The lack of a proposed solution does not make the identification of a problem worthless. Writing code is as much part of the process of solving problems with software as identifying those problems is. When a problem is largely a social one, rather than a technical one, identifying the problem and making people aware of its existence is often the bigger part of the process.
Tor guarantees anonymity. It succeeds at that. There is no technical problem. There is no code to write. This could lead you to think there's a problem with scope, that maybe Tor should guarantee security too. Unfortunately, the design of Tor is not compatible with that goal: if your plain text data goes through an exit node, then by definition, that exit node gets to see what the data is. A bug report titled "Tor does not provide secure communication" would get closed faster than you can say "won't fix". And rightfully so.
There is, however, a social problem, as stated by the OP: many people actually expect security. This is a problem that can only be solved by educating as many people as possible that this is the wrong expectation to have, which is what the OP is contributing to by making this post. This is very much in the spirit of "if you think it should be done, do it".
No it does not, it is always best to use a seperate browser for tor because your browser & OS fingerprint is significant
https://panopticlick.eff.org/index.php?action=log&js=yes
And that is ignoring the fact that most people will continue to login to the HN and facebook accounts.
Doesn't it fail at anonymity if the entire internet is being monitored?
If OP has ever used Tor, he would know that the performance hit is so huge, that no-one in there right mind is going to leave it on by default, if that's even an option. In OPs myopic view, he's missing the fact the the added benefit built in anonymity to all FF Users far outweighs this hypothetical security risk.
Won't work. People have too many accounts to be able to remember unique passwords. A large percentage of mundane users won't understand these things and will just be nagged all the time that they cannot log into their accounts with this new Firething.
You'd need to warn them before they even start typing a password in on an http page.
This does require the browser to know which passwords are which, though, at which point it might as well be entering them for you (and only being willing to do that over https).
But the thing is that thous TOR exit points (just like Proxies) can inject all kinds of JS on the sites they display and while some people run NoScript or similar browser extensions most do not.
And giving out your username/password combinations for scriptkiddies and criminals and allowing them to run any JS on sites you visit does hell of a lot more short term damage than any government surveillance, losing all of your possessions in an identity theft or just getting phony bills is way worse for your average consumer than having their Facebook chat logged.
Tor is a good tool when used properly, but slapping it on to everything isn't what the tool was made for.
I always thought that one possible way around this would be for websites to generate the passwords for their users, essentially forcing them to use some sort of password storage (either in the browser, or LastPass, or whatever-you-want). So one would register with just an email address/username and then be shown a generated password à la O5O1zn8H3zEGNjf1Ly8v to store in the browser’s password manager.
Of course, this only works if people only ever use the service from devices they own and I have absolutely no idea how common internet café/public library users are nowadays.
It seems like a more modular approach than using Facebook or Google to sign into third party sites, but similarly secure in terms of exposing passwords.
One extension, of course, would be for websites to somehow signal to browser ‘Hey, please store this password/username for this website’, but I’m not sure whether that's necessary.
It cuts both ways. I don't understand why you meta-comment, instead of going fixing those things yourself.
Whereas if I'm just telling people "this is no good, it needs fixing" then not only am I not helping, I'm not persuading other people to help either.
The main premise is wrong too: "if I'm just telling people "this is no good, it needs fixing" then not only am I not helping, I'm not persuading other people to help either.".
Lots of things that are no good NEED to be pointed out. Project members don't magically see all of them.
Either because they don't have that particular use case themselves, or because they haven't thought it that way, or they think it's not important but the users think otherwise, or they have invested too much in some design that they cannot admit it's flawed, etc.
Pointing things out helps making those flaws visible, helps start a discussion, makes the opinion of potential or actual users known, etc etc.
Telling people to go and help is very secondary to that. I don't think many people ever got motivated because of some second-hand meta-comment from someone not even involved in the project.
How about false sense of security? Zero improvement in security plus baseless confidence that you are now secure sounds like a step backwards to me! It's already suspected that NSA has been working around Tor for years now. Wasn't there an article recently stating that the NSA (or was in the CIA...?) control 2/3 of Tor exit nodes?
These issues are trivial compared to the bigger issue at play: the right to read and to write without exception.
That is what is at stake here.
Exits sniffing passwords for plain-text forums is a minor concern compared to the bigger issues at play. I'd like to point out that it's trivial to test for this too...(create some plaintext accounts on forums, post there, then run a honeypot server with your own email address and see if you get a login, do this automatically for each exit) However the time commitment isn't so trivial: If you wrote such a program it would be appreciated, please yell loudly about it on the tor-talk list if you do! Tor works by and large by people following some basic principles, like "if you think it should be done, do it".
You could also see the issues with plaintext passwords on HTTP sites and password reuse as a problem of user education. If you're not up for writing software, why not open a bug and suggest some wireframed ideas for how a UI could look to prevent password reuse? There is a whole bunch of ways to contribute.
There are literally 100's of problems like this Mozilla or Tor could get help with... get involved instead of ahead of time saying "This can almost guarantee that this will do waaaay more harm than good." I hope to see your responsible posting of these concerns to a bug tracker. A lot of what gets done in FOSS projects like Tor really is just a bunch of people who've decided "hey, if I don't do this, who will?".
As for doing more harm than good: I can't possibly see how this does more harm than NSA domestic surveillance.