The work required to build reliable exploits against hardened Windows can take months. Why shouldn't researchers be compensated for that work? If you don't want to accept payment for it, that's fine; don't. But why is it bad for other people to do so?
By default a naturally occurring exploit probably upon inspection looks less intentional then one put there on purpose.
. . . except for the outsider who mailed them about it and got paid a chunk of money as a result.
At least an internal employee is on your payroll, and has been screened with a background check. You don't get to screen which people get to discover vulnerabilities.
They would not know about the program which takes that exploit and then gives it to the NSA.
Nevertheless, I don't see how this is a bad thing.
MS is in the unique position of being the only ones able to fix the exploit so they are a single-point-of-failure, which diminishes the security of everybody using Windows operating systems.
Microsoft does not have the in-house expertise to feed exploits to anyone.
I agree with you everywhere else in this thread, but you are clearly not up to speed on who works there if you believe that to be accurate. Some of the best exploit writers, who have pioneered new classes of techniques, work at Microsoft (because Microsoft went on a recruiting spree to target them).
Then again, the notion that Microsoft dedicates resources to serve as an outsourcing shop for NSA hackers to develop "cyber weapons" no longer has "reasonable person" anywhere on the horizon. That's not even worth entertaining, I just had to interject because I thought you were saying MS doesn't have good exploit writers ;)
I do think the MAPP equivalent for governments, probably as an unintended side effect, grants some advantage to parts of the .gov interested in attacking the products. How much, and whether or not they need it, is another story. But I agree that the NSA sure doesn't need their help - it's probably just a bit of free gravy if anything.
And in Microsoft's defense, it really wouldn't matter if they gave them to the NSA or not. The distribution list is very large, and the teams who ultimately receive that content are not vetted in any way.
(I made that number up.)
> The work required to build reliable exploits against hardened Windows can take months.
Under it all, the current model remains a by obscurity model, where anyone with orders of more magnitude of resources can certainly do enough reverse engineering to find the weak links and break in without planting backdoors.
Vendors reaching the point where they can offer bounties without contemplating bankruptcy implies considerably more resources are going into secure by design software and will continue to flow if they plan to remain solvent and unembarrassed (equally emabarassed?)
I've been playing with a chromebook and I am delighted to see frivolous and even fairly significant features were dropped to develop a secure boot model with a reasonable opt out. I'm sure it will still be broken, but 5-10 years ago it would have been trivially breakable to meet some last minute corporate request for tftp booting, marketing demo, or what have you..
Similar to the drug market, you can not drop the open market and expect everything to stop. Instead you must capture as many resources as you can and direct them to the right goal. I would hope that goal is secure kernels that expand out towards today's features, since the opposite clearly does not work with the resources at hand.
Selling exploits to customers who don't intend on fixing the exploit (buying a hacker's silence) is exactly the nightmare that came to light regarding MS releasing exploit information to NSA prior to releasing publicly-available bugfixes, and these kinds of monetary incentives to the security community will only make things worse.
Read more: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/03/zero-day-exploit-sales...
These exploits are effectively high-tech weaponry and they should be treated similarly.