Re:Two-Factor Authentication and the Police State
by aspensmonster on Wednesday August 21, 2013 @09:25AM
(#6250058)
From what I can tell, if they've targeted you, they're going to take your stuff. Doesn't matter if the drives look like noise or are nothing but zeros. The point is primarily to be a thorn in your side and to drain you of money. Any intel gleaned is just icing on the cake.
Re:Two-Factor Authentication and the Police State
by buro9 on Wednesday August 21, 2013 @09:39AM
(#6250152)
Actually, in the scenario I outlined you don't need to take a laptop anywhere.
Just ship the data and use a commodity device at the other end.
Re:Two-Factor Authentication and the Police State
by Spearchucker on Wednesday August 21, 2013 @11:11AM
(#6250851)
This, I think, is where it's at. I reset my phone and delete my TrueCrypt volume every time I cross a border. On the other side I just download the TC volume, download my app[1] onto my phone, and re-sync my data.
[1] This a DB I wrote myself, is sideloaded (i.e. isn't in an app store), and syncs data between my phone, laptop and desktop.
Re:Two-Factor Authentication and the Police State
by grecy on Wednesday August 21, 2013 @03:56PM
(#6252933)
If they're watching you already, they are going to know about this DB full of good stuff you have, and they're going to demand you give them access to it, in the same way they can demand you give them keys and unencrypted data.
Use TrueCrypt volumes on USB sticks (encrypted data). Put puppet scripts on there to bootstrap your system.
Ship both separately and confirm receipt of YubiKey before shipping the USB stick.
Travel with unencrypted, freshly imaged hardware with no sensitive data (perhaps run an OS from a read-only file system).
Arrive, insert USB stick and YubiKey... now enter password (something you know)... and bootstrap your system to use it.
This is all a big pain in the arse, but leaves you travelling with nothing likely to get you into trouble.