Re:Introducing Sodium, a new cryptographic library
by jedisct1 on Wednesday March 06, 2013 @10:13PM
(#5335814)
Take a look at arc4random() implementations for a hint.
The generator has to switch to a new key after (in the OpenBSD implementation, too lazy to check other implementations now) 1600000 bytes of output.
How do you switch to a new key?
OpenBSD implemented a sysctl to retrieve the output of the kernel prg. This is great, as it perfectly works in a chroot()ed environment.
Other operating systems don't necessarily provide the same facility. They will try accessing /dev/urandom, and if it doesn't exist, revert to something pretty bad, like read whatever is on the stack and use that as a key.
Sodium provides randombytes_random(), randombytes_uniform() and randombytes_buf() that you can use as drop-in replacements for arc4random(), arc4random_uniform() and arc4random_buf(). On Unix, the file descriptor to /dev/urandom will be kept open, and accessible after a chroot() call. On Windows, the crypto services provider will be transparently used instead.
Re:Introducing Sodium, a new cryptographic library
by nwmcsween on Saturday March 09, 2013 @08:21AM
(#5348320)
Hmm linux provides AT_RANDOM from the kernel at program startup usually for randomization of stack canaries (but it can also be used for other things).
Other operating systems don't necessarily provide the same facility. They will try accessing /dev/urandom, and if it doesn't exist, revert to something pretty bad, like read whatever is on the stack and use that as a key.
Sodium provides randombytes_random(), randombytes_uniform() and randombytes_buf() that you can use as drop-in replacements for arc4random(), arc4random_uniform() and arc4random_buf(). On Unix, the file descriptor to /dev/urandom will be kept open, and accessible after a chroot() call. On Windows, the crypto services provider will be transparently used instead.