If you just wanted security only against eavesdroppers(i.e. you trusted the chat server), xmpp over TLS would work fine.