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Re:How To CryptoParty by derrida on Monday June 17, 2013 @11:57AM (#5893902)
I've participated in 5 of these now. I've noticed new bugs, and have a new appreciation for the art of a UI design because of it. Feel free to ask any questions or drop into the irc at #cryptoparty on irc.oftc.net (you can connect through Tor)

There have been 100's of them in >50 cities. It took off when the Australian Government notified the public that they intended to increase the powers of the intelligence agencies.

It's not so much teaching cryptography as it would be in a university or hacker to hacker as it is teaching people all of the pitfalls and what's hidden from the UI and what's really going on when you say, use Tor.

Re:How To CryptoParty by niels_olson on Monday June 17, 2013 @12:15PM (#5894003)
What are some of your bugs and design improvements? I plan on attempting one of this in the next couple of weeks.
Re:How To CryptoParty by derrida on Monday June 17, 2013 @01:22PM (#5894479)
I was mostly helping people with Tor-related stuff and didn't have time to get a sense of the other usability issues out there in thinks like whole disk-encryption and PGP.

There is a very literal UI bug that is also a security problem in the Tor Browser Bundle. If you resize the Firefox window, you increase your browsers uniqueness & thus make you easier to identify. Try this by switching off a toolbar and noticing the difference at panopticlick.eff.org

Getting a piece of software like Pidgin to work through Tor was a challenge for many. The concepts of 'localhost' and sockets and a TCP-stream was challenging to get across. I don't really know the answer to this problem. These are hard issues to solve with software and the best we've got so far, I think, is education. If I had to imagine a piece of software: something like a packet filter that could go into 'incognito mode' set-up a transparent proxy and automatically flag packets that could reduce one's anonymity or reveal one's identity, then recommend steps to take in the relevant applications to get around that. It's not a completely thought through idea but maybe someone will come along and read this and it would spark the solution in their mind.

There are more bugs than people, check out trac.torproject.org and see what you can do. The #tor irc channel on irc.oftc.net & [email protected] are good places to ask questions.

Re:How To CryptoParty by thomasbk on Monday June 17, 2013 @06:34PM (#5896416)
The answer to things like the Pidgin configuration issue you mentioned could be https://tails.boum.org/ -- a live USB distribution that runs all traffic through Tor, and comes with Pidgin preinstalled and preconfigured. It has optional encrypted persistence too.
Re:How To CryptoParty by derrida on Monday June 17, 2013 @10:37PM (#5897204)
Yes, I did show some people through this too. However, it's not usable as an everyday operating system, for, say researchers such as academics, or journalists.
Re:How To CryptoParty by jlgaddis on Monday June 17, 2013 @09:42PM (#5897066)
The screen resolution is obtained by JavaScript, right? Would it not be possible to modify the Mozilla source code (in the TBB) so that it always returns a specific screen resolution, regardless of the actual resolution?
Re:How To CryptoParty by blackaspen on Monday June 17, 2013 @11:15AM (#5893638)
While I'm all for propagating the knowledge of cryptography, there was a kid in High School would walk around handing his public key out to people on slips of paper. That wasn't terribly effective for him.
Re:How To CryptoParty by niels_olson on Monday June 17, 2013 @11:22AM (#5893675)
Here's my issue with that, and, hey, I sort of agree, I have found pgp to be useful among hackers, but no one outside that circle has any interest in it, even my mom, the college math teacher.

But is this where the technorati has failed to fill their real social obligation? Are we the new Russian intellectuals who failed to engage the people? Are we so self-absorbed in navel-gazing on Hacker News that we fail to actually execute on the one idea that matters? If we can't restore the security of communications, how will history judge us?

Re:How To CryptoParty by stinkytaco on Monday June 17, 2013 @11:46AM (#5893838)
I love PGP, but I would think that history would judge us for not developing something more accessible rather than for not spreading PGP. Even I, a PGP user and geek, access my email via Gmail web or my phone's app most of the time rather than via my IMAP client because most people I communicate with don't use PGP and cannot be bothered to (because they also use webmail). And the sad part? I don't blame them. I'm not at my computer all the time. I don't carry it with me anymore and neither do they. They check it from work, from their phone or wherever.

I don't have a solution for the problems that would plague a good crypto/identity system. Centralized trusted parties? That's worked just OK for websites and it entails a cost, and the paranoia that comes with it. A open solution like Persona? Maybe, but I don't know how to integrate that across browsers and devices without trust concerns.

No, I don’t know. But I do know that PGP is a lot of trouble.

Re:How To CryptoParty by jiggy2011 on Monday June 17, 2013 @12:21PM (#5894035)
It's a shame facebook doesn't allow for sharing PGP keys, that would solve the problem pretty well.
Re:How To CryptoParty by stinkytaco on Monday June 17, 2013 @12:31PM (#5894094)
It would go some of the way to solving the problem, but you've got to trust Facebook in that exchange and I'm not sure I do. The only real way to establish trust in PGP is in person (or over the phone if you really know the person).

