That's Google. We've yet to hear from many of the other companies in the program about whether this sort of access is technically impossible, or whether it's an honor system that the government is supposed to follow.[1] I haven't been closely following the Facebook, Microsoft, or Apple statements, so maybe they have also been explicit that it is a restriction that is implemented by technical means. Some of the companies haven't said anything yet.
How many of the companies really make sure there is legitimate documentation for each request? Do they really do this every time, or have they become resigned to the fact that there's nothing they can do, so they just rubber stamp each request coming through, even without the proper legal documentation?
[1] This seems to be a major issue--the President and NSA leaders have claimed that analysts "cannot" access your phone metadata and phone call content without the correct legal instruments. But by "cannot", they seem to mean "they are not allowed to" rather than "it is not possible for them to".
my understanding of PRISM and all this is that the entire internet is vacuumed and everything is stored, just in case. I cannot imagine a guy "checking off" on every email or every mailbox for millions of gmail users every day or even once a month manually. With 11K terabytes of digital data created per hour by US, I cannot imagine any sort of manual system being implemented.
It has to be totally entirely automatic, otherwise it won't fly.
The PRISM program mentioned in the Powerpoint slides is very likely the same program that is mentioned in unclassified documents such as Army Field Manual (FM) 3-55, Information Collection[2]:
> 6-12. Two joint ISR planning systems—the collection management mission application and the Planning Tool for Resource, Integration, Synchronization, and Management (PRISM)—help facilitate access to joint resources. PRISM, a subsystem of collection management mission application, is a Web-based management and synchronization tool used to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of theater operations. PRISM creates a collaborative environment for resource managers, collection managers, exploitation managers, and customers. In joint collection management operations, the collection manager coordinates with the operations directorate to forward collection requirements to the component commander exercising tactical control over the theater reconnaissance and surveillance assets. A mission tasking order goes to the unit responsible for the collection operations. At the selected unit, the mission manager makes the final choice of platforms, equipment, and personnel required for the collection operations based on operational considerations such as maintenance, schedules, training, and experience. The Air Force uses the collection management mission application. This application is a Web-centric information systems architecture that incorporates existing programs sponsored by several commands, Services, and agencies. It also provides tools for recording, gathering, organizing, and tracking intelligence collection requirements for all disciplines
[1]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-prism-server...
[2]http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_55.pd...
Of course, this isn't remotely reassuring for a bunch of reasons. Most of all though, I'd be curious to hear more about how the auditing process works. He kept saying "auditable" I noticed, not you know... "actually audited".
But what I'm afraid of is that this mess with deciding exactly how much access the government has to Google will turn into a distraction from the larger picture. Which is that, in all likelihood, the NSA does not have access to Google. What they do instead, and what the name PRISM implies, is that they connect to the backbone (Verizon/AT&T), scoop up ALL data, and store it in their freshly built data center in Utah.
The slides I saw seemed to indicate when certain applications or filters came online. Such as a filter for Facebook data, or a filter for Google search/map/GPS data, etc. That's how I interpreted the graph, at least. It would indicate the NSA is rolling out specialized applications to handle data coming to and going from specific sites. Which allows them to more intelligently decipher what is being said, in more or less shotgun fashion.
Hence, the name PRISM. It's a project to split the full Internet stream into a Facebook bucket and a Google bucket, etc.
The hard solution is to secretly duplicate traffic from every data center operated by each of these companies, reverse engineer every HTTP request that goes back and forth so that the data can be parsed, maintain it for every product change that happens at these companies, circumvent HTTPS by compromising the certificate authorities, store it all, and still maintain a massive analytics tool that can make sense of the astounding amount of data coming through.
The easy solution is to avoid all of the technical ugliness of acquiring the data, and just legally make the companies give you the relevant information, neatly structured and packaged. NSLs are the ultimate hack.
You cannot decrypt passive monitoring with a CA's key.
Google started using these for their TLS setup about a year ago, and it's smart. They blogged about it, hoping others would follow suit.
I wonder if perhaps that change, and blog post, were their way of saying without saying.
For example for emails: emails travel unencrypted through the hops, and they would store them all, and then constantly analyzing them. When something suspicious comes up, they would go to the email provider to ask for more data. So for example if gmail address is there, they would go to Google and use their PRISM interface to get more data associated with that gmail adress, if it will be yahoo email, they will go to Yahoo for more data, etc.
This is even more complicated when the data centers are in other countries, and none of the data actually enters the US. So if two EU users were accessing Gmail from the EU, the data may never enter the US at all. This means any network tapping would have to be done in the EU as well, requiring cooperation from many international telecom companies.
It's still easiest to just force Google to hand it over via NSL. Google's still legally bound to deliver the data even if it isn't physically stored in the US.
