If the DNSSEC secured DANE records specify that connections to this server must be encrypted, then I guess at that point, you drop the connection and bounce the message back to the sender.
I know of at least the Exim and Postfix projects which are both working on adding DANE support to their MTAs.
Also, even without any certificate verification, opportunistic SSL is extremely useful. It may not be able to stop targetted surveilance, but it can sure stop a large chunk (most?) of the dragnet style surveilance that has recently been reported.
We should do the best we can with our current system until a new system is deployed. We don't know how long we'll be waiting.
The fact that a simple delivery stack turns into a mish-mash of SpamAssassin, virus scanning, DKIM, DNSSEC, DANE, SPF, PGP, certificates, CA's, numerous ports open, severla products and many more TLA's is the problem.
Complexity does not breed security.
I would say it’s patching a hole, and it’s the feasible way to make email secure, rather than throw it all out and convince the world to switch to a new system.
Most (internet) standards evolve this way. That’s the curse of evolving a standard that is already in widespread use.
The problem is that sometimes standards are no longer fit for purpose on multiple levels. At this point, migration is required to new standards.
This does happen quite regularly. Look at IPv4 to IPv6. The change should be of the same magnitude.
We've done this before. First UUCP, then SMTP, then XYZ.
You will use a mail client that requires SSL to connect to our mail server, or one that does support SSL will be provided for you.
Would you ever allow fallback to HTTP of authentication or credit card data? NO! It is time for unencrypted mail transport to die.
Unencrypted email is like unencrypted telephone calls. Imagine how to get the world to switch to using encrypted handsets.
I remember having an unencrypted NMT handset and ditching it circa 2000 in favor of a GSM handset. NMT support was dropped by my service provider 3-4 years later.
So transitions like this are definitely possible, though not overnight. Remember the slow introduction of https.
I can't remember calling a landline last couple years, except for public offices and banks.
> Any fucker can buy an SSL certificate and
> masquerade as someone else.
You lost me there. I'm not entirely convinced on that.How might I simply buy an SSL certificate and masquerade as https://www.google.com?
Email only works at the moment because in this scenario, usually the sending MTA just says "what the hell" and delivers it over the wire in plain text anyway.
The moment you force TLS as a requirement, the internet starts having lots of large black holes in it due to the number of SMTP servers that don't support it (still) or don't have valid certificates. At that point email fails.
However, the moment you agree to it, you are at the mercy of the root PKI (certificate authorities) who aren't necessarily all that trustworthy. Any fucker can buy an SSL certificate and masquerade as someone else. Also don't forget that CRL (revocation lists) exist that list naff CA certs that have been compromised. At that point, encryption fails.
That's why it's fucked - whack-a-mole all over the place.