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Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by paulsutter on Monday June 24, 2013 @02:09PM (#5934626)
Chrome should change the lock icon to something weaker for sessions that don't use ephemeral keys.

This may be the most important article on HN related to the NSA leaks. Fact is, most of us haven't paid enough attention to the details of https.

EDIT: "something weaker" - didn't mention color. People dont need to understand "forward secrecy", the browser just needs to raise the bar for what's considered secure. The goal is to change server-side behavior, not consumer behavior.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:20PM (#5935060)
People barely pay attention to the lock icon. Why would color-coding the lock make a difference?
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by IvyMike on Monday June 24, 2013 @07:53PM (#5936538)
I don't think the goal would be getting everyone to pay attention, because if it is, you're absolutely correct.

But if you look at it as a way to spread awareness to web admins, to be confronted with the question "how come we don't have the bestest type of icon", it's not so bad.

A related example: I have recently been wondering how widespread DNSSEC is.

I installed the DNSSEC validator chrome plugin, and now (almost) every website on the planet shows me a sad "no DNSSEC" icon. I can't help but feel that part of the low deployment of DNSSEC is because almost nobody, including web admins, gets any feedback about DNSSEC. (I am aware that there are other costs and risks to deployment.)

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Monday June 24, 2013 @09:54PM (#5937004)
DNSSEC provides minimal value and adds significant overhead. We're better off the less it's deployed.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by IvyMike on Monday June 24, 2013 @10:17PM (#5937096)
If you're like me, and wishing tptacek would elaborate, it turns out he has in the past. For example, this entertaining thread from three years ago:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1234567

Also, despite my earlier google queries about DNSSEC, everything I was reading was pretty dry. The magic phrase to google for is "DNSSEC sucks"--that gets you the interesting stuff.

I haven't digested it yet, but in those results, this looks pretty interesting from D. J. Bernstein: http://cr.yp.to/talks/2010.12.28/slides.pdf

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @12:36AM (#5937553)
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by damarquis on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @09:11AM (#5939137)
The a video of the talk those slides are from is online http://vimeo.com/18417770

Worth watching even if you don't care much about DNSSEC, Bernstein is a good speaker.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by oconnore on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @04:47AM (#5938248)
I don't understand why your criticism of DNSSEC focuses on TLS vs. DNSSEC.

DNS is a scalable global key-value store, and DNSSEC allows owners of namespaces to sign their own key pairs and delegate to sub-namespaces. If you can make the case that _that_ is not valuable, or how that is accomplished by other means, I am curious. But TLS vs. DNSSEC doesn't cut it.

Yes, DNSSEC/DANE can make TLS work better. It provides a straightforward way to pin an entire zone tree while allowing site owner modifications. Your example of Ghadaffi and Bit.ly is silly, because the status quo is that governments already have access to CA keys able to issue for any server. Restricting to a single zone can only improve that.

I don't know how you can claim NSEC3 is a grotesque hack without noting that it is equally grotesque to pretend that your DNS records are private. If I wanted to collect the BoA zone, I would setup recursive nameservers on the coffee shops' wifi within a quarter mile of their headquarters and grep the logs. Incidentally, this would work even with DNSCurve deployed.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @10:33AM (#5939678)
Anyone who would advocate for DANE in 2013 is looking at a situation where users assume that governments have compromised the PKI that drives the most important encryption on the Internet, and saying to themselves, "let's bake that problem into the network architecturally; let's make it so that the NSA doesn't even need to compromise a CA, because they'll own the global root of all CAs".

Regarding NSEC3: most people reading this thread don't know what it is, so I'll explain it really quickly and let them decide, because it it so obviously a stupid hack that I don't think I need to argue against it too much:

Just a couple years ago --- more than a decade after work on DNSSEC was started --- somebody realized that Bank of America would not in fact be OK with a DNS design where every single one of their hostnames, for both public and internal systems, was public. But that's a problem, because DNSSEC wants to authenticate negative responses; if there's no JABBERWOCKY.BANKOFAMERICA.COM, DNSSEC wants that cryptographically proven. But their design to do that breaks if there are nonpublic names, because DNSSEC chains the names together as a way to authenticate denial.

