But if you look at it as a way to spread awareness to web admins, to be confronted with the question "how come we don't have the bestest type of icon", it's not so bad.
A related example: I have recently been wondering how widespread DNSSEC is.
I installed the DNSSEC validator chrome plugin, and now (almost) every website on the planet shows me a sad "no DNSSEC" icon. I can't help but feel that part of the low deployment of DNSSEC is because almost nobody, including web admins, gets any feedback about DNSSEC. (I am aware that there are other costs and risks to deployment.)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1234567
Also, despite my earlier google queries about DNSSEC, everything I was reading was pretty dry. The magic phrase to google for is "DNSSEC sucks"--that gets you the interesting stuff.
I haven't digested it yet, but in those results, this looks pretty interesting from D. J. Bernstein: http://cr.yp.to/talks/2010.12.28/slides.pdf
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5571937
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4071178
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2932378
I really don't like DNSSEC. I think it's a bad design that will harm the Internet.
Worth watching even if you don't care much about DNSSEC, Bernstein is a good speaker.
DNS is a scalable global key-value store, and DNSSEC allows owners of namespaces to sign their own key pairs and delegate to sub-namespaces. If you can make the case that _that_ is not valuable, or how that is accomplished by other means, I am curious. But TLS vs. DNSSEC doesn't cut it.
Yes, DNSSEC/DANE can make TLS work better. It provides a straightforward way to pin an entire zone tree while allowing site owner modifications. Your example of Ghadaffi and Bit.ly is silly, because the status quo is that governments already have access to CA keys able to issue for any server. Restricting to a single zone can only improve that.
I don't know how you can claim NSEC3 is a grotesque hack without noting that it is equally grotesque to pretend that your DNS records are private. If I wanted to collect the BoA zone, I would setup recursive nameservers on the coffee shops' wifi within a quarter mile of their headquarters and grep the logs. Incidentally, this would work even with DNSCurve deployed.
Regarding NSEC3: most people reading this thread don't know what it is, so I'll explain it really quickly and let them decide, because it it so obviously a stupid hack that I don't think I need to argue against it too much:
Just a couple years ago --- more than a decade after work on DNSSEC was started --- somebody realized that Bank of America would not in fact be OK with a DNS design where every single one of their hostnames, for both public and internal systems, was public. But that's a problem, because DNSSEC wants to authenticate negative responses; if there's no JABBERWOCKY.BANKOFAMERICA.COM, DNSSEC wants that cryptographically proven. But their design to do that breaks if there are nonpublic names, because DNSSEC chains the names together as a way to authenticate denial.
So here's what they came up with: domain names are hashed (crappily) as if for a 1997 Unix password file, and the authenticated denial messages refer to hash ranges instead of literal hostnames. Meaning you can only discover all of Bank of America's hostnames if you are as technologically sophisticated as a circa-1997 password cracker.
I don't know why you're talking about the NSA. And if you are, anyway, do you really think they can't ask Verisign for an arbitrary cert already? And won't the same tools that modern network programs use to protect against these attacks (certificate pinning, convergence, etc.) work equally well when applied to DNSSEC KSKs?
NSEC3 is good enough. I gave you a trivial way of acquiring jabberwocky.bankofamerica.com, even with DNSCurve deployed. If BOA wants network accessible services on a network accessible namespace to be private, they should make a zone cut at internal.bankofamerica.com and restrict access to the delegated NS (which can be the same machine). The easiest way to do this is to run a VPN, which they already do.
I am asserting that having a global key-value store, where namespace owners can sign their own entries and make delegations, is a valuable system to have in place. That is what DNSSEC is. Unless you can argue against that, you are simply beating on a straw man.
The "trivial way of acquiring jabberwocky.bankofamerica.com" relies on somehow being in the same coffee shop as an employee who accesses the site using public DNS. Whereas DNSSEC just goes right ahead and publishes the information.
As for "making zone cuts" --- they haven't. Very few networks have. DNSSEC advocates just like to pretend that everyone has either architected their DNS zones they way they would, or that they'll all relabel all their hosts to fit that way.
I don't know why I should care about a "global key value store where namespace owners can sign their own entries and make delegations". We can have lots of those. Why use a crappy one bolted onto DNS?
> As for "making zone cuts" --- they haven't. Very few networks have. DNSSEC advocates just like to pretend that everyone has either architected their DNS zones they way they would, or that they'll all relabel all their hosts to fit that way.
Very few networks have ridiculous PHB requirements for public servers defined on public namespaces that are somehow slightly more difficult to find than normal (and once the cat / jabberwocky is out of the bag and published to a mailing list somewhere, gives no advantage whatsoever).
Those that do have reasonable options for satisfying said PHBs, first with NSEC3 and then with zone cuts and private networks (which actually does solve the problem, instead of just pretending to solve it).
> I don't know why I should care about a "global key value store where namespace owners can sign their own entries and make delegations". We can have lots of those. Why use a crappy one bolted onto DNS?
What alternatives? To my knowledge, there is no credible alternative system to DNS. Why put up with a DNS system that is not end to end verified when you don't have to?
Of the sites you mention, paypal is the only one that I use on any sort of a recurring basis. But it's a little weird to a DNSSEC newbie like me, so maybe you can explain. The verisign tool shows that paypal.com is using DNSSEC, but it doesn't appear that www.paypal.com itself is secured. Is the chrome plugin giving me misleading information? Is this how things are supposed to be?
And a lot of US government sites have DNSSEC waivers. The first two examples I tried:
cia.gov appears to not use DNSSEC: http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/www.cia.gov nsa.gov appears to not use DNSSEC: http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/www.nsa.gov
(Thank goodness the verisign tool itself IS using DNSSEC.)
