But is this where the technorati has failed to fill their real social obligation? Are we the new Russian intellectuals who failed to engage the people? Are we so self-absorbed in navel-gazing on Hacker News that we fail to actually execute on the one idea that matters? If we can't restore the security of communications, how will history judge us?
I don't have a solution for the problems that would plague a good crypto/identity system. Centralized trusted parties? That's worked just OK for websites and it entails a cost, and the paranoia that comes with it. A open solution like Persona? Maybe, but I don't know how to integrate that across browsers and devices without trust concerns.
No, I don’t know. But I do know that PGP is a lot of trouble.
That said, I do think Facebook could go a long way to establishing a trust infrastructure.
Private keys could be stored on facebook's servers but encrypted with a key that is not sent to facebook (so all client side). The signing interface could be built into the facebook UI (like a verify button).
So hopefully the FB API could expose public keys for use by other apps.
Not perfect, but the advantage is that people already have FB accounts linked to their real IDs.
But I would still need to verify the trust in person. Otherwise, Facebook could be the MITM.
Which is, of course, the problem with the web of trust concept being exposed to the world at large. Too many people would simply establish trust for the expediency. I can see someone in my high school class signing my key and thus expecting me to do the same, without any understanding of the point of the whole business. If Facebook has shown us anything, it's that interpersonal concepts (like "friend") can be easily eroded.
Once the trust was established though, especially with OTR it would be more difficult for them to later start abusing it. But it's still an improvement on FB having everything on their server under their complete control, if they starting messing with keys people would notice.
There could be a problem with people just signing any old key, but really you just need to verify that the person is who they say they are. I think that works 90% of the time on FB as it is, it's unlikely you'd get away with being an imposter.
Lots of people trusted Hushmail "to a degree" and we saw how that turned out...
The nice thing is that it has opportunistic encryption enabled by default. Thus, it will always try to encrypt an outgoing e-mail and throw up a warning if the recipient's public key isn't available, for example. The error is, surprisingly, understandable to the average person (something like "A public key for <recipient> is not available and this message cannot be sent encrypted. Would you like to send it unencrypted?")