So here's what they came up with: domain names are hashed (crappily) as if for a 1997 Unix password file, and the authenticated denial messages refer to hash ranges instead of literal hostnames. Meaning you can only discover all of Bank of America's hostnames if you are as technologically sophisticated as a circa-1997 password cracker.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by oconnore on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @09:44PM (#5943608)
You didn't actually respond to what I said.

I don't know why you're talking about the NSA. And if you are, anyway, do you really think they can't ask Verisign for an arbitrary cert already? And won't the same tools that modern network programs use to protect against these attacks (certificate pinning, convergence, etc.) work equally well when applied to DNSSEC KSKs?

NSEC3 is good enough. I gave you a trivial way of acquiring jabberwocky.bankofamerica.com, even with DNSCurve deployed. If BOA wants network accessible services on a network accessible namespace to be private, they should make a zone cut at internal.bankofamerica.com and restrict access to the delegated NS (which can be the same machine). The easiest way to do this is to run a VPN, which they already do.

I am asserting that having a global key-value store, where namespace owners can sign their own entries and make delegations, is a valuable system to have in place. That is what DNSSEC is. Unless you can argue against that, you are simply beating on a straw man.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @10:58PM (#5943886)
Why spend the money adopting DNSSEC if it's at best a marginal setback to Internet security?

The "trivial way of acquiring jabberwocky.bankofamerica.com" relies on somehow being in the same coffee shop as an employee who accesses the site using public DNS. Whereas DNSSEC just goes right ahead and publishes the information.

As for "making zone cuts" --- they haven't. Very few networks have. DNSSEC advocates just like to pretend that everyone has either architected their DNS zones they way they would, or that they'll all relabel all their hosts to fit that way.

I don't know why I should care about a "global key value store where namespace owners can sign their own entries and make delegations". We can have lots of those. Why use a crappy one bolted onto DNS?

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by oconnore on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @11:28PM (#5944007)
It's not a setback at all. You can still use the existing CA system. In fact, you can just not set the secure bit and ignore its existence.

> As for "making zone cuts" --- they haven't. Very few networks have. DNSSEC advocates just like to pretend that everyone has either architected their DNS zones they way they would, or that they'll all relabel all their hosts to fit that way.

Very few networks have ridiculous PHB requirements for public servers defined on public namespaces that are somehow slightly more difficult to find than normal (and once the cat / jabberwocky is out of the bag and published to a mailing list somewhere, gives no advantage whatsoever).

Those that do have reasonable options for satisfying said PHBs, first with NSEC3 and then with zone cuts and private networks (which actually does solve the problem, instead of just pretending to solve it).

> I don't know why I should care about a "global key value store where namespace owners can sign their own entries and make delegations". We can have lots of those. Why use a crappy one bolted onto DNS?

What alternatives? To my knowledge, there is no credible alternative system to DNS. Why put up with a DNS system that is not end to end verified when you don't have to?

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by dfc on Monday June 24, 2013 @08:34PM (#5936710)
I think you are painting an exagerated picture of DNSSEC deployment. Off the top of my head every gov/mil domain is signed, debian, archlinux, fedora, paypal, freebsd, icann, ietf, isc...
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by IvyMike on Monday June 24, 2013 @09:41PM (#5936967)
I don't know--it really seems pretty rare in the sites I use day-to-day. Going over a list of popular websites (plus a few of interest to hackernews users), I don't think any of hackernews, google, reddit, github, wikipedia, facebook, yahoo, amazon, twitter, tumblr, bing, or ebay are using DNSSEC. My bank is not, nor are any of the other banks I thought of off the top of my head.

Of the sites you mention, paypal is the only one that I use on any sort of a recurring basis. But it's a little weird to a DNSSEC newbie like me, so maybe you can explain. The verisign tool shows that paypal.com is using DNSSEC, but it doesn't appear that www.paypal.com itself is secured. Is the chrome plugin giving me misleading information? Is this how things are supposed to be?

And a lot of US government sites have DNSSEC waivers. The first two examples I tried:

cia.gov appears to not use DNSSEC: http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/www.cia.gov nsa.gov appears to not use DNSSEC: http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/www.nsa.gov

(Thank goodness the verisign tool itself IS using DNSSEC.)

