I would not be surprised if something similar was involved here. It worked with stuxnet, too.
Unspecified computer parts were interdicted by US intelligence while being shipped to Neda Industrial and infected with Stuxnet. Four other external vendors working on the enrichment plant were also compromised, likely by Israeli intelligence physically entering buildings.
Stuxnet then spread across each companies internal networks and onto USB drives that were then carried into the facility and plugged into the air gapped network.
Beyond that it's also typically blocked by GPO prohibiting USB, so even if that were the case, the net result would be no real data transfer and a nice email to the DA mailgroup about the workstation and logged in user who triggered the alert.
There are a couple of things to keep in mind with nsanet though:
- It can handle anywhere between confidential to TS//SCI information
- It is largely (completely?) an off-infra network, meaning that it doesn't run over the same infrastructure that the open internet uses. It uses an entirely(?) discrete backbone. SIPRNET uses similar architecture.
- You cannot easily cross pollinate data from unclassified networks to nsanet. Everything from removable media to EMSEC is considered prohibited without proper channels being informed and paperwork being performed.
- Lastly, we're unaware of the timing of this supposed source. This could have been over the last week or a month ago or <n>. Scant detail is given, so I'm unwilling to believe "lolz nsa pwnd" just yet.