Likewise, choices that appear irrational may turn out to be entirely sensible but for the exclusion of relevant factors. Having been quite poor in the past I can certainly distinguish between irrational choices of the 'oh fuck it, let tomorrow take care of itself' variety and rational ones of the 'this is inefficient, but satisfies constraints' type.
As an example of the latter, consider riding the bus. In many places you can get a monthly pass at a substantial discount to paying multiple fares every day. But for someone who is un- or under-employed, the expected value of purchasing the monthly pass is quite different from that of someone with a predictable commute; if that person makes the wrong guess about how often s/he will travel over the month, it can result in a significant opportunity cost.
Then there's the even simpler case of the person who can't accumulate enough cash at a time to buy the monthly pass, but who won't be able to get paid at the end of the week without taking the bus to work each day. Absent credit facilities, paying bus far on a day-by-day basis can be perfectly rational when viewed in the individual's overall economic context. Unfortunately, economics textbooks don't devote much attention to multiple inelastic constraints.
Having a high discount rate is not irrational. Multiple discount rates are, but a single high discount rate is perfectly rational.
But if you discount the future too liberally, then pretty much anything can be spun as a rational choice, eg drug addiction, being a hobo, taking up crime or whatever. I smoked fairly heavily for about 20 years, which I'm sur is going to have some negative impact on my future lifespan/quality of life, if the way I felt by the time I quit is anything to go by. For all that I liked smoking at times, it was basically a symptom of nictotine addiction and I can't say my life was improved by having been a smoker. This is certainly one case where I discounted the future too heavily.
Not everything we do is rational, but all the things you mentioned can -- and imo should, absent evidence to the contrary -- be treated as rational choice.
Also, "rational" is contextual, not objective or axiomatic in any real-world finite computational system as a matter of mathematics. This is an important distinction often ignored. As a consequence, "irrationality" can be generally defined as "making a decision from a different contextual basis". Again, this defeats the desire to create absolute rules of economics that fit in a soundbite.
Economics is perfectly capable of dealing with the complexities of real-world actors in theory. In practice, most economists attempt to reduce the complex dynamics implied by the theory into trivial theorems that are easy to turn into government policy. This is somewhat understandable because even approximating a pure model is computationally prohibitive. This provides a lovely framework within which any economist can come up with a narrow model that suits their particular ideological proclivities. You rarely see an economist that properly recognizes the constraints and assumptions of their model but those limitations exist nonetheless. Advanced computer science will allow us to implement the more general models directly regardless of whether or not the results are politically convenient, but it may take a while before we see it.
Preference heterogeneity by itself does not imply anything about rationality. However, that is not to say the topic is so simple. We know this empirically by looking things like revealed preference for risk taking. One example might be propensity to take risky bets, despite known zero/negative NPV expected values. These people are happy to buy earnings Vol because the distributions on the downside has such little variation (poor today = poor tomorrow). Whereas a middle class person can make more use of the savings (investment opportunities are greater, and the downside risk of less savings is too), on the one hand, and is not so desperate for upside on the other (even if its just the psychic hit of the "chance" to be rich).
I have absolutely no idea where you get this idea. Both supply and demand curves are based entirely on the concept of heterogeneity.
The microfoundations of the supply and demand curves are (for simplicity assuming each customer will supply/purchase only 0 or 1 item):
Supply(P) = # of suppliers with reserve price > P
Demand(P) = # of customers who's reserve price < P
If agents were homogeneous, then both of those curves would be a step function.Similarly, the standard economic explanation of why the poor make "bad" choices is heterogeneity - the poor have a higher discount rate than the rich.
Er, no, while people have been saying that this is the "real point" of various stories on internet discussion fora at least as long as I've been on internet discussion fora (which goes back to the latter half of the year 1990), its really not. The rational actor model (whose role in economics is much more limited than many people seem to think) has always -- from the day it was conceived -- been known to be a simplified model (like the "perfectly competitive market") which is a good-enough approximation for some real world interactions but fundamentally not true (it assumes, among other thing, what amounts to effective omniscience -- at least where it concerns any decision that has any impact on the actor's own experienced utility -- on the part of all actors), and also not even good enough to be useful for many important situations.
No one anywhere in the social sciences thinks the rational actor model represents the underlying reality, and in economics particularly it (along with perfectly competitive markets) is baseline that works both as a basis for a highly idealized model that is important pedagogically and often useful as a basis for describing real world situations in terms of variances from (e.g., explaining empirically derived models of real-world behavior in terms of how the empirical model differs from idealized model and connecting that to a theory of how the real underlying processes differ from those that form the basis for the idealized model.)
Part of this may be due to the fact that most economists who appear in the media are basically paid shills, but no matter the reason, it is definitely a problem for the democratic process.
If I were an expert in how bubbles formed in water and spent all of my time thinking of ways to maximize bubble growth by sucking gases out of the water in a tank, I would be good at creating aquariums with large bubbles, but probably end up with a lot dead or sick fish.
The question is, how much, and what kind, of irrationality is reasonable to admit into a model? While rationality is easy to define, there can be an infinite number of ways people can be irrational, and their decision processes would change. Macroeconomics used to assume less-than-rational, empirically calibrated decision processes and aggregate behavior that would rise from those; but these models did not adequately account for people changing their behavior, including the degree of irrationality, in response to changes in the environment.
Apropos of the article: the headline is really making hay out of a tangential point. Sure, the "poor vs. rich" angle gets more clicks and inbound links. But the real point -- which is a huge one, as far as the field of economics is concerned -- is that the "rational (and by implication, homogeneously rational) actor" presumption is under fire. It's been under fire before because people have been shown, time and again, to behave economically irrationally. But this time it's under fire because people have been shown to react heterogeneously to the same stimuli and incentives. (Not really touched upon in the article, but also worth mentioning: a third major critique in recent years has been the revelation that classical economics was highly skewed by the idiosyncrasies of the Western cultures in which it was cultivated and codified. It turns out that not everyone around the world behaves like 19th-20th Century Austrians, Britons, or Americans.)
All of this is huge, I repeat, because pretty much every foundational theory in classical economics is predicated on homogeneity and rationality. Every single one. The entire field. Even a preponderance of modern economics is undergirded by flawed assumptions borrowed from classical models.
I, for one, am really excited by the modernist, behaviorist, relativist, empiricist and frequentist challenges to classical economics. This is sort of like seeing a paradigm shift in a highly influential field of study play out in something resembling real time. Economics has always been based on statistics -- even highly sophisticated statistics -- but the inputs, so to speak, have been pretty unsophisticated. These challenges will help drag economics into the 21st century.