A long list of US .gov sites with and without working DNSSEC: http://fedv6-deployment.antd.nist.gov/cgi-bin/generate-gov

(Also: nist.gov is using DNSSEC)

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by dfc on Monday June 24, 2013 @11:12PM (#5937292)
I am certainly not a DNSSEC expert so take my explanation with a grain of salt.

Short answer www.paypal.com is a cname for an akamai box. That cname record is secure:

  $ unbound-host -v -t cname www.paypal.com www.paypal.com has CNAME record
  www.paypal.com.akadns.net. (secure)

Everything falls apart when your resolver finishes the rest of the required lookups to get an IP address from akadns/akamaiedge.

As I have been experimenting/researching dnssec I have often found it is useful to use verisign's tool AND sandia's dnsviz[1] tool. For the moment forget what I said about paypal's cname and compare sandia's[2] and verisign's[3] results for www.paypal.com and see if you can spot the issue.

You are correct that it is a relief that verisign uses DNSSEC but if I may be so bold I think you may be wrong about why it is a relief. (I am trying to be helpful, i apologize if that sounds dickish it is not my intent) With DNSSEC (just like DNS) everything flows from the root. Verisign manages the .com tld so if they did not sign the .com you could not verify anyhost.com. The same thing can be said for DISA, GSA and PIR for .mil, .gov and .org zones respectively.

As far as NIST goes they are the second least surprising DNSSEC adopter as far as the federal government goes. Because of NIST's standards function within the government they are normally at the forefront for things like this. Moreover DNSSEC is heavily reliant on accurate time and NIST is the home of the government's truechimer. However if you go down this rabbit hole you start to have some serious chicken and egg problems.

[1] http://dnsviz.net/ (NB: sandia's is so slow that its painful)

[2] http://dnsviz.net/d/www.paypal.com/dnssec/

[3] http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/www.paypal.com

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by phlo on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @05:27AM (#5938334)
Since you mentioned banks, I just need to chime in:

I recently (May, June) surveyed 100 european banks (in Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Austria), roughly selected for the 20 specimens with the greatest total assets per country.

None of them have deployed DNSSEC. Most use SSL, many use EV certificates, a few go so far as to include HSTS. DNSSEC? Zero.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by dfc on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @11:40PM (#5944049)
Do you have the dataset anywhere?
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by phlo on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @04:57AM (#5944887)
The data will be part of my bachelor's thesis, to be published in July. Well, pseudo-published, as such theses tend to end up.

Ping me at ycombinator at y dot ly for your choice of either raw (collected using Qualys' SSL Server Test[1] and plain old DiG) or aggregate data.

[1] http://ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by patmcc on Monday June 24, 2013 @09:43PM (#5936974)
So in terms of traffic, basically 0% of the internet.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by dfc on Monday June 24, 2013 @10:00PM (#5937032)
In terms of traffic no doubt. But that seems like the most ridiculous metric to use. But more importantly these are off the top of my head and my interests are not your average internet users interests (eg debian). Comcast is using DNSSEC. Google's dns (8.8.8.8) will do dnssec if requested in the query.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by malandrew on Monday June 24, 2013 @04:06PM (#5935324)
Part of the problem is that the lock icon is just grey. The lock icon should be pulsing red, solid yellow or green. This would work the same way Google's anti-black-hat-SEO advisories work. Force people into security by calling attention to bad practices and reducing the prominence in search of any site that violates this.

Clicking on the pulsing red icon, would pop up a window that tells people exactly what they should be careful about.

Clicking on the certificate, should present a much clearer dialog for the layman.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by dclowd9901 on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @10:52AM (#5939849)
> pulsing red

Yeah that's great when I'm trying to focus on an article I'm reading. This is why security people aren't allowed to touch UI.

All joking aside, I agree that this issue should be surfaced, and I think people would notice the security icon if it was in constant flux.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by rhizome on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:30PM (#5935116)
Because they can learn.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:32PM (#5935127)
That's what the people selling EV certs said. But EV certs have been a failure too, and they had a much louder UI.

