The balance sheet numbers per share: 1) +$13.50 - Net current assets (i.e liquid assets) 2) +$2.50 - Real estate holding (less liquid) 3) +$6.50 - Book value of IP 4) -$7.00 - TOTAL Liabilities
Meaning if you shut down the company you could realize a value of around $16 per share. Even if you discount current assets & IP since they might be over-valued in the books you can realistically get to a $11-$14 range for the value of the stock.
Essentially this means that any smart owner could realize a significant profit at $9/share just tearing down the company smartly (i.e. not a fire sale). As such, I expect Fairfax: 1) Maintain the businesses that are profitable TODAY 2) Shut down the unprofitable parts of the business that are destroying earnings (and thus slowly eating into asset value and the investment thesis) 3) Shop out ownership / licensing of the IP given it's significant value
I don't think this means that Fairfax is trying to turn around the company and restore Blackberry to its earlier glory; that would be a bit irresponsible and reckless for a value investor. Don't expect Blackberry to be the same company it was before, although I expect parts of business to continue.
* Cash, short-term and long-term liquid investments, receivables, and assets held for sale totaled $6.0 billion. (I wouldn't dare put a dollar value on inventories, because their value declines at an accelerating pace, like a waterfall, due to the rapid pace of technological change.)
* Property plant & equipment (consisting mostly of land and buildings) totals $2.2 billion. Let's give them full credit for this figure.
* Total liabilities are $3.7 billion.
So, assuming you can liquidate the whole business quickly, the liquidation value of all tangible assets appears to be somewhere around $6.0 + $2.2 - $3.7 = $4.5 billion. However, the company is hemorrhaging money by the day and suffering from anti-network effects that can make revenues drop like a waterfall (instead of declining in a gentle slope), so this estimate may be optimistic. In a year, the figure could very well be down to $3.5 billion.
That leaves the value of intellectual property, carried on the books at $3.5 billion. Of that amount, $0.8 billion is the price paid for Blackberry's share of the Nortel patents[2]; the reminder consists primarily of all the Blackberry software they've developed in-house (that is, their proprietary OS and applications, built on top of QNX), which is valuable to third parties only to the extent they want to build a business around it. My (conservative) guess: this is worth a LOT less than $3.5 billion -- maybe ~$1 billion -- but I don't know for sure.[3]
At a proposed purchase price of $4.7 billion, the margin of safety looks very slim to me.
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[1] http://ca.blackberry.com/content/dam/bbCompany/Desktop/Globa...
[2] See the "Intangible Assets, Net" notes in http://press.blackberry.com/content/dam/rim/press/PDF/Financ...
[3] For reference, QNX -- the jewel in Blackberry's software portfolio -- has been sold twice over the past decade. Harman International bought it for $138 million in 1994, and then sold it to RIM for $200 million in 2010. These figures are rounding errors compared to $4.7 billion. Source: http://blog.vdcresearch.com/embedded_sw/2010/04/update-2-rim...
Nevertheless here's where I think we disagree:
* Inventory will have some liquidation value. Let's discount inventory by 75% which is pretty conservative; you will still get $200M here
* IP - Main disagreement for me is here. Most analysts who have pegged the IP at $2 - $3 bn. Let's put it at $2bn, the lower end of the spectrum [1][2]
6.2 + 2.2 - 3.7 + 2 = $6.7B (~40% above purchase price)
As we can see the main question is the value of the IP (and PPE to a lesser extent). I have absolutely no experience valuing patents, I'm not a patent lawyer, and definitely won't be evaluating their 9K+ patent applications. So unfortunately there's a pretty big unknown in the valuation.
Regardless we have a $4.7B - $6.7B range based on a very quick 15 minute analysis of their balance sheet with an upside of earnings of any profitable lines of business that can be operated independently (if they exist).
My guess is tha Prem Watsa, as former chairman of BBRY, has done a much more rigorous evaluation of their IP and found profitable business lines he wants to keep / spin-off to reach a comfortable margin of safety.
[1] http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/24/technology/enterprise/blackb...
[2] http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2013/08/26/the-n...
The value of IP isn't the only question. We also seem to disagree on how quickly value is evaporating! Blackberry sales are bound to decline faster and faster, like a waterfall -- similar to what happened to Nokia's smartphones.
