News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by AnthonyMouse on Wednesday January 23, 2013 @10:01PM (#5106889)
As far as I can tell, Auernheimer is indeed a spectacular idiot. But that's kind of the problem. What he did was idiotic but still shouldn't have been criminal. What he did was, in is essence, pointing out that AT&T was allowing people worse than he is to easily get access to this information. Proof by demonstration, in a way that was almost entirely harmless -- no one malicious was given access to any new information, since the actual malicious parties could have about as easily exploited the exact same vulnerability if these idiots had done nothing.

But here's the thing. Screw Auernheimer. Forget about him. He's a jerk, nobody is going to be motivated to fix anything to help someone like that. He opens his mouth and stupid comes out and it makes otherwise helpful people dislike him.

And we need to fix the laws. For everyone. Not even these idiots deserve to be felons. But I agree that we shouldn't be touting them as examples, because they probably smell funny and it would be a great shame for the stench to rub off.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by rayiner on Wednesday January 23, 2013 @10:36PM (#5107023)
> What he did was idiotic but still shouldn't have been criminal.

The idiot kids who sneak into a factory to see what there is to see are criminals. Should they be felons? No, but under the CFAA, simply breaching a digital boundary is a misdemeanor. It's only when it is in the furtherance of another criminal act that it is potentially punishable as a felony.[1]

In this case, that last bit is predicated on a NJ statute which requires: "defendant `knowingly or recklessly discloses or causes to be disclosed any data . . . or personal identifying information.’"

If the jury finds he didn't disclose or cause to be disclosed any personal information, the NJ statute won't have been violated, and the CFAA charge will reduce to a misdemeanor.

See: http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2012/11/unauthorized-access-i....

[1] I should point out that I'm not a fan of such "escalation" provisions.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by AnthonyMouse on Wednesday January 23, 2013 @11:44PM (#5107404)
>The idiot kids who sneak into a factory to see what there is to see are criminals.

I don't know if that's the right analogy. That's part of the problem: I think legutierr is on to something with the issue that every time we talk about the CFAA we try to come up with strained analogies, because we can't conceptualize why the specific thing that someone did to a computer is wrong. Why is this like sneaking into a factory and not like reading a list of their other customers' email addresses that AT&T has mistakenly printed on the back of everyone's billing statement?

I still think the whole notion of "unauthorized access" is the wrong way to go. If someone breaks into your computer and intentionally deletes your data, vandalism. If they take credit card numbers and use or sell them, identity theft. So on and so forth. If all they do is fiddle with a URL or prove to you that your security is not what you thought it was without damaging anything or committing any other crime, why does that have to be a crime in itself? It seems like all that does is chill the propensity for security experts to point out vulnerabilities when they see them, for fear that embarrassing the system's operator will result in retaliatory pressing of charges, and give prosecutors a catch all to charge people with when they can't make a case based on anything else.

This is almost a case in point. These defendants are royal jerks. They're sitting around contemplating everything from blackmail to securities fraud, but in this specific case it doesn't seem like they've actually done anything like that, just talked about it like pompous idiots. So they get charged with the CFAA, because it catches almost everybody whether they've really done anything or not, even though from what I can tell all they actually did was publicize that AT&T's poor security was putting AT&T's customers' personal information at risk. I don't know how convinced I am that the fact that they did it in a stupid and immature way should send them to jail.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by rayiner on Wednesday January 23, 2013 @11:54PM (#5107451)
> Why is this like sneaking into a factory and not like reading a list of their other customers' email addresses that AT&T has mistakenly printed on the back of everyone's billing statement?

Because it requires intentional effort to find information that is intended to be private. It requires you to "walk through the door." The digital equivalent of your scenario is if AT&T accidentally e-mailed their customer list to everyone along with their e-bills.

> I still think the whole notion of "unauthorized access" is the wrong way to go. If someone breaks into your computer and intentionally deletes your data, vandalism. If they take credit card numbers and use or sell them, identity theft. So on and so forth. If all they do is fiddle with a URL or prove to you that your security is not what you thought it was without damaging anything or committing any other crime, why does that have to be a crime in itself?

