That said, I do understand what you’re saying, that we can’t insist that we never start human commercial space travel unless it can be perfectly safe, and we can’t stop it every time there’s an accident. But that’s not quite the same thing as having an expected fatality rate that we find acceptable.
The linked reference does indeed give an acceptable rate. This doesn’t seem to be a curious discussion if you’re jumping to argue instead of engaging the answer provided.
It’s cool man, I think you’re wrong in your overall approach here, but it’s not worth arguing, agreed.
But if you ask a question and literally given the authoritative source but are too lazy to read it, maybe feed it into AI or something. That is, if you actually want the answer.
My pilot license has long expired, but I did work as a reliability engineer in aerospace. I'm telling you, this is how the design work operates. You are either being deliberately obtuse or misunderstanding what I'm saying. Nobody is "letting accidents slide". If a mishap occurs, it will be investigated. But when they are designing aircraft/spacecraft, failure modes are categorized on severity and probability to determine risk. Something that may be "catastrophic" must have a lower probability of occurrence than something that is "hazardous" and so on. If that risk is above a specified threshold the system must be redesigned to fall within the acceptable risk limits or, in the case of some space operations, waived by those with the technical authority to do so.
Since you follow accidents, I'm sure you are aware of the MCAS issue with Boeing. The Seattle Times had some good early reporting on how they misapplied their hazard analysis and characterization of that system if you want a real-world example with some public information available.