Absolutely. This was a massive defense spending project by any measure. How many people do you think worked on it? Assuming the project was highly compartmentalized, I would estimate that there are at least SIX subteams currently working on the next Stuxnet.
- 0-Day exploitation of PCs. How big is the team responsible for discovering / purchasing 0-day exploits?
- Hardware/firmware-level infection. This would require expert knowledge of the specific control systems.
- Networking / infrastructure. This requires an intimate knowledge of target network topology.
- Boots-on-the-ground payload delivery (nontechnical).
- Spear-phishing payload delivery. Perhaps the points of entry were several levels removed from the actual target facility (e.g., security guards' wives' laptops).
- Testing / QA.
All of this of course has to be backed up by world-class intelligence support, which I shan't address further. The technical feats of developing this alone are astounding and intriguing.
Holy shit.
Given the speculation that it was the US behind Stuxnet, this one is a cheap and easy one. The US has been buying up ready-made exploits for a good while now (there's a reason that the likes of Raytheon are hiring exploit devs left and right) and have nice stockpiles of them just ready and waiting for the likes of Stuxnet.
If you're curious what companies are actually committing to vulnerability dev you can search any cleared jobs site for "offensive"; the companies that have listings are who you'd imagine them to be (minus a couple placement firms that just put people right at the Fort).
What's going to happen when the first Chinese/North Korean/... company succeeds at actually doing this ? When will we have the first startup doing it ? Startups are known for creativity, both in technical development and interpretation of the law, so why not ?
The cost for things like this needs to go up, by a lot, fast. Or we're going to be in a deep hole.
"One day, toward the end of Mr. Bush’s term, the rubble of a centrifuge was spread out on the conference table in the Situation Room, proof of the potential power of a cyberweapon. The worm was declared ready to test against the real target: Iran’s underground enrichment plant."
And i don't mean to stray off Stuxnet here, but just really quickly: The chosen-prefix collision attack used in signing the Windows Update malware (FLAME) also suspected of being from the US was a never before published variant.
The computing power alone was on the order of $200k, and makes you wonder what else the NSA or the national labs have up their sleeves.
I recall reading somewhere recently that the NSA has their own entire chip fab... this is to say nothing of the output of such a facility.
Is anyone aware of a somewhat comprehensive auto-update cryptography survey anywhere?
I am often alarmed by the number of updates pushed through desktop software, often with little explanation. (I'm looking at you, Adobe.) .. not just for security, but for bandwidth management too.
Many open source products seem to just query a URL and direct you to go download stuff. With SSL essentially broken, that's gotta be a bit risky vs. MITM.
Gentoo for one combines pre-distributed SHA256, SHA512 and Whirlpool checksums with file size, which feels secure enough against collisions. But the pre-distribution is decentralized through potential MITM (non-trusted parties), and the cryptography around that process - if any - is less than transparent, and integrity checking is apparently not made upon locally extracted package database.
Perhaps we need a standard, cross-platform solution in the software update query space that is cryptographically paranoid and well-reviewed enough by multiple parties to be considered secure, meets the generalised need and has some OS-level integration features more advanced than "secretly do things in the background".
There's nothing stopping one from linking against their own copy of an SSL lib, and supplying their own list of trust anchors/trusted CAs. I've been wondering for a while why lots of apps (e.g. mobile apps) don't do this more often.
Given the above, perhaps all distribution maintainers can realistically do is say "it hasn't changed since I first saw it" which is what happens when they provide multiple checksums of a file, which is probably lower CPU and software library overhead than performing a cryptographic signature check.
We could just as easily nuke, bomb or invade Iran - we would easily overwhelm them.
But sabotage is a hell of a lot easier, cheaper, faster and less risky, with no civilian deaths.
But seriously, what about hyper-velocity "rods from god" thrown at those nuclear facilities from orbit?
I don't trust the US just like I don't trust these Muslim states. Neither are really pro-freedom.
If it walks like a duck ..
Oh, I forgot, "they" are all rag head, terrorist, fundamental nut job ay-rabs.
Pretty sure the US armed a lot of the terrorists in the first place. When you suck the resources out of the world and push people into starvation whilst living in the land of plenty, you're obviously going to become a target.
Maybe the US is ALSO the problem here?
There are millions of Muslims representing hundreds of view points.
"All Christians are homophobic retards." What? There's nothing wrong with that statement. It describes those Westboro morons and therefore can be extrapolated to every Christian, right?
The speculation is that Stuxnet was tested on P-1 centrifuges that the US acquired when Libya dismantled its nuclear program, set up in Israel's nuclear arms facility in Dimona. [1]
[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet...;
Stuxnet recorded various data points while the cascades and centrifuges operated normally, in order to replay this data to operators once the sabotage began. They must have had a working system to test this on?! The budget for something like this is probably in the tens of millions if not more. The HR requirement must have been pretty large too. Analysts to gather information, managers, programmers, qa, siemens hardware experts, physicists, deployment, monitoring, etc, etc.