I disagree. I don't think the digital world should be treated any differently than the real world. In the real world, we enforce boundaries in their own right, with minimal penalties unless it is accompanied by another crime. We do so to discourage people from poking around where they shouldn't, because such poking around is highly correlated with actual crime. Allowing people to poke around freely makes enforcement hard. Everyone who actually did something wrong is going to claim "oh I was just poking around." This rationale translates just fine into the digital world.

> It seems like all that does is chill the propensity for security experts to point out vulnerabilities when they see them

Why can't security researchers get consent from their subjects to do experiments on them, like every other kind of researcher? Should my doctor be allowed to test his pet theories on me while treating unrelated conditions, on a "no harm no foul" basis?

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by tptacek on Thursday January 24, 2013 @12:40AM (#5107679)
They can and do get consent before looking for vulnerabilities.

The idea that security researchers are or even should be free to poke at random websites for vulnerabilities so they can "inform the public" is a myth. It's a meme that's seen most of its spread over the last few years. A couple years ago, most professional researchers would warn you not to test public web applications for flaws. People have gotten into serious legal trouble for doing that.

The C.W. on this has obviously changed. But I don't think the law has!

The best web application shops post pages, like 37signals, or Github, or Google, inviting researchers and instructing them how to report their findings. If you're concerned that you might be using an application that would sue or press charges for someone conducting unauthorized security tests, just stick to the ones that have security pages.

The web applications that don't post pages like this? Don't poke them. It's illegal and (you'd know better than me, Rayiner) probably a tort, which means you can get sued for it right through your corporate liability protection.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by AnthonyMouse on Thursday January 24, 2013 @01:44AM (#5108017)
>Because it requires intentional effort to find information that is intended to be private. It requires you to "walk through the door."

There is no door though. The digital equivalent of your scenario is Tron.

An intentionally publicly accessible computer doesn't have well-defined boundaries. The line between authorized and unauthorized is very fuzzy, which is not a good feature in criminal law. Especially where defendants are characteristically individuals without the resources to defend their interpretation of the law in court.

>We do so to discourage people from poking around where they shouldn't, because such poking around is highly correlated with actual crime.

That seems like a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you criminalize poking around then only criminals will poke around. There are also much better reasons for prohibiting it in physical space than on the internet. Industrial equipment can be dangerous and cause massive property damage or personal injury if you mess with it. Invading someone's home impacts their physical security. These are rarely if ever the case with computers. Servers are (or should be) backed up, so even where there is highly valuable data, the extent of destruction someone can accidentally cause is limited to the cost of restoring backups, and reckless or intentional damage would continue to be illegal.

Harmless poking around also has the benefit of revealing vulnerabilities before they get revealed through malicious poking around. A kid who sneaks through your literal open window and starts nosing around in your house is not pointing out a critical security vulnerability; you know that your window is open. There is no benefit to the homeowner, the kid is just a pest. But computers have higher security requirements: The equivalent of an open window is a major failing in need of immediate attention, because if a kid can get in then so can foreign criminal syndicates, and if they get in they'll be doing more than poking around.

>Allowing people to poke around freely makes enforcement hard. Everyone who actually did something wrong is going to claim "oh I was just poking around."

Won't the fact that they actually did something wrong give lie to that claim? The ones who are actually doing something wrong will be found making charges to purloined credit card numbers or modifying shipping information in databases or the like. I suppose you may catch someone in the act before they have an opportunity to do any such thing, but if you have someone who is really trying to do wrong, isn't it better to extend the investigation so as to be able to charge them with the serious crime they actually intended than to roll them up right away on a minor offense?

>Why can't security researchers get consent from their subjects to do experiments on them, like every other kind of researcher?

Discovering vulnerabilities in production servers is not really research, it's more like being a plumber or a firefighter. There may be professionals who are paid to do it, but if you see water leaking or smell smoke, taking a moment to do some cursory looking around to see if there is a serious underlying problem should be just part of being a good citizen.

