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Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by thibaut_barrere on Sunday February 03, 2013 @04:20AM (#5159179)
I suggest Rails people have a look at safe_yaml which (now) replaces YAML.load by a safe (safer?) version:

https://github.com/dtao/safe_yaml

(nb: I've enable it on apps without issues)

Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by PommeDeTerre on Sunday February 03, 2013 @09:28AM (#5159738)
This reminds me a lot of how the PHP crowd handles these kinds of problems.

So there's some piece of functionality, but security or some other obviously-important factor wasn't considered at all when it was initially "designed" and implemented. It's soon found to exhibit numerous problems, often including major security flaws.

Then a "safe" version of said functionality is offered. Yet for some reason (incompetence?) it has its own set of problems. And so the developers keep trying again and again, never seeming to get anywhere close to even a suitable solution.

An example is the mysql_escape_string() function, which was replaced by mysql_real_escape_string(), which has in turn been replaced by mysqli_escape_string(), mysqli::real_escape_string() and PDO::quote().

The end result is confusion, especially for novice users, or those coming back to PHP after some time. They don't know which of the several functions to use, or they're using older reference material that suggest the use of the faultiest of the functions.

It's better just to implement things properly the first time around, especially when security or data integrity, for example, are involved. Trying to hack on "safe" versions of functions, or even an entire "safe mode" is the wrong approach.

Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by knowtheory on Sunday February 03, 2013 @09:42AM (#5159780)
I have never, ever, not even once, in my 8 years working with rails had to call YAML.load myself in an app.

Changing how Rails or other libs process YAML is a behavior that can and should be performed transparently to users. And besides, most people processing user input aren't accepting YAML. It is extremely weird that Rails was accepting YAML in XML requests. It is slightly more understandable that Rails was using a YAML parser to parse JSON (although not a good idea as we've seen). But by and large, if you have an API that accepts user data, standard practice is to parse JSON, not YAML.

Your analogy is not correct.

Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by SilasX on Sunday February 03, 2013 @05:43PM (#5161533)
I never thought I'd see "Rails" and "transparent" in the same sentence...
Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by thibaut_barrere on Sunday February 03, 2013 @12:08PM (#5160201)
Nice generalization!

Safe_yaml is a first drop-in work-around that can be dumped into existing apps: a fix to quickly reduce the risk of exposure. If you have a proper set of tests in your app, it's fast to verify if something is broken here after starting using it.

But then, the underlying issue is being discussed actively [1], with talks about how to incorporate the safe default into coming versions of Ruby.

So I don't really see the parallel with what you describe...

[1] https://github.com/tenderlove/psych/issues/119

Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by lukeschlather on Sunday February 03, 2013 @10:01AM (#5159836)
Composing Mysql manually is a Bad Idea, and the safe version is not safe because the algorithm is fundamentally flawed. People need to be doing parametrized queries. The reason novices can't adapt to PHP is that the library design is bad to begin with. I don't think either Python or Ruby has this problem. I don't think anyone will be confused because suddenly YAML.load doesn't execute arbitrary code.
Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by jrochkind1 on Sunday February 03, 2013 @10:50AM (#5159961)
> I don't think anyone will be confused because suddenly YAML.load doesn't execute arbitrary code.

An example of where people would be confused because YAML.load doesn't _instantiate arbitrary objects_ (which is what it really does, which results in ability to 'execute arbitrary code' as a poorly thought through side effect) -- is people using ActiveRecord::Base.serialize . Which would become broken if you were serializing any objects that weren't string, hash, integer, array.

While we've realized that allowing de-serialization of arbitrary objects ends up being incredibly likely to result in 'allowing execution of arbitrary code' -- referring to the problem simply as the latter confuses about the nature of the problem and the efficacy of various fixes.

Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by yichi on Sunday February 03, 2013 @05:26PM (#5161470)
except when in PHP you occasionally have a feature that itself is a security hole by definition, aka. register_globals
Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by camus on Sunday February 03, 2013 @11:57AM (#5160161)
that's why next php versions should remove all that crap and only keep PDO , things must be breaking , libraries that use deprecated stuffs should not be used period.

Removing confusing stuffs in a language makes it better, but php language designers dont have a clue.

Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by patio11 on Sunday February 03, 2013 @04:30AM (#5159199)
I like that project but have been trying to avoid saying "Use this!" because I haven't personally audited it and am scared that Rails devs might adopt it and think it means it definitively resolves all of their issues for February, which it might not.
Re:On Python security amidst recent Rails/YAML vulnerabilities by thibaut_barrere on Sunday February 03, 2013 @04:47AM (#5159226)
So far, people I've seen using it are "security-aware" developers who know there is always a remaining risk and who are just trying to reduce the surface attack a bit.

For the others, well, we'll have to educate them, or push a safe yaml default quickly into Ruby [1].

This is no holy grail for sure, and there are plenty of other topics to be addressed (eg: secret tokens stored in SCM, pushed to third-party CI services and shared with freelancers and remote employees using non-encrypted disk, shared as well between production and non-regularly updated staging servers etc!)

[1] https://github.com/tenderlove/psych/issues/119