For why I think it's unrealistic to go all-in on signed integers in C, it's because sizeof is unsigned, and most APIs dealing with lengths use size_t, and there are lot of pitfalls when mixing signed and unsigned types.
But I agree that there's a good case for using signed for the task behind that CVE. As I said, there are compelling reasons. But OpenSSL is a case study in the pitfalls with mixing signed and unsigned in C code.
With unsigned you only need one check: 'i < bound', it works always, regardless how i is computed, and it doesn't matter if the calculation overflowed or wrapped around, still works.
With signed you need: 'i >= 0 && i < bound', and you need to be very careful how you calculate i because overflow is undefined behavior.
If `bound` is unsigned and experiences accidental wrap-around due to underflow, the simple `i < bound` check fails open: most values of i pass against the unintentionally-huge `bound`. The signed version fails closed (no i passes both i >= 0 and i < bound), which is usually safer.
That’s how the argument goes, anyway. You’re right that using signed means a missing `>= 0` check can be a problem, as well as all the risks of signed-overflow UB.
No perfect solution in C.
Not that are wraparound CVEs in Rust as well, so there is no perfect solution even outside of C.
There was just a nginx issue that highlights how problematic the use of unsigned is in this context: CVE -2026-123007