Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ...
by anonchl on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @06:42AM
(#5938543)
> they actually need Google's secret key, instead of using a CA under their control
Note that Google runs their own CA (signed by Equifax's Root CA) and, thus, issues their own certificates.
The way things are going, I see no reason why the NSA could not, with a FISA warrant, simply order Google to:
1. provide them with a copy of Google's CA's private key; or, 2. issue the NSA a certificate valid for *.{every-google-domain}.com.
Maybe they can.
Maybe they have.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ...
by commandar on Monday June 24, 2013 @09:05PM
(#5936832)
>But if the NSA got somehow Google's secret key, they can still MITM a SSL connection.
Security isn't my field at all, but I'd gotten the impression from HN that PFS is meant to protect against just this scenario. Am I mistaken?
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ...
by bradleyjg on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @12:03AM
(#5937442)
What PFS will protect against in this scanario is decrypting SSL sessions whose cyphertexts were captured before the attacker had access to the private key. It doesn't protect against (any) man-in-the-middle attacks.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ...
by daeken on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @02:04AM
(#5937817)
Before or after they have access to the private key, so long as an active MITM is not performed. In essence, PFS makes it such that no matter what information you have about the server's configuration, passive sniffing of data is not enough to compromise a connection's confidentiality.
And the entire secure connection stuff is broken, if the NSA just obtains a FISA warrant for your GMail account. ( Or compromises the Google servers directly.)