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Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by sliverstorm on Sunday January 19, 2014 @11:40PM (#7087607)
Can anyone explain on a conceptual level how mixing can possibly work? I'm not thinking about implementation details, but more like boot prints in the snow. You can stamp a big mess in the snow, but no matter how much you stamp about, there is still one set of your tracks entering and one set leaving. When all the transactions are clear to see in the blockchain, all the boot prints are right there.
Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by ohazi on Monday January 20, 2014 @12:07AM (#7087695)
Imagine a bunch of people traveling in different directions in the snow. Rather than going directly towards their intended destination, everybody goes first to one particular spot, where there is one pair of boot imprints.

You walk toward the bootprint, step into it, step out of it, and then continue on your merry way.

When lots of people do the same, you see a bunch of tracks going into one bootprint, and a bunch of tracks going out. But because everybody was careful to place their feet into the one bootprint indentation, the person following your tracks won't know which of the many forward paths you took after you stepped out.

Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by sliverstorm on Monday January 20, 2014 @01:05AM (#7087852)
But what about the part where every boot has a distinct print? Or is that where the metaphor breaks down.
Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by 21echoes on Monday January 20, 2014 @02:29AM (#7088061)
they trade/change boots at that convergent stomping point (i.e., use a new wallet address)
Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by paulbaumgart on Monday January 20, 2014 @01:15AM (#7087870)
Everyone's wearing identical boots.
Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by SilasX on Monday January 20, 2014 @05:56PM (#7092260)
Well, we already have desired situation with a different kind of snow -- cocaine.

Right now, most bills are (supposedly) tainted with cocaine. And yet holding bills with detectable cocaine is not admissible as evidence against you.

That's what these pools are going for: so that every bitcoin has touched every transaction. So yes, you can prove that a bitcoin previously touched a crime at some point ... but that fact has zero evidential value.

Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by sliverstorm on Monday January 20, 2014 @06:26PM (#7092362)
Dollars are not an analogue though, because we don't have a record of every time a dollar bill changed hands. Or at least so my thinking goes.
Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by SilasX on Monday January 20, 2014 @06:54PM (#7092470)
They're close enough for purposes of understanding the dynamics.

For example, cash bills weren't well-mixed, then finding cocaine on your money would indeed be evidence that you were one or two levels removed from drug handlers, and may (legally and rationally) justify a look at the people you've been in contact with.

Likewise, when it's not regular practice to mix up your bitcoins through pools, then holding a marked coin would be evidence of wrongdoing.

(And I've argued elsewhere that that's also a reason for prosecuting mixing pools as money launderers!)

Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by wmf on Monday January 20, 2014 @12:03AM (#7087681)
Nope, there are N entering and N identical leaving (in this case) so there's no way to know which outgoing transaction belongs to which person.
Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by desal on Monday January 20, 2014 @03:19AM (#7088175)
Does that actually matter?

The way i understand it, Bob wants to send 1 BTC to Alice, and Charlie wants to send 1 BTC to Dave, and everyone wishes to do so anonymously. Through the wonder of mixing Bob's coin actually ends up with Dave. Unfortunately for Dave, Alice was a drug dealer and Dave gets arrested for receiving stolen property or proceeds from crime or some such.

Except in reality the mixing is done with smaller parcels, and a larger number of users. Whether or not the feds want to go after you for receiving 27c worth of drug money is another matter entirely, but i can quickly see there being some negatives to using a mixing service.

Re:Bitcoin Mixing: economic analysis and design guidelines by wmf on Monday January 20, 2014 @02:31PM (#7091325)
It depends how you write the blacklisting/tainting rules, which may depend on money laundering regulations and legal standards of proof. You can say that transaction outputs are all tainted if one input is tainted (an or rule), outputs are tainted only if all inputs are tainted (an and rule), or outputs taint equals the average input taint. Mixing can defeat two out of three of these rules.