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Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by nwh on Saturday September 28, 2013 @08:22PM (#6463608)
> As long as you've visited a site once before, any subsequent visits will be safe.

As long as your first visit wasn't compromised.

Sites like Google's also don't use the same certificate every time. Out of my own curiosity I scraped their SSL sites for a while, I saw tens, maybe hundreds of different certificates being presented. There's no way of telling which are actually Google's.

Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by gwu78 on Sunday September 29, 2013 @01:09AM (#6464196)
Certificates could be initially delivered out of band, e.g., in person, or by postal mail. Perhaps in a printed format that can be scanned in.

But then there's no way of telling which postal mail is actually from Google, right? :)

Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by nwh on Sunday September 29, 2013 @03:51AM (#6464471)
We'll sign the out of band letters with their signing key to prove it's aut- wait. Chicken and egg problem.
Re:Client-side SSL/TLS MITM, compromised CA and server imper... by gwu78 on Friday October 04, 2013 @05:25PM (#6498116)
Or we could just sign the OOB letters, on company letterhead, with an ink pen.