Shuttle started at 1:10 and ended with 1:90 chance of loss of crew. That was bad and got it canceled as soon as the station was built, and supposedly ISS was finished only because international obligations. The last mission to extend Hubble's life was almost canceled because the NASA admin thought it was too dangerous.
NASA wanted 1:270 (so just "3 times safer than shuttle at the end of the shuttle program") from commercial crew (i.e. SpaceX Crew Dragon and Boeing Starliner).
Current US law for commercial space works on consent: passengers sign a waiver saying they know it's dangerous, and then the company doesn't have to promise safety the way an airline does. The company is on the hook for debris and innocent bystanaders on the ground though.
SpaceX plan to fly Starship a lot and gain so much experience they can find and fix all problems and reach airline safety. At least private jet level of safety, at a start.
There are multiple layers of risk consent, from engineering, safety, medical, and crew, for NASA. Of those, I think crew are the least likely to say no because they tend to come from a very risk tolerant population.
Whatever official spec that did or did not exist is irrelevant.
If you hire a contractor to build a 2000 sqft house and then after it’s built complain to them that it’s not big enough, the problem is literally the requirement you gave them.
I don't think it's that hard. "We're not sure exactly how safe it is, and do not have any actual requirement that it meet any specific level of safety" is clearly not safe enough for manned flight. (At least not outside of war-time or other such times we're willing to take on extra risks)
Would you get on an elevator that has a weight limit listed as "hasn't fallen yet", "has only fallen that one time", or "did fall that one time, but not since the redesign". Would you trust millions of dollars of human training and several lives to such an elevator?
I think we can say that it wasn’t safe.
The point was that wasn’t explicitly defined up front…they seemed to have fallen into the same trap you did of “we’ll know it when we see it”. CCP has a loss of crew threshold of 0.37%.
We do not design civilian, optional, exploratory space missions with a threshold for acceptable fatalities. There is no number of dead astronauts that we can accept as a design goal.
Unforeseeable fatalities can happen, but death rate should not be a predetermined design parameter.
My comment is that a predetermined fatality rate is unacceptable. Not that unforeseen fatalities are unacceptable. Space programs playing Russian roulette is NOT the same thing as letting a few beetle parts into the Rice Krispies. If you can reasonably foresee that people WILL die (as happened on the space shuttle) you fix it.
I thought you were claiming that they were designing for an intentional failure rate when you said this
> The point was that wasn’t explicitly defined up front…they seemed to have fallen into the same trap you did of “we’ll know it when we see it”. CCP has a loss of crew threshold requirement of 0.37%.
I read your statement of a “requirement” of a crew loss threshold as being required losses. You seem to keep ignoring that I’m saying that no one is designing for intentional losses, and asserting that they are designing to hit a certain number of failures as a “requirement”
Ie, a reliability (survivability) requirement is functionally the same as an acceptable failure requirement. The confusion seems to be around whether that defines a maximum or a minimum.
FWIW I wasn’t deliberately ignoring that point. That’s why I made the distinction between “intentional” and “acceptable” in the GPP
That said, I do understand what you’re saying, that we can’t insist that we never start human commercial space travel unless it can be perfectly safe, and we can’t stop it every time there’s an accident. But that’s not quite the same thing as having an expected fatality rate that we find acceptable.
The linked reference does indeed give an acceptable rate. This doesn’t seem to be a curious discussion if you’re jumping to argue instead of engaging the answer provided.
It’s cool man, I think you’re wrong in your overall approach here, but it’s not worth arguing, agreed.
But if you ask a question and literally given the authoritative source but are too lazy to read it, maybe feed it into AI or something. That is, if you actually want the answer.
My pilot license has long expired, but I did work as a reliability engineer in aerospace. I'm telling you, this is how the design work operates. You are either being deliberately obtuse or misunderstanding what I'm saying. Nobody is "letting accidents slide". If a mishap occurs, it will be investigated. But when they are designing aircraft/spacecraft, failure modes are categorized on severity and probability to determine risk. Something that may be "catastrophic" must have a lower probability of occurrence than something that is "hazardous" and so on. If that risk is above a specified threshold the system must be redesigned to fall within the acceptable risk limits or, in the case of some space operations, waived by those with the technical authority to do so.
Since you follow accidents, I'm sure you are aware of the MCAS issue with Boeing. The Seattle Times had some good early reporting on how they misapplied their hazard analysis and characterization of that system if you want a real-world example with some public information available.
NTSB is an agency investigating accidents why would it define acceptable fatalities… Is it something like after an accident report they’d proclaim “enh, only 10 people died, we’re ok with that”? I just don’t see it. But sounds like you know more.
Maybe FAA has some cutoff before penalties kick in, but those are different agencies with different mandates (though NTSB is an appellate authority for FAA, maybe that’s what you meant…)
It had a failure rate of 2/135. Doing quick math its actual failure rate was about 1500/100,00 flights
But those “expected” rates are just guesstimates and not scientific. Feynman put it at about 1% given the engineering data available in 1986.
Yes. That’s why I asked for clarification. It’s like someone saying, “That costs too much“ And someone else asking “How much can you afford?” They are logically sequential statements.
You responding with “this other thing has a different price” doesn’t answer how much they can afford.
I’m sorry this so offended your delicate sensibilities. I suggest you append “do not reply with anything that isn’t exactly what I’ve asked for” to all of your future comments to avoid any more misunderstandings.
How are you measuring "safe enough" in this context? My understanding is that the Shuttle didn't have programmatic probabilistic requirements for mission safety. Ie, they didn't use overall reliability estimates and instead relied on engineering judgement (which the Challenger report showed varied widely depending on who you interviewed). It's hard to make a claim on whether it was safe enough without explicitly defining the safety goal.
Early 1970s documents were given safety requirements of 1:20 flights being successful. [1] That's the closest I've found to an actual requirement, and the shuttle record falls well within that requirement. I do think such an early spec is not a good basis for final performance, though.
[1] page 326: https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/19700005884/downloads/19...