Google.com generates a public/private key pair and has the public key signed by a CA. The signature only says "I verify this public key really belongs to google.com," it does not become part of the actual cryptographic transaction.
One counter example: Clifford Cocks created a public key crypto system before RSA did, and GCHQ kept it secret for many years.
Q: Is encrypting my email any good at defeating the NSA survelielance? Id my data protected by standard encryption?
A: Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on. Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrifically weak that NSA can frequently find ways around it.
[1] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/17/edward-snowden-n...
p.s. I always like this comic about security: http://xkcd.com/538/
My personal perception (based on available evidence) is that government crypto is as strong as possible, but is weakened where needed via policies. A decade ago during crypto export limitation, there were no backdoors, but a policy: you may export only keys that long [so we can bruteforce them cheaper].
Another example: SSL is technically secure, but its biggest weakness is trust in a limited list of certificate authorities (CAs) like VeriSign. Then, there is policy that certificate authorities should give up their private keys when FBI/CIA asks for them.
Another example: you may encrypt your files, but must give away your password to a court.
Also, it makes sense economically. Government people need strong crypto like everyone else and the best way to test and verify it is by opening it up and deploying as widely as possible. So mistakes are noticed sooner than later. Then, people with guns will make sure you give up your secrets when they need you to.
I believe crypto systems are alright. It is policies and violent coercion we should be afraid of.