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Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by geoffhill on Saturday September 28, 2013 @07:06PM (#6463442)
I like this idea a lot!

A less powerful solution implemented completely locally: A "known_hosts" file for SSL certificates for repeat visits. As long as you've visited a site once before, any subsequent visits will be safe.

To deal with certificate upgrades, certificate Y could present a signed verification that it obsoletes a past certificate X. Then, when a client that trusts certificate X receives certificate Y, it can update its "known_hosts" file accordingly. This change would require more than just local changes, but remote cooperation.

Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by nwh on Saturday September 28, 2013 @08:22PM (#6463608)
> As long as you've visited a site once before, any subsequent visits will be safe.

As long as your first visit wasn't compromised.

Sites like Google's also don't use the same certificate every time. Out of my own curiosity I scraped their SSL sites for a while, I saw tens, maybe hundreds of different certificates being presented. There's no way of telling which are actually Google's.

Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by gwu78 on Sunday September 29, 2013 @01:09AM (#6464196)
Certificates could be initially delivered out of band, e.g., in person, or by postal mail. Perhaps in a printed format that can be scanned in.

But then there's no way of telling which postal mail is actually from Google, right? :)

Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by nwh on Sunday September 29, 2013 @03:51AM (#6464471)
We'll sign the out of band letters with their signing key to prove it's aut- wait. Chicken and egg problem.
Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by gwu78 on Friday October 04, 2013 @05:25PM (#6498116)
Or we could just sign the OOB letters, on company letterhead, with an ink pen.
Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by Nanzikambe on Saturday September 28, 2013 @07:05PM (#6463437)
Interesting, but doesn't this pretty much assume that the MITM isn't occurring in the last hops of the path to the server?

If all paths (including those through Tor) lead through a piece of compromised infrastructure (a rogue access-point like a pineapple, or subverted router) both will report that the site uses the same certificate despite the MITM.

Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by jarito on Saturday September 28, 2013 @09:05PM (#6463695)
How is the different from convergence.io? What does using Tor offer over Moxie's approach? An existing network of machines?
Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by aw3c2 on Sunday September 29, 2013 @05:17AM (#6464628)
See http://detector.io/DetecTor.html , it's really not too much to read and written well.