In any case, I use Matrix for anything FOSDEM related and I have see 1 of these errors over the last year, said user said they replied from withing an Android notification fwiw.
That's not the issue(s) I'm referring to. And typical of Matrix's lack of engagement with weaknesses and issues that have been raised several times. They continue to neglect the issues their protocol has.
This podcast goes into some of the details: https://securitycryptographywhatever.com/2022/11/02/Matrix-w...
However, I would be prepared for a "we fixed those issues" claim which really amounts to shallow fixes that move the issue elsewhere.
The proposal to move to MLS was accepted for a lot of reasons, reasons that have not, or cannot be addressed with their current protocol.
https://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.io/static/paper.pdf
I don't know how much things have changed, but this is the paper's conclusion:
"We presented six attacks that together invalidated the fundamental security promises made by Matrix’ end-to-end encryption against a malicious server. In particular, the version of Matrix as implemented in Element and analysed here neither provided confidentiality nor authentication against such an attacker."
My weak understanding is that if you're using it just for internal use / between friends then it doesn't have as much effect - but in public rooms anyone with a server that joins can decrypt your messages.
I think Element is slowly (slowly) working on improving security.
https://element.io/blog/element-web-device-verification-beco...
You also have to remember that this is a million times better than the status quo: Teams. Cleartext directly to the US.
> You also have to remember that this is a million times better than the status quo: Teams. Cleartext directly to the US.
I would agree with this, but it's also being proposed to replace things like Signal.
https://cfp.2026.matrix.org/matrix-conference-2026/talk/G9XJ...
https://cfp.2026.matrix.org/matrix-conference-2026/talk/7GYB...
Having said that if they were upfront about the shortcomings of the current protocol, I doubt some agencies in Europe would have chosen Matrix. Then there’s the promise to add MLS at some point. My guess is that’s years away: in the Q&A of one of their talks, they said they don’t yet know how to make MLS work with a decentralized architecture.
Yes, arewemlsyet.com is stale as it refers to a much earlier project to swap Olm/Megolm for MLS, which lost funding in 2023. But these days the work is progressing again, as per the linked talks. We'll update arewemlsyet.com to reflect that.
In terms of Matrix's encryption being a "disaster" - the only concrete problem I'm aware of is the fact that group membership is server-controlled, so that a malicious server could add a visible malicious user (not device) to a room by spoofing an invite. The MLS work and other projects is addressing that, but how big a problem this really is in practice depends on their threat model.
As of now you seem to suggest that lack of e2ee outweighs probable safety and security because there's little chance of inviting a third party to the chat.
For transparency: I work as a technical engineer for Element.
I'd love if people check out some of the talks that recently were held on the Matrix conf, so allow me to share some :D
How encryption works in Matrix: https://media.ccc.de/v/matrix-conference-2026-98869-how-encr...
New phone who dis: User verification using X.509 certificates: https://media.ccc.de/v/matrix-conference-2026-100422-new-pho...
The caveat: If a single user from a large public server (like matrix.org) or a third-party server joins your room, that entire remote server becomes a "participating server." It receives a full copy of the room's unencrypted metadata—including who is talking to whom, user IDs, timestamps, display names, and room membership history—and stores it indefinitely.
Also, isn't it made by Israeli telecom guys? I mean I guess nobody can accuse them of not having read the room
And the team worked on telecom stuff for a brazilian company as far as I remember.
> On May 31, 2005, it was announced in Israel that Israeli police and Interpol discovered ahuge computer espionage ring involving a number of former Israeli intelligence officers and Israelicompanies, including AMDOCS. Israeli police questioned AMDOCS computer security manager Eitan Shiron in the investigation that surrounded the use by over a dozen Israeli companies of asophisticated hacking software program, called a Trojan horse, which bypassed the security controlson targeted computer systems
No.
> Also, isn't it made by Israeli telecom guys?
No.
> https://wire.com/en/blog/matrix-not-safe-eu-data-privacy
Regarding Israel:
So its lead developers were not working at Amdocs when it was first created?
Amdocs acquired the companies which hired the team who created Matrix, who happened to be based in UK and France. So no, we’re not Israeli telecom guys, and left Amdocs almost 10 years ago.
I applaud the people working on Matrix, it worthy project, but I feel the E2EE issues are at a level close to negligence.