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Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by toomuchtodo on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @11:22AM (#6244231)
Silly question: If you can trust DNS, and require every client to connect to an SMTP server with TLS/SSL, and only permit SMTP server->SMTP server connections over SSL, how does that not fix the problem?

End to end encryption and MITM countermeasures should solve the issue, no? Then all the NSA knows is which mail server is talking to which mail server.

I admit, I could be very wrong. Please tell me why.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by harrytuttle on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @11:31AM (#6244298)
Well (E)SMTP works effectively by connecting, then knocking on the door and asking for a list of capabilities (EHLO). When the remote SMTP server says "no I don't support TLS", what are you supposed to do?

Email only works at the moment because in this scenario, usually the sending MTA just says "what the hell" and delivers it over the wire in plain text anyway.

The moment you force TLS as a requirement, the internet starts having lots of large black holes in it due to the number of SMTP servers that don't support it (still) or don't have valid certificates. At that point email fails.

However, the moment you agree to it, you are at the mercy of the root PKI (certificate authorities) who aren't necessarily all that trustworthy. Any fucker can buy an SSL certificate and masquerade as someone else. Also don't forget that CRL (revocation lists) exist that list naff CA certs that have been compromised. At that point, encryption fails.

That's why it's fucked - whack-a-mole all over the place.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by mike-cardwell on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @11:38AM (#6244351)
"Well (E)SMTP works effectively by connecting, then knocking on the door and asking for a list of capabilities (EHLO). When the remote SMTP server says "no I don't support TLS", what are you supposed to do?"

If the DNSSEC secured DANE records specify that connections to this server must be encrypted, then I guess at that point, you drop the connection and bounce the message back to the sender.

I know of at least the Exim and Postfix projects which are both working on adding DANE support to their MTAs.

Also, even without any certificate verification, opportunistic SSL is extremely useful. It may not be able to stop targetted surveilance, but it can sure stop a large chunk (most?) of the dragnet style surveilance that has recently been reported.

We should do the best we can with our current system until a new system is deployed. We don't know how long we'll be waiting.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by harrytuttle on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @11:44AM (#6244397)
DNSSEC+DANE is fine and all that, but that's another layer of hack job on top of another lacker of hackjob. It's turtles (or turds in this case) all the way down.

The fact that a simple delivery stack turns into a mish-mash of SpamAssassin, virus scanning, DKIM, DNSSEC, DANE, SPF, PGP, certificates, CA's, numerous ports open, severla products and many more TLA's is the problem.

Complexity does not breed security.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by sorbits on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @12:23PM (#6244694)
Why is it a hack job?

I would say it’s patching a hole, and it’s the feasible way to make email secure, rather than throw it all out and convince the world to switch to a new system.

Most (internet) standards evolve this way. That’s the curse of evolving a standard that is already in widespread use.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by harrytuttle on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @12:28PM (#6244734)
The hack job comes from the fact that it's not universal, nor does it provide a holistic solution. It is literally a sticky plaster.

The problem is that sometimes standards are no longer fit for purpose on multiple levels. At this point, migration is required to new standards.

This does happen quite regularly. Look at IPv4 to IPv6. The change should be of the same magnitude.

We've done this before. First UUCP, then SMTP, then XYZ.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by balabaster on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @10:18PM (#6247786)
Mostly because it rests on CA's and if the government can compel the CA to give them a signed cert for something that your security relies on, all they have to do is pose a MITM attack and you're blissfully clueless that they're spying on you. The whole system is broken and if you don't fix the foundations upon which your house is built, no amount of band-aids are going to keep the walls standing.
Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by kyrias on Wednesday August 21, 2013 @10:49AM (#6250674)
No, with DANE nothing rests on CA's. With DANE domain owners store their keys in the DNS, and the DNS records are signed with DNSSEC
Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by toomuchtodo on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @11:54AM (#6244466)
I think that's the problem though. My browser connects to Gmail with SSL/TLS/HTTPS. The internet community moves fast when we decide something (Goodbye support for Internet Explorer 6!), why can't we decide on this:

You will use a mail client that requires SSL to connect to our mail server, or one that does support SSL will be provided for you.

Would you ever allow fallback to HTTP of authentication or credit card data? NO! It is time for unencrypted mail transport to die.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by seiji on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @12:15PM (#6244619)
Fast? IE6 was released in 2001 and people didn't start "dropping support" until 2008 or 2009.

Unencrypted email is like unencrypted telephone calls. Imagine how to get the world to switch to using encrypted handsets.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by nine_k on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @12:45PM (#6244848)
GSM communication is actually encrypted [1], albeit lightly.

I remember having an unencrypted NMT handset and ditching it circa 2000 in favor of a GSM handset. NMT support was dropped by my service provider 3-4 years later.

So transitions like this are definitely possible, though not overnight. Remember the slow introduction of https.

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GSM#GSM_service_security

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by tlrobinson on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @02:00PM (#6245387)
I think the parent comment was referring to end-to-end encrypted handsets. Phone calls are like email in that only some hops are encrypted.
Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by bdcravens on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @04:11PM (#6246214)
You're forgetting POTS lines. I can call someone on a POTS line, with a 1992 handset, and it works the same as if I called someone with a brand new GSM phone.
Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by toomuchtodo on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @05:48PM (#6246807)
Right. But at the same time, you don't see any of the forklift upgrades that have gone on behind the scenes. All the GSM<->POTS or long-distance POTS calls? They're all being converted to VoIP at some point (private network, but still IP).
Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by nine_k on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @04:57PM (#6246507)
You are correct.

I can't remember calling a landline last couple years, except for public offices and banks.

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by toomuchtodo on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @12:24PM (#6244710)
Perhaps "fast" is a relative term. But nothing starts until a decision is made. So! Let's make the decision and move forward.
Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by qwerty_asdf on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @02:38PM (#6245680)

  > Any fucker can buy an SSL certificate and 
  > masquerade as someone else.
You lost me there. I'm not entirely convinced on that.

How might I simply buy an SSL certificate and masquerade as https://www.google.com?

Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by lucian1900 on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @04:19PM (#6246265)
By convincing one of the trusted CAs to do so. Or if you're a government, forcing them.
Re:Mailpile – taking e-mail back by omh on Tuesday August 20, 2013 @12:20PM (#6244663)
Then all the NSA knows is which mail server is talking to which mail server

Unless they have backdoor access to one of the mail servers themselves (e.g., apparently, gmail).

Even without that, knowing "which mail server is talking to which mail server" could be enough to get a good amount of information. This would be especially true if you're using a relatively small mail provider (like Lavabit) or especially so with your own dedicated mail server.