Interstate commerce has been applied to non-commercial private activities on personal property in numerous ways, for 70+ years.
Please see Raich v. Gonzales and Wickard v. Filburn.
Raich and Wickard are not unreasonable extensions of federal power--they simply reflect the fact that technology has changed the nature of commerce since the Constitution was drafted.
The problem with Raich and Wickard (et al.) is not that they extend federal power, but rather that they invent it of whole cloth.
Raich and Wickard do not invent federal power; they simply extend it to the modern era (or rather, into their future and our present day, since technology took a few decades to catch up).
Let me ask you this: What activity isn't covered in your interpretation of the commerce clause?
Today, technology across all sectors has improved to the point where you can now order heirloom todays and get same day delivery (in some markets). When these SCOTUS cases were decided, that same process would have taken months.
Moreover, trade that does not cross state lines can be interstate. For example--you make good Widget that you sell nationwide. I decide in State X that I want to make and sell Widget as well. (Patent, etc. are not a concern in this hypothetical). My sale in State X of widget necessarily affects your interstate sale of the same widget: every widget that I sell in State X is one less that you might sell, which means one more widget is available in other states, altering the normal supply/demand considerations. (I'm not just pulling this out of my ass, this is the actual logic set forth in the SCOTUS cases.)
You have to trade something in return for those services. Almost always that something is money.
If a lawyer represents me for nothing in return - then no trade took place, it would be a gift.