As for asking permission, the trouble is that the transaction cost consumes the transaction. If someone goes to a website and notices that the URL has a 'userid=1157' appended to it, the natural thing to do is to try putting in 'userid=1158' and see what happens, because the two most overwhelmingly likely things are either for it to produce an access denied error and be harmless, or to log you in as a different user and be harmless as long as you don't further abuse that fact. And 99 times out of 100 it will be the first one. Which is why requiring permission breaks the propensity for good people to help out: If the expectation is for people to ask permission before doing something like that, the website operator is going to have anyone who notices that asking about it, and if it isn't broken then it gets annoying, which annoyance is conveyed to the people asking about it so that in the future they stop asking and stop helping. Which is I think what we see: Security people mostly don't poke websites because the law prohibits it, so security flaws don't get identified until the bad guys identify them.

I would also distinguish this from doing something like SQL injection or exploiting a buffer overflow, which can reasonably be expected to cause a denial of service or data corruption. In those cases there could be a charge for something like reckless disregard for damaging a computer system as opposed to purely for unauthorized access.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by anigbrowl on Thursday January 24, 2013 @02:01AM (#5108089)
Especially where defendants are characteristically individuals without the resources to defend their interpretation of the law in court.

Not true. Just because you may have to rely on a public defender doesn't mean your legal theory would have legs with a better lawyer.

A kid who sneaks through your literal open window and starts nosing around in your house is not pointing out a critical security vulnerability; you know that your window is open. There is no benefit to the homeowner, the kid is just a pest. But computers have higher security requirements: The equivalent of an open window is a major failing in need of immediate attention, because if a kid can get in then so can foreign criminal syndicates, and if they get in they'll be doing more than poking around.

That's true as a pragmatic matter, but it is not your decision to make about other people's systems. I can think of cases where an open window is a critical security vulnerability; kids can fall out of them, medical or legal papers may be accessible to third parties and put the subject of those papers in jeopardy and so on. But that doesn't entitle me to climb through the window in order to demonstrate or draw the homeowner's or business operator's attention to the risks of the open window.

While it's quite true that AT&T was doing its customers a disservice here, and I have no problem with people observing and commenting upon that fact, it's their computer system, not yours. You don't have a right to poke around there just because you have the know-how to build/operate a more secure system. I doubt you would appreciate a private security company representative turning up in your living room to harangue you about your open window. You would rightly tell him that a) it's not his business and b) if he wants to help, ring the fucking doorbell first, rather than publishing an directory of what's inside your house.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by davesims on Wednesday January 23, 2013 @10:19PM (#5106945)
I get it, but the flip side is that if Auernheimer is brought into the same discussion, do we not risk alienating a public likely very sympathetic to Swartz's plight?

In other words, if it's possible that legal reform designed to prevent cases like Aaron's from occuring again, could also let bad actors like Auernheimer off the hook, that could undermine support for the reform.

As far as whether Auernheimer is a felon, I still don't know. It's one thing to find a vulnerability, it's another thing entirely to not only not report it, but exploit it and openly discuss how to use the results to cause significant material harm.

Reported actions of Auernheimer in the AT&T case:

- Did not report the vulnerability but sat on it and refined a script to exploit the data and debated how and who in the press to report the vulnerability to in order to inflict the most economic damage.

- Harvested over 114k emails.

Alleged quotes of Auernheimer:

- "I don't see the point unless we phish for passes even then that's boring"

- "[A]t this point we won. we dropepd [sic] the stock price," Auernheimer wrote. "[L]et's not like do anything else we fking win and i get to like spin us as a legitimate security organization."

Very, very hard to be sympathetic here. He exploited a vulnerability, stole information and discussed at length how to use it to inflict damage. Weigh into that his past malicious behavior, and I wonder if he's not getting off easy.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by nookiemonster on Wednesday January 23, 2013 @10:38PM (#5107040)
I want this anecdote about weev to be the first thing that people talk about when someone brings up any comparison to Weev.

http://bedizen.livejournal.com/258763.html

Comparing Weev to Aaron is like comparing the dali lama to hitler. Weev is actively cultivating this comparison. DO NOT FEED THE FUCKING TROLL.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by josephlord on Thursday January 24, 2013 @05:27AM (#5108784)
From what I've heard Weev is an Ass and Aaron was a superhero. You don't need to compare them however to see similarities in how they were treated and the problems with the US "Justice" system.