That said, I do think Facebook could go a long way to establishing a trust infrastructure.

Re:How To CryptoParty by jiggy2011 on Monday June 17, 2013 @12:53PM (#5894265)
You would to a point. However your facebook friends could verify you by signing your public key with their private keys.

Private keys could be stored on facebook's servers but encrypted with a key that is not sent to facebook (so all client side). The signing interface could be built into the facebook UI (like a verify button).

So hopefully the FB API could expose public keys for use by other apps.

Not perfect, but the advantage is that people already have FB accounts linked to their real IDs.

Re:How To CryptoParty by stinkytaco on Monday June 17, 2013 @01:08PM (#5894382)
This would all be good once trust is established. FB would basically become a large keyserver that people already use, with an exposed API. That's a good thought.

But I would still need to verify the trust in person. Otherwise, Facebook could be the MITM.

Which is, of course, the problem with the web of trust concept being exposed to the world at large. Too many people would simply establish trust for the expediency. I can see someone in my high school class signing my key and thus expecting me to do the same, without any understanding of the point of the whole business. If Facebook has shown us anything, it's that interpersonal concepts (like "friend") can be easily eroded.

Re:How To CryptoParty by jiggy2011 on Monday June 17, 2013 @01:22PM (#5894474)
Yes, you would still have to trust FB to a degree , especially in the initial phase and they would still be serving the code that did all of the crypto so you have issues there.

Once the trust was established though, especially with OTR it would be more difficult for them to later start abusing it. But it's still an improvement on FB having everything on their server under their complete control, if they starting messing with keys people would notice.

There could be a problem with people just signing any old key, but really you just need to verify that the person is who they say they are. I think that works 90% of the time on FB as it is, it's unlikely you'd get away with being an imposter.

Re:How To CryptoParty by jlgaddis on Monday June 17, 2013 @09:48PM (#5897086)
> Yes, you would still have to trust FB to a degree

Lots of people trusted Hushmail "to a degree" and we saw how that turned out...

Re:How To CryptoParty by jlgaddis on Monday June 17, 2013 @09:52PM (#5897100)
Symantec's Windows version of PGP isn't that bad, as far as UIs go. It's been a couple years since I used it but I'm confident I could teach the average person who already uses Outlook how to use it in an hour or two.

The nice thing is that it has opportunistic encryption enabled by default. Thus, it will always try to encrypt an outgoing e-mail and throw up a warning if the recipient's public key isn't available, for example. The error is, surprisingly, understandable to the average person (something like "A public key for <recipient> is not available and this message cannot be sent encrypted. Would you like to send it unencrypted?")

Re:How To CryptoParty by Create on Monday June 17, 2013 @11:39AM (#5893782)
“You can't solve social problems with software.” (Marcus Ranum).
Re:How To CryptoParty by EthanHeilman on Monday June 17, 2013 @11:57AM (#5893898)
Yes you can, given three assumptions:

1. Social relations depend on communication flows (i.e. Marx was wrong the superstructure is informational). 2. Software allows new communication flows. 3. Communication, like water, finds its own level.

Rearrange social relations by altering communications flows. Rearrange communication flows by creating a flow that is easier than the Status Quo. The Babylonians did this with cuneiform, the Romans did this with roads, Radio did this, TV did this, the Internet did this. Software allows you to create new communication flows.

The question is what social problems can be solved by reordering social relations and to what extend these particular social relations depend on communication flows.

Re:How To CryptoParty by stinkytaco on Monday June 17, 2013 @12:28PM (#5894074)
I would argue that none of these developments solved the social problem we're talking about, however, i.e. keeping conversations private and creating trust. Indeed, these developments made it worse because face to face interaction is no longer necessary, and putting the means of communication out of your control (either by transmitting it over a medium you don't control or simply by making it so complicated you can't possibly control it) increasing the likelihood of the "man in the middle" either intercepting your communications or impersonating them.

So I would say that you can reflow communication all you want, but that the underlying problem here is trust and knowledge and those are social problems. People either need to appreciate what these new communication flows mean and/or establish ways to bring their communications under their control (i.e. crypto).

That said, I think the idea of establishing trust through key signing parties (and "crypto" parties) is an interesting one. One of the key features of this is learning from someone you likely don't know, just as when you do a key signing party everyone requires some sort of government ID. In the end, you've got to put your trust in someone, right? So, back to the social problem.

Re:How To CryptoParty by EthanHeilman on Monday June 17, 2013 @12:58PM (#5894299)
I agree, I was objecting to the general statement that “You can't solve social problems with software.". There are social problems that are solvable with software and social problems that are not. It is an open question which cryptographic problems are of which class.