And at least EV certs were backed by a concept that people could understand. It's unreasonable to expect people outside of tech to understand "forward secrecy".

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jessaustin on Monday June 24, 2013 @05:09PM (#5935692)
It is at least possible that EV certs have seen limited uptake because people understand too much about them. After all, they are the same CA "sure you can trust us" scam that we've always had, except with more rent-seeking. Some users and/or site operators might have been influenced e.g. by EV certs' unsavory association with Comodo.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Monday June 24, 2013 @05:35PM (#5935849)
It is extremely unlikely that mass-market adoption of EV certificates has anything to do with the inside baseball of CA politics.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jessaustin on Monday June 24, 2013 @05:48PM (#5935932)
So strike my last sentence. EV certs are still more onerous for site operators in terms of price and process than "normal" certs. They don't offer a credible increase in security or decrease in liability for anyone. Those facts suffice to explain the paucity of their mass-market adoption.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by enraged_camel on Monday June 24, 2013 @07:17PM (#5936375)
Back then people didn't know the extent and depth of NSA's surveillance, so they weren't motivated to learn. The stakes are higher now.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by lemming on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @12:40AM (#5937566)
In retrospect, the timing of Google introducing PFS is interesting. It's possible they introduced it because they either knew about or suspected the surveillance but either had no proof or were unable to talk about it. Of course, maybe they're just security conscious but it's interesting that Adam Langley so explicitly referred to the recording for later decryption scenario.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by thrownaway2424 on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @09:20AM (#5939203)
The USA has one of the least intrusive, least overbroad surveillance regimes in the world. Google introduced PFS because governments in places like India and Russia openly desire to intercept all communications.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by Spooky23 on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @10:05AM (#5939490)
The average customer does not, but security professionals do.

I know that in many government scenarios, (think local governments) for example, policy guidance drives purchasing and other behavior. So if compliance with some security standard requires a "green lock" that lock matters.

That will drive behavior -- banks, insurance companies, and other businesses will be disqualified for all sorts of RFPs.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by ankeshk on Monday June 24, 2013 @04:02PM (#5935294)
Make it blink or jiggle a bit. Problem of winning attention solved.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by rdl on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @02:50AM (#5937949)
Maybe, but in the long run the positive change would be by changing defaults everywhere, and then eventually throwing warnings for non-ephemeral SSL in the browser.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jiggy2011 on Monday June 24, 2013 @04:30PM (#5935461)
How do you explain that to people though?

It's simple enough to say "if you don't see the green padlock, don't enter your credit card number" but then what if the person sees the weaker symbol?

You could say "go ahead" in which case they will go ahead all of the time or you could say "only go ahead under these additional circumstances" , what would they be?

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jlgreco on Monday June 24, 2013 @02:42PM (#5934836)
This is a great idea, but I wonder how far you can go with it. Could you also change the lock icon when larger more secure keys are used? Could you perhaps have the lock icon change color between a continuum of red to green (or better, black to white, or something accessible to colorblind people) depending on how the site is set up?
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by roc on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:11PM (#5934995)
People are not going to pay attention to a color-coded internet-weather-report sort of icon.

But maybe if you switched the iconography/expectation: use a 'person' icon, instead of the lock, for vanilla SSL. It would indicate you have verified the server's identity -- which is not nothing -- but you can reserve the lock icon for forward-secure servers.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jlgreco on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:17PM (#5935033)
The problem of getting users who don't care to care is probably unsolvable without destroying usability. I think providing information nicely to people who care about it is the next best thing to shoot for.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by roc on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:38PM (#5935164)
I don't think it's about users not caring at all. It's more about the limit to which they can add yet-another nuanced technology/security concern to their life and work and then keep up with it as times change. [1]

We've got a question of granularity [2] and rather than make a professional value judgment in the average user's best interests [3], the proposal is trying to represent the entire scale and then expect the user to educate themselves about what the scale means, compare that to their environment needs, etc.

[1] How long ago was it, we were simply railing against insufficient key sizes or improper certificate validation? Anyone who 'learned' up to that day's wisdom would have to continually update their knowledge along with the rest of us to be able to make informed decisions on which colors were 'safe' for which uses.