From their perspective, why not?
A lot of the communication won't be encrypted anyways, and some of it will be, but they may be able to decrypt it at some point in the future.
The hard solution isn't just a little bit harder ... it's several orders of magnitude harder and more expensive. It's also highly vulnerable to simply using encryption. The easy solution works because the US companies are bound by law to cooperate. There's no reason to believe that legal pressure on these companies has failed to get the government what it wants.
Also, not every company is a US company.
I doubt that costs for such an operation would make any difference to the US government, considering how much it is spending per day on its military.
PRISM is a web-app. The slides make it pretty clear its a web-app. The army field manual link helpfully posted before in this discussion outright says its a web-app.
Not necessarily. As another commenter pointed out [1], a single FISA order doesn't have to correspond to a single citizen. One order can encompass millions of accounts.
> their denials address that, they clearly say that is not the case, instead they sftp the data after being served with court orders or warrants and such, including the secretive FISA requests.
While I think it's reasonable to doubt the claim that the NSA has true direct access to servers, I haven't been given a reason to doubt that information can be requested without court orders, warrants or FISA requests.
The court document from Google (http://assets.nationaljournal.com/img/MOTION.pdf) clearly states the desire to clearly list, in aggregate, the number of accounts impacted.
The other companies aren't going this far and I think they deserve a credit for what they're doing.
And I disagree with commend you link to, the solution isn't limiting data collection, sure it makes you a target but more data equals a better product. It's an issue of government overreach not engineering decisions.
I agree with this entire comment. Even the part where you disagreed with part of the comment I linked to. I even responded to that poster before replying to you. :-)
(Sorry about that. I meant to link to the comment for the text of the FISA order, and not for the jab against Google.)
[1]http://twit.tv/show/security-now/408 for audio and relevant links
At any rate, assuming all fibre optic is tapped, how does that explain breaking SSL? That's a really big jump.
As to SSL, is there a claim that NSA has broken it? I wasn't aware of that. Not relevant to Gibson's idea, anyway.
Large governments don't need to break SSL. They have SSL root keys and can man-in-the-middle at will. Doing so across the board would likely be detected, but targeted usage likely wouldn't be.
If this was widespread, I'd expect someone to have found a Google cert signed by different root. Then again I suspect Google pins their certs in chrome for a reason.
This whole conversation is about wholesale data access, so targeting is not relevant. Besides, even if you are talking about targeting, the claim is, they are storing data and then targeting 'retrospectively'. So without a time machine there's no way they are going to be able to go back and MITM the targeted conversations they want to listen to after the fact. They would have to be MITM everything all the time.
How about this: the NSA has issued a secret subpoena for the private SSL key of every listed provider (Google/Facebook/Yahoo/etc). They are using those keys to transparently decrypt traffic and suck up what they want.
When news of the PRISM program was first revealed two weeks ago, officials at Facebook, Google and other tech firms informally conferred on a public response...
I don't know why people keep putting this into question, giving Google the benefit of the doubt, when they were caught pants down, no questions asked.
If the companies mentioned in the slides just complied with the law, why would they be singled out in those slides? Honoring search warrants and FISA requests is an obligation, not an extra.
The reason Google was singled out as a partner since 2009 is because they gave the government full unrestricted access.
Which part of the PRISM slides make you think that? They certainly indicate pretty much full access to accounts which have been OK'd by Google (at least in archive form), but that is very different from 'full unrestricted access' to servers. I'd say we don't really know the extent of it, and welcome Google's decision to try to challenge the government in court to reveal more details.
As far as I read them the few PRISM slides we've seen don't really indicate:
1) The extent of access (how many accounts, how many accounts per order etc) 2) The mechanisms for FISA access 3) Any time delay in receiving documents/access 4) Whether data is realtime or not after access is granted
and the figures that FB, MS, Apple have announced hardly constitute full unrestricted access to all accounts as you seem to be implying. It's still a serious invasion of privacy, there are serious doubts about the efficacy of the FISA court supervision, and for foreigners I'm not even sure there are any protections at all (the NSA might not even feel obliged to get specific permission for non-US communications), so for everyone outside the US this is really invasive, but I'm not sure I can agree with your characterisation of these slides as showing full access (full access to what, to all Google servers, seriously?).
The most worrisome and misunderstood part of these reports is the "direct access" bit: can the government arbitrarily query company servers? their denials address that, they clearly say that is not the case, instead they sftp the data after being served with court orders or warrants and yes also the secretive FISA requests.
So by revealing the number of FISA requests they receive and their scope they hope to clear this "direct access" mess. As even FISA orders are much more acceptable than wholesale access.
As for the development being reported here: I think it has merit seeing how this clearly falls under the first amendment, but I'd like a lawyer to chip in.
[edit: clarity]