I would argue that provable-identity is probably solvable in software, but that identity and utility are deeply connected notions. For instance Alice wants to talk to Bob to satisfy some want or need. His identity is only important to the extent that it is a necessary part of the utility of the communication.

Generally two nodes in a network can prove that they have access to a particular set of keys, but the system tends to fall down on proving that they are useful to each other. A MITM attack is merely one party pretending to be as useful to the communicator as the intended recipient. If you disagree consider that your packets don't go directly to your bank, but are "rebroadcast" by routers and switches along the route.

Re:How To CryptoParty by stinkytaco on Monday June 17, 2013 @01:12PM (#5894413)
I'm not following this argument. If someone is able to compromise Bob's key and impersonate them, then the identity system has broken down. The "utility" and "identity" are effectivly the same in your arguement. If I have something I want to communicate to Bob what matters is his identity not really anything else. Thus I either need to trust the party that verifies his identity or I need to verify the identity personally and I need to trust Bob to maintain control of his keys.
Re:How To CryptoParty by EthanHeilman on Monday June 17, 2013 @02:13PM (#5894842)
>If I have something I want to communicate to Bob what matters is his identity not really anything else.

But how do you know that Bob exists and you want to talk to him? At some point you met someone named Bob and at some point you decided you wanted to communicate with him, but Bob as an identity really only exists in your head. He could be named Jim, he could be someone that is pretending to be Bob, Bob might be one of two twins both named Bob. Maybe Bob is working for your enemies.

One way to simplify the thorny issue of identity is to look at what someone wants out of the communication. The part of the identity Bob that matters to a communication is the expected utility of the communication. The identity is merely an end to that utility. For instance when you call tech support, you are trying to solve a problem and it doesn't really matter if the person tells you their name is Jim rather than James.

The only hard and fast identity is cryptographic identity, it can be compromised if someone shares their secret key, but at least you know that you are communicating with someone that has access to that secret key. That is, I can send to a message to all parties with access to the secret key, SK0. The next question is how do I know that parties which have access to SK0 will increase my utility via communication. That can only be built from past actions either directly or indirectly performed by that party.

Utility of identity depends on reputation of identity. Reputation of identity depends on past actions of identity (think stackoverflow/hackernews/silkroad).

All of which can be cryptographically proved if the identity consists merely of access to SK0. Note, this is how identity and trust works outside of computers.

Re:How To CryptoParty by stinkytaco on Monday June 17, 2013 @03:39PM (#5895404)
OK, I see where you are going. Using crypto and web-of-trust as an identity system is really using it as a reputation system. I would point out, however, that the cryptographic identity is not a "hard and fast identity", at least not in a way that's useful. As you point out, I've met Bob, I trust Bob and Bob's an old friend. I know Bob's cryptographic identity, but I also know that identity could be compromised at any time. However, if I know Bob I'm much more likely to realize that.

The reputation system tied to that identity could also be compromised, the difference is I'm much less likely to find out until it's too late and the potential harm to me is very high (lets say the government is operating a Silk Road honeypot). That brings us back around to the problem of identity. If I know and trust Bob then his utility is higher.

Which is the point of the "web of trust", it (sort of) builds that utility system in. I personally know Bob and know he's pretty sharp. He knows Jim and has signed Jim's key, but I don't know Jim and I'm taking Bob's word for his identity. Jim knows someone as well and has signed their key, but now we're getting pretty far removed from Bob. Their utility (in this case their utility at confirming identities) is getting smaller for me. I'm less inclined to trust them.

But Bob, Bob's an old friend.

So I see where you're going, but I still think "identity" is the critical factor.

Re:How To CryptoParty by EthanHeilman on Monday June 17, 2013 @03:58PM (#5895543)
>So I see where you're going, but I still think "identity" is the critical factor.

Agreed. So how do we live in such a world and make decisions?

Do you trust Bobs ability to protect his key? Can you buy insurance against this given Bobs reputation? Are the premiums worth the cost?

Re:How To CryptoParty by niels_olson on Monday June 17, 2013 @11:41AM (#5893794)
Right. You have to go meet people. Invite them over to your house, have dinner, and understand their concerns.
Re:How To CryptoParty by redblacktree on Monday June 17, 2013 @12:02PM (#5893926)
That sounds tedious.
Re:How To CryptoParty by niels_olson on Monday June 17, 2013 @12:11PM (#5893982)
To quote from the HN front page

> What is there in this that is unbearable and beyond endurance?

http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/05/mar...

Re:How To CryptoParty by peterwwillis on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:10PM (#5895608)
It would be nice to have one website with a HOWTO for creating a business card QR code with a vCard embedded with your public key in it, and instructions on how to use it with every native e-mail client.