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Re:Introducing Sodium, a new cryptographic library by anonyfoo on Wednesday March 06, 2013 @09:41PM (#5335676)
Excuse my ignorance -- I find myself fairly knowledgeable in crypto/security, but I'm confused by "Sodium also provides a secure, chroot()-resistant drop-in replacement for the arc4random() function family, including the ability to generate random numbers within a given interval with a nearly random distribution."

What does chroot have to do with arc4random()?

Re:Introducing Sodium, a new cryptographic library by jedisct1 on Wednesday March 06, 2013 @10:13PM (#5335814)
Take a look at arc4random() implementations for a hint. The generator has to switch to a new key after (in the OpenBSD implementation, too lazy to check other implementations now) 1600000 bytes of output. How do you switch to a new key? OpenBSD implemented a sysctl to retrieve the output of the kernel prg. This is great, as it perfectly works in a chroot()ed environment.

Other operating systems don't necessarily provide the same facility. They will try accessing /dev/urandom, and if it doesn't exist, revert to something pretty bad, like read whatever is on the stack and use that as a key.

Sodium provides randombytes_random(), randombytes_uniform() and randombytes_buf() that you can use as drop-in replacements for arc4random(), arc4random_uniform() and arc4random_buf(). On Unix, the file descriptor to /dev/urandom will be kept open, and accessible after a chroot() call. On Windows, the crypto services provider will be transparently used instead.

Re:Introducing Sodium, a new cryptographic library by nwmcsween on Saturday March 09, 2013 @08:21AM (#5348320)
Hmm linux provides AT_RANDOM from the kernel at program startup usually for randomization of stack canaries (but it can also be used for other things).
Re:Introducing Sodium, a new cryptographic library by tsewlliw on Wednesday March 06, 2013 @10:04PM (#5335777)
you can chroot yourself away from access to /dev/random