But the architecture of the Internet also seems to make it very difficult to determine conclusively that a given communication has nothing whatsoever to do with someone outside the U.S.
Consider a VPN/proxies for instance, or even an email from an American to AQ_Recruiter at gmail (where the owner of AQ_Recruiter logs in from Yemen via a series of proxies, the endpoint of which is wholly-domestic).
I guarantee you that NSA wishes that problem was easy... they could pawn off the mere "domestic" stuff wholly on the FBI and focus on the "interesting" work of international spying and counter-terrorism (because again, in bizarro-world they aren't simply spying on people just because, but because they have a specific mission to attend to as directed by Congress and the DoD, which having to filter USPERS detracts from).
But the whole business of "parallel construction" where the NSA shares warrantlessly intercepted data with the DEA and keeps it secret from defense lawyers is pretty good evidence that "minimization" is a sham and the NSA is not honestly trying to keep itself within legal and constitutional bounds.
I've had occasion to think about this before, here and in other countries. I'm Irish, and as I'm sure you know there was a lot of anti-British terrorism originating in Northern Ireland for a long time. Terrorism was carried out within the UK, and for that mattter a good bit of it was funded from the US by people who considered that terrorism a noble cause (including, famously, Republican representative Peter King - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_T._King#Support_for_the_I...).
But the whole business of "parallel construction" where the NSA shares warrantlessly intercepted data with the DEA and keeps it secret from defense lawyers is pretty good evidence that "minimization" is a sham and the NSA is not honestly trying to keep itself within legal and constitutional bounds.
No dispute with that point. I just want to clarify that the NSA's legitimate scope is not defined purely geographically.
That's why the NSA is generally careful to refer to "U.S. persons" instead of "U.S. citizens" when they talk in technical terms about things like minimization.
See also http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ar...
BTW can you drop me an email at some point? Username at gmail.
If that were true then http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction would not be part and parcel of this whole story.
In the NSA's heyday there was simply never a need for parallel construction as it wasn't as if they were going to be bringing up Soviet diplomats on indictments. They explicitly didn't touch people on American soil so the whole idea of 'chain of custody' was almost completely moot.
Even now parallel construction is only a thing because it's that much easier for NSA to run across domestic communications commingled with international comms. Nowadays the analyst may see evidence of a major upcoming crime in the process of their actual duties, which puts you back in Churchill's Coventry quandry.
See:
http://theweek.com/article/index/237427/history-detective-di...
And lots of other places.
(2) The NSA is way out of line in this respect and no matter how much they do/did it that stands and you should not apologize for it. If you do you are essentially advocating for broadening the official reach of the NSA's powers rather than to rein them in because they clearly can not stick to their mandate.
The balance here is not to get to perfect security without privacy, the balance point is to get to an optimal level of security with a maximum of privacy. Anything less won't do, lest we all end telling another generation how terribly sorry we were.
Power corrupts, it's never been any different historically.
It's not whether it actually happened that's important or not, and I think you realize that. Prime Minister Churchill certainly did need to be careful about what actions he took based on ULTRA decrypts so as to avoid revealing the activities of Bletchley Park. Coventry is the quotable example despite not actually happening the way the story is told.
However if you require an example that actually happened, consider when Adm. Nimitz received message intelligence pointing out Adm. Yamamoto's flight itinerary.
In his case he ended up using a literal example of parallel construction (having a coastwatcher send a report of a Japanese flight) to generate a non-codebreaking reason for his staff to know about the flight, and then sent out his fighter planes to shoot Yamamoto's flight down.
> (2) The NSA is way out of line in this respect and no matter how much they do/did it that stands and you should not apologize for it.
With respect to things like DEA I would agree with you. But on the other hand if they came across a no-shit email from a hitman or something describing an upcoming murder I would expect them to report it.
It may be that it's impossible to write a policy that straddles that border, in which case I'd say we should probably ban that type of information sharing and then rely on the idea that an analyst who sees that type of murder plot might still leave an anonymous tip.
> The balance here is not to get to perfect security without privacy, the balance point is to get to an optimal level of security with a maximum of privacy.
Hey look at that, we fully agree!
Completely untrue. The NSA is in the business of gathering national foreign intelligence, which includes intelligence on the signals activity of foreign persons within the US. Suppose we know there are two Belgian spies in New York, are you telling me the NSA isn't allowed to listen into their conversations? Of course they are. This notion that they're not supposed to listen to any calls that begin and end within the US is just absurd. Foreign intelligence doesn't just encompass other places, it encompasses persons from those places who may be acting within the US. I can't believe I have to explain this.
