Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1...
by dbaupp on Friday November 20, 2026 @07:18AM
(#50573693)
The issue with accidental overflow leading to wrap-around is also relevant to the value of `bound`.
If `bound` is unsigned and experiences accidental wrap-around due to underflow, the simple `i < bound` check fails open: most values of i pass against the unintentionally-huge `bound`. The signed version fails closed (no i passes both i >= 0 and i < bound), which is usually safer.
That’s how the argument goes, anyway. You’re right that using signed means a missing `>= 0` check can be a problem, as well as all the risks of signed-overflow UB.
No perfect solution in C.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1...
by uecker on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:41AM
(#50577532)
The N >= 0 check you often get automatically using sanitizers, e.g. when using an array [N] somewhere, or by concerting to size_t at last moment and then getting a size which is so big that allocation is guaranteed to fail.
Not that are wraparound CVEs in Rust as well, so there is no perfect solution even outside of C.
With unsigned you only need one check: 'i < bound', it works always, regardless how i is computed, and it doesn't matter if the calculation overflowed or wrapped around, still works.
With signed you need: 'i >= 0 && i < bound', and you need to be very careful how you calculate i because overflow is undefined behavior.