Mobile is probably more important in the long run, especially for the kind of activist users CryptoCat seems to target.
(Another obvious thing is just i18n/l10n for arabic/pashto/etc., of existing tools.)
Another feature which would be nice is Grugqian "anti-forensics"; Adium for a while logged OTR chats by default, and even retaining OTR keys could be used against you (even if it doesn't allow decryption of past messages, it is enough outside of a court of law to link you to activity...). A browser extension or mobile app which didn't save local state (doing key derivation from a passphrase?) would probably be great for that. Add in SnapChat-style "no logging in the application", and honest-but-stupid counterparties wouldn't log chats.
The only weakness I see is no great way to do message-encryption for multiparty right now in a standard way. I'm not sure how you can do multiparty key agreement with PFS using anything outside academic papers.
Or with a trusted third party (at the limit, just do irc-over-SSL.) This is probably fairly safe if you pick your TTP correctly -- I'd trust the NYT or USG even if I were a Syrian protester with the FSA.
I agree overall -- and am not trying to defend CryptoCat, just the CryptoCat market niche.