News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by wahern on Friday November 20, 2026 @12:24AM (#50570495)
Not everybody recommends size_t. There's a sizeable community of people absolutely convinced most integers, including length and capacity integers, should be signed. And they stick to their guns even for C and C++. They have some very compelling logical arguments on their side, but IMO in languages like C and C++ they're just fatally unrealistic.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by uecker on Friday November 20, 2026 @01:04AM (#50570755)
Why unrealistic? I was in the unsigned camp a long time ago and switched to signed types for indexing and sizes, and this made many problems go a way.

There was just a nginx issue that highlights how problematic the use of unsigned is in this context: CVE -2026-123007

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by wahern on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:33AM (#50571355)
From a brief look, I'd say there were several wrong turns made that led to CVE-2026-123007.

For why I think it's unrealistic to go all-in on signed integers in C, it's because sizeof is unsigned, and most APIs dealing with lengths use size_t, and there are lot of pitfalls when mixing signed and unsigned types.

But I agree that there's a good case for using signed for the task behind that CVE. As I said, there are compelling reasons. But OpenSSL is a case study in the pitfalls with mixing signed and unsigned in C code.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by uecker on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:49AM (#50577698)
The way to deal with APIs which use size_t and which works for me is to convert at the last moment.
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by reillyrider on Friday November 20, 2026 @05:04AM (#50572522)
Why would anyone prefer signed for indexing and sizes?

With unsigned you only need one check: 'i < bound', it works always, regardless how i is computed, and it doesn't matter if the calculation overflowed or wrapped around, still works.

With signed you need: 'i >= 0 && i < bound', and you need to be very careful how you calculate i because overflow is undefined behavior.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by dbaupp on Friday November 20, 2026 @07:18AM (#50573693)
The issue with accidental overflow leading to wrap-around is also relevant to the value of `bound`.

If `bound` is unsigned and experiences accidental wrap-around due to underflow, the simple `i < bound` check fails open: most values of i pass against the unintentionally-huge `bound`. The signed version fails closed (no i passes both i >= 0 and i < bound), which is usually safer.

That’s how the argument goes, anyway. You’re right that using signed means a missing `>= 0` check can be a problem, as well as all the risks of signed-overflow UB.

No perfect solution in C.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by uecker on Friday November 20, 2026 @11:41AM (#50577532)
The N >= 0 check you often get automatically using sanitizers, e.g. when using an array [N] somewhere, or by concerting to size_t at last moment and then getting a size which is so big that allocation is guaranteed to fail.

Not that are wraparound CVEs in Rust as well, so there is no perfect solution even outside of C.

Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by jurf on Friday November 20, 2026 @02:40AM (#50571397)
ssize_t
Re:OpenSSL: Buffer overflow in EVP_EncodeBlock() (CVE-2026-1... by ozgrakkurt on Friday November 20, 2026 @03:15AM (#50571659)
This is anachronistic imo. There is no point of using signed or larger than needed integers when programming in a modern way.

You have fuzzing, test coverage checks, overflow checks, static analysis, llm review. There is no conceivable reason why you might have a problem with using an u16 for a buffer length.

Even reading the PR comments shows that these libraries are just really low quality.

They are discussing if they should check the error return on callsites now that they made a function fallible.