Re:Android RNG Weakness Renders Bitcoin Wallets Insecure
by tptacek on Sunday August 11, 2013 @02:40PM
(#6195737)
They were explicitly seeding SecureRandom?
Re:Android RNG Weakness Renders Bitcoin Wallets Insecure
by glurgh on Sunday August 11, 2013 @03:01PM
(#6195821)
Not in the bitcoinj library they all appear to be using, no. That, in turn, uses bouncycastle. Bitcoinj is not explicitly seeding SecureRandom, I'm reasonably sure.
Re:Android RNG Weakness Renders Bitcoin Wallets Insecure
by tptacek on Sunday August 11, 2013 @03:20PM
(#6195899)
I couldn't find a line of code in bitcoinj that explicitly seeded SecureRandom, or used the explicit-seed constructor.
Re:Android RNG Weakness Renders Bitcoin Wallets Insecure
by glurgh on Sunday August 11, 2013 @03:51PM
(#6196066)
Neither could I. Maybe it is SecureRandom itself but then that would be a bigger deal than some broken BitCoin wallets, one would think.
Re:Android RNG Weakness Renders Bitcoin Wallets Insecure
by patio11 on Sunday August 11, 2013 @02:54PM
(#6195794)
Don't know. This just seemed like the high-percentage guess.
Re:Android RNG Weakness Renders Bitcoin Wallets Insecure
by Dylan16807 on Sunday August 11, 2013 @02:41PM
(#6195738)
If that's the problem, it does lead to a beautiful solution of fixing bugs by removing code entirely.
One easy way to shoot yourself in the foot with SecureRandom is to use seed values from a source with low entropy.
http://developer.android.com/reference/java/security/SecureR...
If one were to copy/paste the sort of code samples which show up when one Googles for [Android SecureRandom], one would more than likely call setSeed, possibly in such a fashion as to duplicate seeds and, predictably, make the output of the random number generator deterministic.
I will leave it to one's individual judgement as to whether "It is unlikely a serious developer would copy/paste in crypto code into a project that has real money on the line" is descriptive of the prevalent standard of care in engineering in the Bitcoin community.