See http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/execut... 1.12b
EDIT: It amuses me that people downvote posts with citations to primary sources. Have some more! Here's the definition of US persons (who the NSA is not supposed to spy on): http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/faqs.shtml#sigint4 per http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1801 which defines exactly who is a US person, an agent of a foreign power etc. basically, individuals who are citizens or hold green cards are US persons (also some associations and corporations, but you can read it yourself), any other individual is not regardless of whether they are in the US or not.
"Roamers: Roaming incidents occur when valid foreign target selectors are active inside the U.S. Roamer incidents continue to constitute the largest category of collection incidents across E.O. 12333 and FAA authorities. Roamer incidents are largely unpreventable, even with good target awareness and traffic review, since target travel activities are often unannounced and not easily predicted."
[1] http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/758651-1qcy12-violati...
I should have cited a link to EO 12333 [1] in my previous comment; the section that indicates that the FBI has the lead in domestic counterintelligence is section 2.3 (b). I'll admit it's not the most clearly worded, but it does go out of its way to single out the FBI:
"Collection within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise obtainable shall be undertaken by the FBI or, when significant foreign intelligence is sought, by other authorized agencies of the Intelligence Community, provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such agencies may be undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons"
The section on the NSA responsibilities (section 1.12(b)) speaks primarily to collecting signals intelligence for foreign intelligence purposes in support of the Department of Defense; it doesn't mention anything about counterintelligence. The FBI is singled out again in 1.14(a) as having the responsibility to conduct domestic counterintelligence. Other parts of the DoD have the responsibity to work with the FBI on matters of domestic counterintelligence (1.12(d)).
[1] http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/execut...
As mentioned elsewhere in this thread, that term refers to citizens and green card holders, plus associations/corporations made up largely of those two groups. A tourist or someone on a temporary visa, for example, is not a US person. therefore, any activities they engage in are by definition those of a forieng person. I stand by my argument that 'foreign/domestic' is a function of the people involved and the scope of their activities, not of geography.
"NSA's domestic surveillance activities are limited by the requirements imposed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; however, these protections do not apply to non-U.S. persons located outside of U.S. borders, so the NSA's foreign surveillance efforts are subject to far fewer limitations under U.S. law."[1]
As you mentioned in another one of your comments, the Fourth Amendment applies in the U.S. even to people who are not U.S. Persons. So this would seem to imply that warrantless eavesdropping on people's communications within the U.S. by the NSA is not permissible.
Also, regarding FISA:
"In sum, a significant purpose of the electronic surveillance must be to obtain intelligence in the United States on foreign powers (such as enemy agents or spies) or individuals connected to international terrorist groups. To use FISA, the government must show probable cause that the “target of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power."[2]
This does not seem to permit going after ordinary criminals such as drug dealers, and it does not seem to permit indiscriminate gathering of all internet communications (since there would be no probable cause for the vast majority of these communications).
"Suppose we know there are two Belgian spies in New York, are you telling me the NSA isn't allowed to listen into their conversations?"
Sure they are, if they go to the FISA court and get a warrant.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nsa#Domestic_activity
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveilla...
This does not seem to permit going after ordinary criminals such as drug dealers, and it does not seem to permit indiscriminate gathering of all internet communications (since there would be no probable cause for the vast majority of these communications).
I'm specifically not talking about that non-national security contexts. Everything I've heard about the relationship between the NSA and the DEA seems like a massive ethical and legal fail.
As has been discussed before, internet communications almost certainly do not meet the definition of 'papers' per the 4th amendment, especially if those communications are not point-to-point but go through third party providers like webmail providers. Arguably they should be, but my understanding of the alw (especially Smith v. Maryland) is that they're not.
There is evidence that the FBI also engages in warrantless wiretapping. See http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/privacy-line
However, it is not within the NSA's authority to pursue criminal activity within the U.S. — they're only mandated to spy on communications between the U.S. and a foreign country, or entirely outside the U.S. If I'm in the U.S. and send an encrypted message to somebody else in the U.S. (like my friend or my bank), they have no legal excuse to spy on me. If I'm under criminal suspicion for a crime committed in the U.S., the FBI or local law enforcement agencies need to get a warrant to intercept my communications. But, as the article states:
In fact, the NSA's "minimization" techniques — touted as methods for restricting spying to foreign terrorists instead of U.S. citizens — are often transparently and insultingly ridiculous.