Edit: It looks like it's been removed from Netflix, but you can still stream it directly from PBS's website:
[irony] As we are used in Germany, we are kept in the dark. [irony end]
Maybe he's busy.
I'll check back.
First, when it comes to programs by US intelligence agencies (both previously known, currently revealed, and yet to be revealed) there are multiple categories of evaluation: namely, ethical, legal, constitutional.
Generally speaking, everything the Feds are doing is legal in the sense that it follows a specific legal process that was setup in the scare over terrorism, which both expanded the powers of the executive branch and created "shadow courts" which presumably provide some checks and balances in the system. Of course, we can't really know how reliably these work since the process for National Security Letters and other aspects itself is secret. Nonetheless, there are specific process in places that seem generally speaking to be followed. How often there are "exceptions" to this process is difficult to ascertain, and has not really been a focus in the present debate.
When it comes to constitutionality, it is a hotly debated topic among Americans partially because it was the bedrock of the American state, but an increasing number of Americans (including justices) either aren't knowledgable or don't care about the specifics of the constitution. This is a huge topic, but it is sufficient to say that something can be unconstitutional (even blatantly so) and nonetheless be legal. In this specific case, it is difficult to know how or whether the protection against "unreasonable" searches includes storage of metadata associated with phonecalls that can be searched by an analyst.
Then, more broadly, there are a wide representation of ethical issues. For example, it is completely legal and constitutional to spy on non US citizens, but are there any boundaries that should be set on what is and is not acceptable behavior? My strongly held view is that, at least when it comes to US hq'ed companies with a large foreign user base that they provisions in places for non US citizens should at the very least be the same as those for US citizens. However, saying that something should exist and implementing it are two different things, and one is considerably more difficult than the other.
So this is all basically to defend tptacek and say that it is important to differentiate when accusing the US government of "crimes." In other words, there are lots of unethical things that you can do that are perfectly legal.
I fully expected Craig Timberg to be attacked, just like Glenn Greenwald was.
It is unfair that I'm using a nym, whereas tptacek's a real identity.
It may be unfair to single out tptacek out of the mob of people banging the "direct action" drum. He stands out here on HN. Since I'm using a nym, I won't belabor the point.
However, if any analyst can at whim look at the info associated with any gmail account / Facebook user / etc. then you have a clearly extra-legal approach with absolutely no accountability.
Also, there is a significant difference between capacity and use. If a analyst or a sys admin for the NSA has capacity to view things but does not actually have permission from the NSA to use that capability absent an NSL, then
To be honest, to date nothing has emerged that makes it seem that the NSA has this sort of capacity, except when it comes to Verizon phone calls, although I don't think we know much if anything about the NSA's downstream capabilities when it comes to major Silicon Valley firms.
In short, I assume that Google, Facebook, etc. are telling an important truth when they say that access is limited to legal processes. Whether or not the NSA also has and uses downstream access to similar data is another question altogether.
Take off all the nicks, for maximum message resolution.
In any case, it's wildly interesting stuff.
Specifically relating to the recent revelations, this book was where I learned of the NSA's "vacuum cleaner" approach, in which all available messages are collected -- in this case, it was trans-Atlantic radio transmissions being monitored by ECHELON. So, an American citizen in the UK calling an American citizen in the US would have their call collected.
The approach (collect everything you can at the trunk line or server farm) is very similar to the e-mail collection strategy that's being documented now.
... I thought one of the points of Fiber was that you couldn't tap in without disturbing the optical signal? Did I just make that up in my head?
Getting the signal out of the fiber pales in comparison, though, with the task of getting all of that data back to Maryland/Utah.
Unless they have specific cooperation of the cable owners and can tap/split the fibers at the landings, they must be spending a significant percentage of the cost of the original fiber runs (in parallel cables to return the tapped data). The mind reels.
Of course, this requires a friendly country at one end of the cable, but that's probably not too big a problem.
This is a nice primer on fibre:
http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redbooks/pdfs/sg245230.pdf
And here is one talking about its security, in particular vs tapping (the conclusion: it can be done):
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/physcial/fiber-...
Finally, I always figured that tapping fibre was exactly what this was for:
Well of course you can't. If you're going to split it off to read it, then you're "disturbing" it by definition.
Whether or not you can do such that it's not noticeable to the proper end parties, of course, is a different story.
Interfering with existing amplifiers/signal boosters would be fairly hard to hide unless the NSA was solely responsible for that units maintenance, and I suspect that as a general rule they aren't. It's much easier to hide a tap at some random point along the line where nobody has any reason to visit
I wouldn't be surprised if there are other esoteric techniques that somehow allow NSA to monitor emanations through an intact fiber optic cable and its shielding.
(The presentation was given by Evi Nemeth, who was sadly in the news recently due to being lost at sea.)
[1] http://www.caida.org/workshops/isma/9808/report.html "The coral/ocXmon family of monitors use optical splitters to tap fiber, filtering 5-10% of the light signal to interface cards in the coral monitoring host."
On the other hand, if you'd tap only a short distance downstream of the transmitter (or an inline amplifier), that 1% might be plenty, undisturbed by the distortions introduced further on the line, so probably that's the preferable tapping location anyway.
[I know that I'm oversimplifying a lot here and modern optical communication systems work much different.]
All these revelations regarding call metadata, PRISM collection (albeit under a different codename at the time), modern fiber taps, and even more are covered.
You'll learn about how they shave fiber optic cables in order to intercept traffic and not be detected. You'll find out about the various facilities already reported, along with others like the NSA Georgia facility. You'll find out exactly where on what beach these fiber lines run in and out of. It's a very well-researched book.
You'll learn a lot more than what's been verified with these leaks.
http://www.amazon.com/The-Shadow-Factory-Eavesdropping-Ameri...