Something either browser-extension or mobile app would be a lot better. IMO, also not supporting legacy stuff like aim/yahoo/etc, and supporting OTR out of the box.
Nadim did a decent job on the simple UI front. I don't know about the lack of persistent identity (pluses and minuses to that).
Mobile is probably more important in the long run, especially for the kind of activist users CryptoCat seems to target.
(Another obvious thing is just i18n/l10n for arabic/pashto/etc., of existing tools.)
Another feature which would be nice is Grugqian "anti-forensics"; Adium for a while logged OTR chats by default, and even retaining OTR keys could be used against you (even if it doesn't allow decryption of past messages, it is enough outside of a court of law to link you to activity...). A browser extension or mobile app which didn't save local state (doing key derivation from a passphrase?) would probably be great for that. Add in SnapChat-style "no logging in the application", and honest-but-stupid counterparties wouldn't log chats.
The only weakness I see is no great way to do message-encryption for multiparty right now in a standard way. I'm not sure how you can do multiparty key agreement with PFS using anything outside academic papers.
Or with a trusted third party (at the limit, just do irc-over-SSL.) This is probably fairly safe if you pick your TTP correctly -- I'd trust the NYT or USG even if I were a Syrian protester with the FSA.
I agree overall -- and am not trying to defend CryptoCat, just the CryptoCat market niche.
People keep making these technical arguments. They are ignored. It is frustrating to have to keep pushing warnings and to have those warnings ignored.
> (1) the technical internals of Cryptocat from (2) the core idea behind Cryptocat and, especially, (3) Nadim himself, personally?
That sounds reasonable, except it's hard to do.
The internals of Cryptocat are closely tied to the core idea. People point out the flaws in the core ideas, and cryptocat team just say "point out an actual attack". So then people are forced to find bugs in the internals. And when they do CryptoCat patch, and say "See! Nothing to worry about!" Except that the core idea is still flawed.
People get exasperated playing this game of Whack-a-mole.
I get that Nadim is proud of his product, but his choices of promotion have caused friction, and his reaction to some of the criticism has made it worse.
Some people have mentioned that the crypto community is toxic. They're right, but there's also a high barrier to entry. When someone releases a product as secure, but has made very many obvious flaws that ruin the security of that product, they're going to attract a lot of flak. Don't forget that many people are not sincerely trying to learn about crypto and make it accessible. Many people are bodging together terrible software and selling it. There's a long history of debunking snake-oil.
It's unfortunate that Nadim has been subject to attack, but he should have known it was coming and presented the product differently.
> making Cryptocat better
It can never be made "good enough". That's the fundamental point.