After the introduction of iOS and Android in 2007-2008, Nokia's quarterly smartphone unit sales barely budged... at first... but then dropped by two-thirds between Q1 2010 and Q1 2012![1]
Liquidating a company of Blackberry's size would take at least two years. Any estimate of liquidation value should take into account the possibility of quarterly unit sales dropping by two-thirds in the near future.
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[1] http://www.dazeinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/post-15.b...
http://qz.com/127441/cheat-sheet-here-are-the-bits-of-blackb...
All I did was take the balance sheet and pull out intangible assets: https://www.google.com/finance?q=NASDAQ%3ABBRY&fstype=ii&ei=.... I did NOT consider the value of earnings from any of the business (i.e. income sheet) as the investment thesis I made was for shutting down the business, and I don't want to divine profitability from each of the business lines.
They really need to require finance coursework in college so this kind of fake financial journalism gets stamped out.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/blackberry...
FWIW, this is about where Apple was in 2000, at ~$12/share.
The only justifications I can think of for buying Blackberry are a: to rebuild them, b: to integrate their good tech into an existing system (a good play for an also-ran smart phone that wants more market share and is willing to gamble for Blackberry's old, loyal enterprise market), c: to deliberately put them out of business (a good play for a successful smart phone to either go after the vacuum created by their death, or prevent competitors from exercising plan B).
Is it such a stretch to imagine a buyer killing R&D and investment, and marketing the carcass for enough years of free cash flow to get back the $4.7 billion?
Value investors aren't necessarily growth investors. The margin of error they look for can come from a cheap price.
It's similar to, "What if AOL just tried to milk the subscriptions instead of blowing all that money?"
AOL has an ongoing cash flow from subscription payments. Those payments keep coming from customers until they either quit the service or die off.
Blackberry sells devices. They don't have significant recurring revenue streams - customers have to come back and re-up to a new device every 2-3 years, or they don't get any money. That means as soon as you're no longer offering a competitive product, the revenue stream can dry up very quickly. Especially if carriers and retailers decide you're no longer worth carrying.
Look at the 50% drop they've taken in the past two years. Even if that line just stays constant, you're talking about a decrease of 90% in 6 years total. It's rare than you can scale a tech business down 90% or more and still operate it in any reasonable fashion.
"On January 22, 2012, it was reported he was to be appointed to BlackBerry handset maker, Research In Motion Ltd. (RIM), board of directors in the company's largest ever corporate shakeup. Mr Watsa resigned in August 2013, but kept his investment in the company at the time."
Source Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prem_Watsa
BBRY just did a massive writedown basically valuing all their newest phone inventory at $0. BBRY also changed the way they record sales so it looks like they have a bigger sales drop than they really did(they still had a very bad drop).
To have all these bad news and then for Watsa make what is effectively an insider bid for a company after participating in such negative news(resigning from the BBRY board a few weeks earlier does not count), smacks of something "unethical".
Why didn't he make a $12 bid a few days earlier? It is obvious Watsa knew the bad news and could make an informed bid.
A lot of regular investors are feeling extremely hurt by this. If I had invested in BBRY at say $10 hoping for a longer term turnaround, I would be upset as well.
To a regular investor it looks like the big boys not playing fair. Not that life is fair or anything.
1. Note I'm avoiding the argument about what makes dropbox less secure than box.com. I have no idea, but somehow box.com is making money. The company I work for mandated box.com over dropbox citing "security concerns". Whatever the reason/mindset exists that concludes dropbox is less secure than https://www.box.com/enterprise/ , is the same mindset that would buy "enterprise-secure" smartphone over whatever trendy iOS/Android phone is available.
These sorts of things are pretty mandatory for companies of reasonable size.
This seems like your textbook acquire, split and sell.
You are correct that BBRY has $3.4B of current liabilities.
> Take it private, do another, more aggressive round of layoffs and get down to a very core group. Then decide whether to chop it up and sell it off (patents alone are probably worth a good chunk of money). As far as I know, Blackberry has no debt, so that makes the math a bit easier.
Watsa is a great investor with a solid track record, but I think this has been a mistake for him.
If Fairfax is offering to pay $4.7 billion to acquire RIM, Mr. Watsa somehow must have convinced himself that the value of RIM's business exceeds $4.7 billion by a large margin.
However, to me Blackberry looks like a dying platform suffering from anti-network effects (that is, fewer and fewer people use it, so fewer and fewer people want or need to use it). I don't understand how he gets comfortable with that number.
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[1] See page 8 of Fairfax's last annual letter to shareholders: http://www.fairfax.ca/files/Letter%20to%20Shareholders%20fro...