Prosecutorial bullying and overreach is bad whoever it is done to (even if they are an Ass/Hitler).

Do you want 10 years to be the normal sentence (or even the prosecutors threat) for crawling URLs and reporting the privacy breaching results to the news media?

In my view some of the behaviour in the story that you linked to is MORE criminal than the actions against AT&T. If evidence can be found for that I would be fully in favour of that prosecution but the he's done all these horrible things that we can't prove so lets trump up a minor issue we can prove concept doesn't feel like a secure route to freedom and justice for anybody. If the linked information could all be proved in court to be Weev I would be happy for him to get 1-2 years in prison for harassment or longer if it is a pattern of behaviour against other people too but for the AT&T "hack" anything over a month or two would seem excessive to me.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by davesims on Thursday January 24, 2013 @09:53AM (#5109776)
"Do you want 10 years to be the normal sentence (or even the prosecutors threat) for crawling URLs and reporting the privacy breaching results to the news media?"

This is such a sanitized version. I'm open to being corrected here, but afaik the 'crawling' in question was done by a script written and refined for the expressed purpose of harvesting data, with intent to cause material economic harm to AT&T, which they did. They sat on the vulnerability for days while discussing at length how to perform the 'report' in such a way as to cause the most negative effect.

They knew full well what they were doing was illegal and were afraid of being caught and discussed it.

Let's state it again in a less-sanitized fashion: They found a vulnerability, did not report it, exploited the vulnerability and stole data with the stated intent to cause material harm and/or sell said data, and actually brought about said economic harm.

People defending weev are making it sound like some guy tweaked a value in his browser url bar, ran to AT&T and said 'look what I found', and had his home promptly raided. Hence the ridiculous top comment on slashdot, "America has lost its fucking mind."

Let us not, as the hacker community, lose ours over this. What weev did was malicious and illegal and harmful and if we appear to defend him I'm afraid we undermine the cause of Aaron's case and the possibility of curtailing real prosecutorial aggresion. I really don't think it was the case at all with weev.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by josephlord on Thursday January 24, 2013 @10:19AM (#5109936)
I said crawling URLs not tweaking address bars (implying scripted mass process). The other point is that the sentence in this case whether reasonable for other reasons or not will be a reference point for future prosecutions against less unlikeable people.

Legally in the US there seems to be very little protection for privacy (unlike copyright) whereas in the UK Sony has just been fined £250K for failing to adequately secure personal data (PSN hack).

Should this person have collected more than 100K email addresses? - NO.

Should they have blown the whistle or reported it straight away? - YES

Were they criminal? Probably just about.

Does what they joked about matter? No unless they actually tried to do it.

Does the fact that they wanted to harm AT&T matter? Not much for me, AT&T harmed themselves and while discoverers of the flaw could mitigate AT&T's harm and these guys chose not to for me that doesn't turn it into a crime although possible does suggest additional sentencing is appropriate.

Is 10 years an appropriate sentence for accessing information that legally had less legal protection than copyright works? Definitely not in my view.

Re:Andrew Auernheimer case uncomfortably similar to Aaron Sw... by davesims on Thursday January 24, 2013 @10:46AM (#5110084)
It's 10 years max, and no that doesn't seem disproportionate to me at all, given that you have stated malicious intent and actual material harm. I can think of white-collar crimes that have similar effect (dumping stock, insider info) that carry bigger max sentences.

I also completely disagree that AT&T 'harmed themselves'. This to me is grey-hat rationalizing/hand-washing. "It's not my fault that your security sucks. I just, you know, exploited it, harvested hundreds of thousands of emails, highlighted the most important executive and government official emails and released them in as public a manner as possible, potentially causing hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars worth of economic damage and loss of reputation."

Sorry, to me a max 10 years is light, compared to the kinds of white-collar sentences we've seen for stuff like insider trading. They stole the data. They sat on it. They tried to release it in such a way as to cause harm, and the potential dollar-value risk for AT&T and all their employees was huge. Think of the massive hit RSA took when their data was stolen. It doesn't matter how "easy" the hack was: what matters is intent, action and effect. All three, to me, are clear-cut here. I don't see how weev could expect any different outcome.