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Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by danbruc on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @08:38AM (#5938972)
The problem is that we are not enough - you have to get the other 95 % not really caring on the bandwagon...and this without causing the slightest bit of additional inconvenience.
Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by buro9 on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @09:06AM (#5939105)
We own websites... make them SSL.

We affect the 95%.

Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by malloc2x on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @09:56AM (#5939424)
You must assume that the NSA already has master keys for all domestic CA root certificates, and given how many were hacked recently, foreign ones too. In which case SSL traffic is effectively the same as plaintext to them.

The solution could be a distributed CA system like http://convergence.io/

Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by karlmdavis on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @10:55AM (#5939866)
Is this correct? Wouldn't they still need all of the leaf private keys to decrypt things?

My understanding was that having a CA's private key just enables someone to issue new child keys for that CA. That vulnerability could be addressed with certificate pinning.

Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by malloc2x on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @11:50AM (#5940318)
To decrypt after-the-handshake bytes I think you're right, they would need a leaf private key.

However, they absolutely can mount a MITM with the CA root.

EDIT: Further, if they can compel a master key then they can also compel a copy of all the private keys the CA generates.

Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by juhanima on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @02:06PM (#5941310)
Not quite sure what you mean, but for the record, as a general rule CAs do not generate keys. They just sign the public keys coming in as Certificate Signing Requests. Without ever seeing the accompanied private key.
Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by jeltz on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @10:17AM (#5939561)
Perfect forward security should prevent the master key from working.
Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by mhandley on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @10:18AM (#5939570)
On the other hand, we do have the influence to get something like http://tcpcrypt.org standardized and deployed in commodity operating systems if we really care enough. Then the 95% won't need to care.
Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by eru on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @08:49AM (#5939027)
95% would be nice, but a few percent should be good enough, if there's enough traffic overall. (And even 100% would not be enough if there's almost no traffic, like in the beginning of the internet.) Absolute numbers matter more than shares, here.
Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by greyman on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @08:42AM (#5938994)
Or it is rather 99.995? ;-)
Re:Don't Even Think of Using Encryption Software to Escape N... by danbruc on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @08:51AM (#5939034)
True. 316 million US citizens and 117 thousands of them signing the Snowden petition yields a first approximation of 99.96 %.