Because we can't really predict the future and some far-fetched science-fiction sounding things such as quantum computers and future advancements we can't currently conceive of may completely and utterly change that, perhaps even overnight.
From a paranoid security point of view, it's definitely a bad idea to assume your cryptography is perfect and always will be.
What book would you use? That's how "they" used to do it.
I'm talking about complacency, and how it's a better idea for us to assume that sooner or later (if not currently) our best-known cryptography will be broken. If I recall correctly, in 2008, Simple Nomad[1] told us to consider PGP broken by the government. He wasn't saying it is... just we should consider it as such and find something better, before it's too late.
Also, to be a bit unfair, I have no idea who you are, but I know who Simple Nomad[1] is. If Simple Nomad told me the government had definitely owned PGP, AES, or anything else of that nature I'd be very concerned, no evidence necessary. The implication is that he already has the evidence, but maybe can't share it with me. Or he's really drunk and messing with me.... either way, good times ahead!
[1] http://www.soldierx.com/hdb/Simple-Nomad
> He has spoken at DefCon, BlackHat, ^Shmoocon^, and ToorCon, and he is known for his somewhat paranoid mindset.
You switch to something else out of paranoia and you could easily switch to something with a theoretical backdoor that NSA has already identified and exploited (after all, they're "10-20 years ahead of us", right?).
So we need to utilize other channels, like key-signing parties.
Or, I suppose you can communicate using something like SRP to avoid this issue, though it sounds like a complicated layering of crypto that is destined to be screwed up at some point. However, this is what ZRTP does, and it seems to be pretty widely adopted.
Well, that's the problem isn't it? The known attacks aren't the ones you have to worry about. Nearly every form of cryptography to date was expected to last longer than it actually did. I would not be at all surprised to find AES-256 broken before I'm on the wrong side of the grass.
Use a Diffie-Hellman style protocol to create and exchange a secret key for each session, use AES-256 if you're ultra-paranoid, then forget the session key. It even works today, and there are no known attacks against AES that can reduce the work enough to beat the heat death of the universe.