A long list of US .gov sites with and without working DNSSEC: http://fedv6-deployment.antd.nist.gov/cgi-bin/generate-gov
(Also: nist.gov is using DNSSEC)
Short answer www.paypal.com is a cname for an akamai box. That cname record is secure:
$ unbound-host -v -t cname www.paypal.com www.paypal.com has CNAME record
www.paypal.com.akadns.net. (secure)
Everything falls apart when your resolver finishes the rest of the required
lookups to get an IP address from akadns/akamaiedge.As I have been experimenting/researching dnssec I have often found it is useful to use verisign's tool AND sandia's dnsviz[1] tool. For the moment forget what I said about paypal's cname and compare sandia's[2] and verisign's[3] results for www.paypal.com and see if you can spot the issue.
You are correct that it is a relief that verisign uses DNSSEC but if I may be so bold I think you may be wrong about why it is a relief. (I am trying to be helpful, i apologize if that sounds dickish it is not my intent) With DNSSEC (just like DNS) everything flows from the root. Verisign manages the .com tld so if they did not sign the .com you could not verify anyhost.com. The same thing can be said for DISA, GSA and PIR for .mil, .gov and .org zones respectively.
As far as NIST goes they are the second least surprising DNSSEC adopter as far as the federal government goes. Because of NIST's standards function within the government they are normally at the forefront for things like this. Moreover DNSSEC is heavily reliant on accurate time and NIST is the home of the government's truechimer. However if you go down this rabbit hole you start to have some serious chicken and egg problems.
[1] http://dnsviz.net/ (NB: sandia's is so slow that its painful)
I recently (May, June) surveyed 100 european banks (in Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Austria), roughly selected for the 20 specimens with the greatest total assets per country.
None of them have deployed DNSSEC. Most use SSL, many use EV certificates, a few go so far as to include HSTS. DNSSEC? Zero.
Ping me at ycombinator at y dot ly for your choice of either raw (collected using Qualys' SSL Server Test[1] and plain old DiG) or aggregate data.
Clicking on the pulsing red icon, would pop up a window that tells people exactly what they should be careful about.
Clicking on the certificate, should present a much clearer dialog for the layman.
Yeah that's great when I'm trying to focus on an article I'm reading. This is why security people aren't allowed to touch UI.
All joking aside, I agree that this issue should be surfaced, and I think people would notice the security icon if it was in constant flux.
And at least EV certs were backed by a concept that people could understand. It's unreasonable to expect people outside of tech to understand "forward secrecy".
I know that in many government scenarios, (think local governments) for example, policy guidance drives purchasing and other behavior. So if compliance with some security standard requires a "green lock" that lock matters.
That will drive behavior -- banks, insurance companies, and other businesses will be disqualified for all sorts of RFPs.
It's simple enough to say "if you don't see the green padlock, don't enter your credit card number" but then what if the person sees the weaker symbol?
You could say "go ahead" in which case they will go ahead all of the time or you could say "only go ahead under these additional circumstances" , what would they be?
But maybe if you switched the iconography/expectation: use a 'person' icon, instead of the lock, for vanilla SSL. It would indicate you have verified the server's identity -- which is not nothing -- but you can reserve the lock icon for forward-secure servers.
We've got a question of granularity [2] and rather than make a professional value judgment in the average user's best interests [3], the proposal is trying to represent the entire scale and then expect the user to educate themselves about what the scale means, compare that to their environment needs, etc.
[1] How long ago was it, we were simply railing against insufficient key sizes or improper certificate validation? Anyone who 'learned' up to that day's wisdom would have to continually update their knowledge along with the rest of us to be able to make informed decisions on which colors were 'safe' for which uses.
[2] 'how secure' on a scale from 'unsecure' to 'SSL' to 'perfect forward secrecy'
[3] drawing a line on the scale, to the left of which is not secure and to the right of which is secure. And, when 'less-secure' options prevent valuable information that isn't necessarily 'security' (e.g. identity validation) using a clear method of distinguishing that.
I'd support three stages: 1) no encryption, 2) some/partial encryption, 3) "perfect" encryption.
For the partial encryption, the browser would provide an explanation of exactly how it could be compromised. For the case where the encrypted version does not have perfect forward secrecy, it could explain that if the server is compromised, this session can also be decrypted.
I don't think browsers should cover the banks' asses here.
Edit (since I can't reply deeper): I thought you were being sarcastic since I consider a gradient to be a really horrible idea. I'd want something where the browser tells me something. I don't want to wonder whether the new browser version changed the gradients slightly or a site improved its encryption strategy. Clear symbols and language is a must.
And the entire secure connection stuff is broken, if the NSA just obtains a FISA warrant for your GMail account. ( Or compromises the Google servers directly.)
Note that Google runs their own CA (signed by Equifax's Root CA) and, thus, issues their own certificates.
The way things are going, I see no reason why the NSA could not, with a FISA warrant, simply order Google to:
1. provide them with a copy of Google's CA's private key; or, 2. issue the NSA a certificate valid for *.{every-google-domain}.com.
Maybe they can.
Maybe they have.
Security isn't my field at all, but I'd gotten the impression from HN that PFS is meant to protect against just this scenario. Am I mistaken?
This may be the most important article on HN related to the NSA leaks. Fact is, most of us haven't paid enough attention to the details of https.
EDIT: "something weaker" - didn't mention color. People dont need to understand "forward secrecy", the browser just needs to raise the bar for what's considered secure. The goal is to change server-side behavior, not consumer behavior.