So while you can quibble over yelling "fire" in a theater, silencing speech against prosecution from the government is diametrically opposed to the intent of the first amendment.
FYI, even this argument has been rejected for decades. Now, your speech must be likely to cause "imminent lawless action". [1]
Yelling fire in a crowded theater is not about causing lawless action; the people fleeing in panic are behaving lawfully. The act of yelling "fire" is outlawed because that panic can result in grave bodily harm to others, and is a foreseeable result of doing so.
Brandenburg deals with inflammatory speech (usually hate speech but also includes seditious speech), which must rise to the level of incitement to be criminal, specifically meaning that you must incite others to actually hurt a third party or to actually take seditious actions against the government. Otherwise, the inflammatory speech is justy the expression of personal opinion, which is directly protected by the 1st Amendment.
Neither Schenck nor Brandenburg (which is considered to relate to Schenck) relate to actually yelling the word 'fire' more than indirectly.
I'm mildly interested in the actual hypothetical; out of curiosity can you cite caselaw that backs your claim (The act of yelling "fire" is outlawed because that panic can result in grave bodily harm to others, and is a foreseeable result of doing so)?
1. http://www.popehat.com/2012/09/19/three-generations-of-a-hac...
Then, I think someone forgot to tell the government that.
The entire framework of the US government's core documents and the non-legal documents written by the founders around the same time completely support the notion that these documents have purposes, chief among which is the defense of citizens from the government itself.
Interstate commerce has been applied to non-commercial private activities on personal property in numerous ways, for 70+ years.
Please see Raich v. Gonzales and Wickard v. Filburn.
Raich and Wickard are not unreasonable extensions of federal power--they simply reflect the fact that technology has changed the nature of commerce since the Constitution was drafted.
The problem with Raich and Wickard (et al.) is not that they extend federal power, but rather that they invent it of whole cloth.
Raich and Wickard do not invent federal power; they simply extend it to the modern era (or rather, into their future and our present day, since technology took a few decades to catch up).
Let me ask you this: What activity isn't covered in your interpretation of the commerce clause?
Today, technology across all sectors has improved to the point where you can now order heirloom todays and get same day delivery (in some markets). When these SCOTUS cases were decided, that same process would have taken months.
Moreover, trade that does not cross state lines can be interstate. For example--you make good Widget that you sell nationwide. I decide in State X that I want to make and sell Widget as well. (Patent, etc. are not a concern in this hypothetical). My sale in State X of widget necessarily affects your interstate sale of the same widget: every widget that I sell in State X is one less that you might sell, which means one more widget is available in other states, altering the normal supply/demand considerations. (I'm not just pulling this out of my ass, this is the actual logic set forth in the SCOTUS cases.)
You have to trade something in return for those services. Almost always that something is money.
If a lawyer represents me for nothing in return - then no trade took place, it would be a gift.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentum_ad_populum
"Virtually everyone" is not qualified to make a constitution, and if by "the courts" you mean the SCOTUS, then the courts have a history of doing a lot of stupid things based on personal bias.
So the real question (whether NSLs should be allowed) is quite a bit more nuanced.
I don't think they should, but not really on the basis of free speech.