[2] 'how secure' on a scale from 'unsecure' to 'SSL' to 'perfect forward secrecy'

[3] drawing a line on the scale, to the left of which is not secure and to the right of which is secure. And, when 'less-secure' options prevent valuable information that isn't necessarily 'security' (e.g. identity validation) using a clear method of distinguishing that.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by dllthomas on Monday June 24, 2013 @02:54PM (#5934896)
Probably it should be a rolling standard, based on current best-practices.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jlgreco on Monday June 24, 2013 @02:56PM (#5934906)
I was thinking it would be up to the browser vendor to decide how to rate things, but if there were a more formal system that would be great I think.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by dllthomas on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:05PM (#5934954)
Oh, I'd just meant "standard" in the "something against which you measure things" sense, and had been thinking per-browser, but I agree that some industry-wide coordination would be fantastic, if done right. Probably an industry-wide lower bound, with individual browsers allowed to require more security for a given marking, would be best.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by Skalman on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:04PM (#5934949)
Assuming you're sarcastic, but don't you think it's right to punish sites that don't use the best encryption strategies?

I'd support three stages: 1) no encryption, 2) some/partial encryption, 3) "perfect" encryption.

For the partial encryption, the browser would provide an explanation of exactly how it could be compromised. For the case where the encrypted version does not have perfect forward secrecy, it could explain that if the server is compromised, this session can also be decrypted.

I don't think browsers should cover the banks' asses here.

Edit (since I can't reply deeper): I thought you were being sarcastic since I consider a gradient to be a really horrible idea. I'd want something where the browser tells me something. I don't want to wonder whether the new browser version changed the gradients slightly or a site improved its encryption strategy. Clear symbols and language is a must.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jlgreco on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:09PM (#5934971)
I'm not being sarcastic, I think this is a good idea. I probably came off wrong because half-way through writing my comment I actually changed my mind, I guess my tone leaked through though.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by andrewflnr on Monday June 24, 2013 @09:02PM (#5936822)
I vote for having a rope tied in a knot as the icon: still sort of secure, just less so.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by schtev on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:22PM (#5935075)
Or just throw away the lock entirely, given that Google is in bed with the NSA.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by mpyne on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:32PM (#5935133)
Google is the only major player even employing perfect forward secrecy; hardly a case of a company trying to get extra-cozy with the NSA.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by yk on Monday June 24, 2013 @07:36PM (#5936456)
Perfect forward secrecy would prevent some attacks against Google, as does certificate pinning in Chrome. But if the NSA got somehow Google's secret key, they can still MITM a SSL connection. It just means, that they actually need Google's secret key, instead of using a CA under their control. ( And they need this key before they can MITM any connection.)

And the entire secure connection stuff is broken, if the NSA just obtains a FISA warrant for your GMail account. ( Or compromises the Google servers directly.)

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by anonchl on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @06:42AM (#5938543)
> they actually need Google's secret key, instead of using a CA under their control

Note that Google runs their own CA (signed by Equifax's Root CA) and, thus, issues their own certificates.

The way things are going, I see no reason why the NSA could not, with a FISA warrant, simply order Google to:

1. provide them with a copy of Google's CA's private key; or, 2. issue the NSA a certificate valid for *.{every-google-domain}.com.

Maybe they can.

Maybe they have.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by commandar on Monday June 24, 2013 @09:05PM (#5936832)
>But if the NSA got somehow Google's secret key, they can still MITM a SSL connection.

Security isn't my field at all, but I'd gotten the impression from HN that PFS is meant to protect against just this scenario. Am I mistaken?

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by bradleyjg on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @12:03AM (#5937442)
What PFS will protect against in this scanario is decrypting SSL sessions whose cyphertexts were captured before the attacker had access to the private key. It doesn't protect against (any) man-in-the-middle attacks.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by daeken on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @02:04AM (#5937817)
Before or after they have access to the private key, so long as an active MITM is not performed. In essence, PFS makes it such that no matter what information you have about the server's configuration, passive sniffing of data is not enough to compromise a connection's confidentiality.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by inopinatus on Monday June 24, 2013 @08:30PM (#5936689)
How about a big red nose next to the padlock?